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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1, General Topic.
In the spring of 1922 there were given at Mansfield
College, Oxford, a series of lectures, on the Dale Found-
ation, which were shortly afterward published in two
volumes under the general title of a philosophy of civ-
1
ilization. They contain a statement of the philosophical
outlook of an Alsatian scholar, Dr. Albert Schweitzer,
who had already achieved distinction as a university
teacher, theologian, writer, musician and medical mission-
ary. The author, known most widely as writer of the
Ge3chlchte der Leben—Jesu-Forschung (Eng. tr., The Quest
of the Historical Jesus ) and as biographer of Bach, is,
as his accomplishments would indicate, a man of unusual
genius, range of intellectual achievements, and spiritual
vigor. His work in philosophy expresses these qualities.
It is not a piece of technical literature, and in fact
it abjures, for reasons which are grounded in its view-
point, many of the topics and problems which constitute
the material of professional discussion. It is, however,
the work of a scholar who is philosophically trained, who
in a work on Kant's philosophy of religion has shown him-
self master of the most critical philosophical spirit and
method, and who is freely at home with the detail and
inner spirit of philosophical thought.

2Of Schweitzer's Kulturphilosophle one may say, as the
noted French organist and composer Charles M. Widor said of
his treatment of Bach, that it is a work with horizons.
The outlook embodied in it arises from a survey, of uncommon
extent for any individual, of the spiritual accomplishments
of man (religious, artistic, historical, and scientific),
and from the material of a peculiarly rich and intense
spiritual activity. Schweitzer has, further, a way of pen-
etrating to the heart of thought, and of keeping clear, in
the midst of elaboration, the main themes and motives. He
approaches philosophy not from the standpoint of treatment
of a body of academic material, but from that of a thinking
man who wishes to know what persistent and ordered thought
has secured or can achieve in answer to the problems of
man's relation to himself and to the world. The project is
comprehensive and elemental, and its execution is direct
and vigorous as is the character of the author. It frankly
acknowledges that it is not disinterested, but it asks what
honest, open, and undistorted grounds it has for its inter-
ests. It asks whether active optimism and ethical will
have a basis in reality, and seeks to find whether there
can be secured for the ideals of civilization any "real
and permanent foundation in thought."
In this work, as in all Schweitzer' s writings, one has
the sense of dealing with a vitally earnest and deeply
sincere spiritual effort. Where one disagrees with it as
well as where one agrees, the conviction remains that it is

a significant work, and that its writing is a positive con-
tribution to thought about philosophical problems. It is no
ordinary work, or one that can be forgotten. The impression
of it is unescapable. There is here (not entirely in the two
volumes in question taken by themselves, but in the life of
the man as a whole, and here expressed) a significant and
fruitful outlook through which life finds meaning, unity and
direction. A spiritual achievement of this sort is so much
the common and necessary objective of life, and so rare as an
actual accomplishment, at least in any individually reflect-
ive way, that one cannot but wish to understand and appraise
it.
2. Albert Schweitzer, The Man.
(1) Life. Before any further statement of the objects,
interests, and problems of the study is undertaken, it would
be helpful to know more of the life and character of the man
in whose world-view we are interested. Albert Schweitzer
was born on January 14, 1875, in Upper Alsace as the son of
an Evangelical minister. His father was then pastor in the
town of Kaysersberg, but removed six months later to Gu'nsbach,
which remained the family home. There he passed what he has
called a delightful childhood, with the companionship of a
younger brother and three sisters, of whom one was older than
himself.
In the home there existed the influence of culture and of
religion. On both his mother's and father's side there was
musical ability, and also what might be called a clerical

4tradition. The spirit was not in any way narrow, however,
but intellectually rationalistic and creedally liberal. There
was the discipline of a well-regulated home, but with it
respect for the personality and the real convictions of the
children. Though in the mother there was a marked reserve
in feeling, the relation between parents and children was one
of companionship and free confident communication.
Meagerness of financial resources cast a shadow upon the
home for some time, and engendered constant anxiety and denial
during the years of Schweitzer's youth. Then a small fortune
left by a distant relative banished the worst of the money-
worries, and during the last years of his school-time, as
Schweitzer expresses it, "lag. . . .wieder voller Sonnenschein
1 2
ilber meinem Vaterhaus." Schweitzer's youth, he testifies,
was on the whole a happy one, in which the harmony and under-
standing between children and parents was the chief contrib-
uting element. The consciousness of undeserved good fortune
(in health, strength, and happiness of youth) and of respon-
sibility for it, constituted in fact, Schweitzer relates, one
of the two strongest experiences of his early years, of which
the other one was sympathy with the pain which prevailed
round about in the world.
Schweitzer's formal education began in the village school.
This was not common for the children of the educated class,
who began directly in the Gymnasium, but for the fact
Schweitzer says he has all his life been glad. Prom it came
a knowledge of the village children and a respect for their

equal powers. No doubt much of the genuine social democracy
which is so pronounced in him is due to it. At the age of
nine, however, he began attending the Realschule at Ll&nster, at
a distance of about two miles, which he daily walked. The
following year, at the generous invitation of his godfather,
and grandfather's half-brother, who was director of the
elementary schools of M&Lhausen, he went to live with him
and his wife, "Aunt" Sophie, in order to attend the Gymnasium
of that city. Life there was under strictest discipline and
regulation, but was enriched by reading (for which he had a
great passion), discussion, and music. The course at the
Gymnasium was finished when Schweitzer was eighteen, and in
the fall of 1893 he went to the University of Strassburg to
study theology. In the spring of 1898 he passed the state
examination in theology; and a scholarship which he won,
which carried with it the expectation that he would work for
the degree of Licentiate, enabled him to study in Paris and
Berlin. The following winter semester was thus spent at the
Sorbonne; and the summer semester, at the University of Berlin.
While in Paris Schweitzer made a critical study of Kantian
philosophy of religion, presenting a dissertation with the
subject Die
,tRellglonsphllosophlsche Sklzze" der Krltlk der
relnen Vernunft for the degree of doctor of philosophy, which
he received in 1899, and publishing during the same year a
larger work on Kant's philosophy of religion. On his return
to Strassburg after the travel-year he became assistant pastor
in St. Nicholas' Church, a position which he held for ten

years while also engaged in university work. In 1900 he
received the degree of Licentiate in Theology, and in 1902
"became a Privatdocent on the theological faculty. His
dissertation in theology, with addition of other material had
"been published in 1901 under the title Das Abendmahl 1m Zu-
sammenhang mit dem Leben Jesu . In 1904 a study of Bach
appeared, and in 1905 Schweitzer was made honorary organist
of the Paris Bach Society. The latter year, however, he came
to the decision to go as a medical missionary to the natives
of Africa. He began medical study; and at the end of 1912,
received a degree in medicine. In the meantime there were
published, a work on the critical investigation of the life
of Jesus, the Von Relmarus zu Wrede, Elne G-eschl chte der
Leben-Jesu-Fors chung, which made him internationally known
as a theologian; a study of French and German organ construc-
tion and playing; a history of the critical study of Paulin-
1
ism; and a work on the mental health of Jesus. At Easter
time, 1913, he set out for a mission station in Equatorial
Africa, where, with the financial aid of proceeds from his
books and music, and of gifts from friends, he erected a
small hospital, and, with the assistance of only his wife
and native helpers, he cared for the sick of the district
until war conditions made the continuation of the work im-
possible and forced his return to Europe in 1917. The need
to recuperate health and finances kept him there for several
years. During this time he published the story of his work
in Africa, the philosophical work which is the object of our

7interest, a series of lectures on Christianity and other
world-religions which had been given to a Quaker Missionary
Conference at Selley Oaks Institute near Manchester, England,
1
and memoirs of his childhood. In February of 1924 he start-
ed back again to Africa, and reestablished his work. The
public recognition which his activity had secured won him the
help of other doctors. This led to the extension of the work,
and Schweitzer is now on a second visit to Europe, where he
is active in its interest.
(2) Traits and Mental Development. Of the character of
the man something has already been suggested in the opening
paragraphs. The most outstanding impression one receives of
him is that of a sensitive sympathy with all human experience
and an intense interest in the physical and spiritual fortunes
of humanity. He is aroused to service, as by an irresistible
power, in the face of men's physical misfortunes and pain,
their mental problems, and their spiritual difficulties.
Practical activity and administrative work, which Schweit-
zer carries on so well for the service of humanity, are not
in themselves, however, most natural to his temperament. As
expressions of the intensity and vigor of his character in
the service of a conviction, they are characteristic, but the
primary bent of his genius is toward the conquest in thought
of the problems which confront the spirit, and toward the
attainment of a plan of life. Only by first making his way
through difficulties, and than as an expression of an insight
which has been won and is thereby disseminated, does Schweitzer

8come to free, vigorous expression of active life.
Primarily Schweitzer is reserved and shy in personal dis-
position. He is gifted with particular sensitiveness and in-
tensity of feeling, but is disposed to be unexpressive . He
has from cnildhood been serious in his apprehension of life
1
and its ills, with by no means a merry character, as he says,
but nevertheless with "die Schwlche dass ich leicht zum Lachen
2
zu bringen war." He was, moreover, he admits "zu sehr ver-
3
trlumt." With intellectual awakening, however, the dreaming
became an active reflection on elemental questions. The
earnestness of intellectual interests and the intense sympathy
with life, of which his peculiarity of laughter was a symptom,
won a victory over his reserve, and the solution of the diff-
iculties of life-view led to action.
Piety and religious Interest are deeply rooted in Schweit-
zer. His earliest recollections center about the church -
the feel of the servant-girl's cotton glove over his mouth
when he yawned or sang too loud in the services to attendance
at which he looked forward during the whole week, the reflec-
tion of the organist in the organ-mirror which disappeared
when the preacher entered the pulpit and which was mistaken
for the devil, and the impression of quiet and solemnity.
He says,
Aus den G-ottesdiensten, an denen ich als Kind teil-
nahm, habe ich den Sinn fur das Feierliche und das
Bedurfnis nach Stllle und Sammlung mit ins Leben
genommen, ohne die ich mir mein Dasein nicht denken
kann. Darum vermag ich der Meinung derer nicht bei-
zutreten, die die Jugend am G-ottesdienste der Erwach-
senen nicht teilnehmen lassen wollen, ehe sie etwas

9davcn versteht. Es kommt gar nicht auf ein Verstehen
an, sondern auf das Erleben des Feierlichen. Dass
das Kind die Erwachsenen and&chtig sieht und von ihr-
er Andacht mit ergriffen wird: dies ist es, was fur
es bedeutungsvoll ist.l
Then there was also the religious life of the home, and the
telling of Bible stories by his father. To these were added
the religious instruction in school, particularly that of
Pastor SchSffer, a religious personality and more than aver-
age orator who "konnte die biblischen G-eschichten hinreizend
2
erzlthlen."
In Schweitzer* s religious life there has been throughout
a strong element of personal feeling which approaches the
mystical. The church of his youth was shared by Protestant
and Catholic congregations, and a deep impression was made
by the seeming magnificence of the Catholic chancel flooded
by sunlight, and by its windows through which "schaute man
auf Blume, D&cher, Wolken und Himmel hlnaus, auf Welt, die
den Chor der Kirche in die unendliche Feme fortsetzte und
mit dem Scheine der Verkllrung umflossen war." In this
manner, "wanderte mein Blick," Schweitzer says, "aus der
Endlichkeit in die Unendlichkeit . Stille und Friede flber-
3
kamen meine Seele." For worship in general, he insists
that MDas Auge bedarf stimmungsvoller Feme, in der das
lusserliche Schauen sich zum innerlichen wandelt." Music
had also a large place in Schweitzer's religious feeling,
and its moving power and harmony with the thoughts of
5
his heart are mentioned.
A strong love for nature has also been a marked feature
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in Schweitzer's character throughout his life. The daily-
walks between his home and the Realschule at Monster, which
he attended when nine, were taken preferably without the
other boys who made the trip, in order that he might enjoy
nature in its beauties and seasonal changes. The decision
to send him the following year to M&lhausen was met with grief,
because, he says, MEs war mir, als risse man mich von der Natur
1
los." To be cut off from nature, he states again in his
account of the Mdlhausen days, was one of the things which he
felt most keenly during his first year there. The walks which
he was allowed to take when older are also among the memories
which persist. What impressed him in nature, he relates, was
the absolute mysteriousness . The assurance of the scientific
text books and their confident explanations ("ihre zuversicht-
lichen auf das Auswendiglernen zugeschnittenen ErklSrungen -
2
die, wie ich schon merkte, bereits auch etwas veraltet waren..'1 )
satisfied him in no respect, and filled him with positive
hatred. His strongest impression was of the forever inexplic-
able character of what is called Force or Life.
In scholastic fields Schweitzer was not a ready or receptive
pupil. He tells, as an incident which had prophetic meaning,
that as his father took him to school for the first time he
cried all the way. He was, as was mentioned before, too given
to day-dreaming to be a good student, and in some things, such
as explanation of literature, he was, he confesses, not merely
an inattentive scholar, but even a scholar in opposition, shut-
ting out attention and dipping here and there according to
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taste. In the first term at the Gymnasium at Mulhausen his
reports were poor, and a conference between his father and
the Principal was arranged, in which it was suggested that
it might be well to withdraw him from the school. Then a
ne7/ form-master, self-disciplined and conscientious in even
the smallest matter of class duty, stirred his admiration
and was taken as his model. Prom that time on he was a fair-
ly good scholar, and soon acquired marked intellectual interests.
For languages and mathematics Schweitzer had no aptitude, but
in history he had real ability. History was during his earlier
school
-days his chief interest; his next, was natural science,
which, he says, Mhatte fur mich etwas eigentumlich Aufregend-
1
es." In the former, as well as the latter, he was affected
by a consciousness that knowledge consisted in more or less
thorough description, and that the process under investigation
was full of riddles.
The occupation with philosophy followed from the sense of
the problematic in nature and in human history. Its inception,
however, was in the influence, which Schweitzer calls the most
profound of his G-ymnasium days, of the Principal, Wilhelm
Deecke, a scholar of distinction. "Unvergesslich, " Schweitzer
says, "sind mir die Stunden, in denen er mit uns Plato las und
2
uns dabei mit der Philosophie flberhaupt bekannt machte." The
influence of this teacher is a factor of which serious account
must be taken. In tribute to him Schweitzer says in the short
biography of one of his doctoral- dissertations, "Nur wer den
tiefen sittlichen Ernst, von welchem der Unterricht dieses
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hervorragenden und bescheidenen Lehrers getragen wurde kannte,
vermag den Einfluss zu ermessen, den er auf seine Schiller aus-
1
geubt hat. w
The close of Schweitzer's course in the Gymnasium found
him eager to go on to the university, and determined to carry
on the study of philosophy and music along with theology.
Under the influence of music, he had lived from childhood.
Instruction in it had been begun in very early years, and
during his years in the Gymnasium it had been among his great-
est experiences to play on the organ of the Mulhausen Church,
By this musical interest, as well as by religious thought, an
impulse was given to his philosophical activity. In the in-
tellectual history of the above-mentioned oncography he says,
Auf das philosophische Gebiet wurde ich von zwei Punk-
ten aus gedra'ngt. Einmal durch den zusammenhang der
theologischen Studlen mit der Religionsphilosophie
ilberhaupt, so dann durch a'sthetisch-ku'nstlerische In-
teressen, welche in dem phllosophischen Studium nach
Klarheit rangen, 2
(3) Appearance and Personal Impression. In his appearance
and personality Schweitzer seems to make a vivid impression.
An excellent word-picture, not only of appearance but also of
social presence, is given in an article by W. Montgomery in
the Hibbert Journal . He says,
Imagine....a tall, handsome, powerfully built man.,.,
with an easy natural manner. .. .in the favorable accep-
tance of the term. .a man of the world. An Alsatian by
birth, and resident for long periods in Paris, he
speaks French as readily as German. • • .he is an inter-
esting talker, but beyond that he is one of those men
whose personality tells directly. The impression
which one receives from him, first, last, and all the
time, is one of immense but well-disciplined energy.
In any company he would count, and in any circumstances
would not be negligible.
3
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A similar impression from hearing him speak in Switzerland
after his recent return from Africa is referred to by Lucia
Ames Mead in a letter published in the Boston Herald during
October, 1927. She says, MHe was the most impressive person-
ality who came within my range in over three months travel,
which in London and Geneva had given me sight and hearing of
1
some of the most notable persons in the world, M Dr. Von
Mftller, who speaks of his figure as suggestive of that of
Nietzsche, says in conclusion of an article in Westermanns
Monatshefte
,
Von welcher Seite man auch dem Menschen Albert
Schweitzer nahekommen mag, immer wird man ge-
fesselt sein von der schlichten G-ro'sse und Tiefe
und von der eigenart dieser Persflnlichkeit • Wer
ihn einmal in seinem Wesen Oder in seinem Werk
pers8nlich erlebt hat, fur den wird dies Erleb-
nls fur immer seinen Wert und seine fortwlrken-
de Kraft behalten. 2
The basis of such impressions is apparently not so much
the intellectual accomplishments of the man, notable as
these are, but the directness and sincerity of his human
fellowship, the genuineness of his social reactions, and
the strength and enthusiasm of his convictions. The effect
is not only of greatness, but of attractiveness. Intellect-
ual freedom and evangelical zeal, strength and gentleness,
are the qualities combined in him in the thought of Nathaniel
Micklem, author of a foreword to the English translation of
Schweitzer's lectures on Christianity at Selly Oaks Institute.
He adds, "it is not easy to explain in words that will not
appear extravagant how greatly we were drawn to the man him-
3
self."

14
3. Purposes and Problems of the Inquiry.
The qualities of Schweitzer' s person belong in large
measure to his thought even in printed form. In his writings
one feels the vigor and unity of his outlook on life. It is
presented in the Kulturphilosophie with intellectual freedom
and originality. It seeks to set itself off from the tradit-
ional philosophy of our western culture, and to enter into
criticism of it. It makes suggestion of a new method of at-
taining a dependable world-view, and refers to itself as a
new type of rational thought.
The object in taking this philosophical outlook as a sub-
ject for investigation is, in the first place, to establish,
with as much definiteness as it will permit, what the full
nature of the viewpoint is. There are several reasons why
this is necessary. One set of these is in Schweitzer's work
on philosophy itself. In the first place, not all of the
root3 of the system, or its full spread, are evident in the
Kulturphilosophie alone, but these are only known when it is
taken in connection with the other writings. Then, the treat-
ment, which is plainly, and in a good sense of the word, pop-
ularly written, does not have a technically exact and complete
presentation of its position on all philosophical issues which
are involved; these must be determined, and must be made more
evident and systematically coherent, if we are to see the im-
plications of the viewpoint in its full extension and to be
able to appraise it. A further need for clarification also
arises out of Schweitzer's use of certain terms such as monism
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and dualism, optimism and pessimism, and world-view. They
are words which show variations in reference and meaning
even in the circles of most precise philosophical usage, and
in Schweitzer's quite Individual employment of them they are
confusing and misleading. The other set of reasons which
call for an exposition is more objective. There has "been no
thorough critical treatment of the outlook, particularly in
English-speaking circles; "but still, interpretations have been
put upon it which are inconsistent with each other and with
what the writer of the dissertation understands as its nature.
Part of the difficulty here arises from the peculiarities in
terminology which were referred to, and part from the attempts
to locate Schweitzer in existing classifications. His thought,
whatever else may be said of it, is decidedly Individual, and
is not amenable to such treatment. Some affinities must, of
course, be taken account of, but the mental attitude of the
classifying approach is so much a part of the established
viewpoints that it misses the spirit and suggestion of Schweit-
zer^ declarations.
Beyond the establishment of the nature of the viewpoint,
secondly, the dissertation has the object of determining to
what degree the system fulfills the purposes of its construct-
ion and lives up to its pretensions. First, is it a philos-
ophical departure, and is its method in any sense a new one?
Secondly, if so, in what measure is it a significant and
fruitful contribution?
In particular, in the understanding and evaluation of
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Schweitzer's proposed philosophy of civilization, one sees
that the central and most significant feature of it is an
element of intuition. It is this which must be particular-
ly observed, with regard to its nature and position, and
which must be especially appraised, for it is the coping-
stone of the whole edifice.
We might, then, briefly enumerate the purposes of the
dissertation as follows:
(a) To bring the philosophy of civilization set forth in
Schweitzer's Kulturphilosophle into relation to his other
writings and work, for the sake of a better understanding of
it;
(b) To determine, in so far as the writings permit, the
definite nature of Schweitzer's positions on important phil-
osophical issues, and their systematic character; and in so
doing,
(c) To clarify the meaning of Schweitzer's individual
and peculiar use of the terms dualism, optimism, and world-
view, and to eliminate the misunderstanding of his system
through his employment of them in reference to it; and
(d) To correct certain misunderstandings and misrepresent-
ations which have appeared in critical treatments; and thus,
(e) To give to a new and vital expression of philosophical
thought a more thorough critical exposition than it has so
far had;
(f ) Through an examination of its philosophical procedure,
its logical and epistemological principles, and its raeta-

physical content, to appraise Schweitzer's attempt to give
the ideals of civilization "a real and permanent foundation
in thought;" and
(g) In particular, to determine whether in the element
of intuition, which is the heart of his new rationalism,
Schweitzer has given
i. A definite and original contribution to
philosophical thought, and
ii. An independent and adequate basis for
active ethical will.
The first study must "be that of Schweitzer's earlier
writings. In them the foundations of the philosophical
structure are laid, and in them the tendencies of thought
are at work which later appear in it.

PART ONE
SCHWEITZER'S WORKS AND THE CRITICS
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CHAPTER TWO
SCHY/EITZER'S RELIG-IONSPHILOSOPHIE KANT'S
1. Interest in Religious Values.
We are accustomed to consider Kant's thought in relation
to the two poles of his interest: the starry heavens above
(typifying the realm of physical nature and its laws in gen-
eral), and the moral law within. It serves well to character-
ize Schweitzer, to indicate his relation to these interests
of Kant's. There is lacking in him Kant's direct scientific
Interest in the natural world and its amenability to univer-
sal apriori laws. The sphere of moral action, on the other
hand, and with it the objects of religion, form the center
of Schweitzer's thought. The main concern in all Schweitzer's
writings is the rational foundation of ethical ideals and
conduct, but in view of his religious background and training,
it is natural that the religious foundations should receive
first consideration. Religion is with Schweitzer in itself
a real and permanent interest, and yet it is always viewed,
even where it is the direct object of investigation, with
reference to its relation to the ethical life.
In the Religionsphilosophie Kant's Schweitzer is concerned
to test with intellectual honesty and rigor the philosophical
foundations of belief in the objects of religion as they were
laid in the retrenched and consolidated, but supposedly im-
pregnable position of Kant's critical idealism. An echo of
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this undertaking which lies at the beginning of Schweitzer's
intellectual quest is heard in the later Kulturphilosophle ,
where he remarks that the ethical and at the same time optim-
istic philosophy of Rationalism which gave society a current
and healthful foundation for its civilization "was unable in
the long run to meet the criticism of pure thought" despite
the fact that Kant "tried to provide the tottering building
1
with new foundations? More closely regarded, in the Relie-
lonsphilosophie Kant's itself, the conclusion of Schweitzer 1 s
investigation is that the seer of KiJnigsberg nowhere gives a
philosophy of religion which is founded upon Critical Ideal-
ism and which lies within its boundaries. The plan projected
in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft , to go in a practical employ-
ment of reason beyond the knowledge accorded by reason in its
theoretical use, and thus to establish the ideas of freedom,
G-od, and immortality, he holds, is not carried out as proposed.
2. Plan and Method.
Schweitzer modestly says of his work on Kant that "Sie
will kein Werk flber Kant's Religionsphilosophie sein; sie hat
nlcht die Absicht, ein Urteil zu fallen, sondern ihr Zweck
geht dahin, neben den Werken flber Kant's Religionsphilosophie
2
Kant selbst wieder G-eho'r zu verschaffen. " What it offers,he
says, is "in der Hauptsache eine kritische Analyse der Gedank-
en Kant's, welche mlt den religionsphilosophischen Problemen
3
in irgend einer Beziehung stehen." The method followed in
this undertaking is to treat each of Kant's writings which
are concerned - namely, the "religionsphllosophische Skizze"
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of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (that is, the three sections
1
of the "Kanon der reinen Vernunft" ) , the Kritik der praktisch-
en Vernunft , the Religion innerhalb der G-renzen der blossen
Vernunft
, and the Kritik der Urteilskraft - in turn, and then
to relate and compare the course of thought of each with that
2
of the others.
The result of Schweitzer's investigation, notwithstanding
the modest pretensions of the work, is new light both for the
understanding and for the evaluation of Kant's thought with
regard to the objects which are of interest to religious
faith - self, G-od, and immortality. The usual presentation
of Kant's philosophy of religion proceeds from the Kritik
der praktischen Vernunft , but Schweitzer, by assembling
Kant's various treatments of the problems of philosophy of
religion and comparing them, both shows the development of
his thought (in which, he suggests, one may have a picture
of the development of the philosophy of religion of the Nine-
teenth Century) and brings the writings into a mutual crit-
icism of each other which serves to reveal more clearly how
far Kant has fulfilled his intentions, and what his results
are.
3. Concerning the "Skizze M .
The relation of Critical Idealism to a philosophy of
religion founded upon it, as shown in the section leading
from the Transcendental Dialectic, is first pointed out by
Schweitzer. The transcendental hypotheses establish nothing
on top of the sceptical conclusions of the Dialectic, but
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they keep the questions of religious belief open against the
transcendent pretensions of disbelief, and it is then Kant*s
thought that there is a practical employment of reason in
which it has further dealings with the same ideas and may
place them beyond a problematic status.
In the fact that Kant, in tracing the identity of the
ideas of reason in the two uses, gives two differing deriv-
ations of the practical ideas (from the system of Transcend-
ental Ideas in the one case, and from the system of Cosmolog-
1
ical Ideas in the other)., Schweitzer concludes that the two
systems are not different, but only two cross-sections, at
different distances, of the same lines proceeding from a
2
vertex in the idea of freedom, to the realization of which
all the efforts of reason are in reality directed. When the
transition of the ideas to the realm of practical interest
was effected, he observes, the plan for a philosophy of re-
ligion would not go foreward as projected. The idea of free-
dom inevitably took the place of transcendent importance, and
in relation to it, Schweitzer says, "entscheidet sich die
Frage [negatively , according to his view)> ob der kritische
Idealismus mit moralisch-religio'sen Interessen sich verbinden
3
la'sst.." The question which was left unsettled by theoretic-
al reason was that of transcendental freedom, but Kant sets
it aside as inconsiderable when dealing with practical inter-
ests, Schweitzer points out, and affirms a practical freedom
which falls within natural causation only allowing for caus-
ality through reason, and which is said to be provable through
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1
experience. His comment is:
Hierdurch wi&erspricht dieses Verhalten dem religions-
phi lo sophischen Plane der ganzen transcendentalen Dial-
ektik, zerstflrt die verkundete Einhelt des spekulativen
und praktischen Interesses der Vernunft und macht den
wichtigen Teil der Untersuchungen der Kritik der reinen
Vernunft, welcher sich auf das Freiheitsproblera bezieht
und die Vorbereitung der Idee der Freiheit zur praktisch-
en Realisierung enthElt, vollstHndlg wertlos; wir mttssen
nUmlich konstatieren, dass bei der praktischen Realisier-
ung der Freiheitsidee auf S. 608 u. 609 eine in jeder
Hinsicht auff&llige und neue, mit dem kritischen Ideal-
ismus sich gar nicht berflhrende Fassung der Freiheits-
idee auftaucht, welche sich nun in die Stelle der trans-
cendentalen eindrSngt und die letztere ganz wertlos macht, 2
What Schweitzer considers as the new and alien element here
is the suggestion that there is pure practical reason only in
consideration of the moral law. Sven though the concept of
moral law is not fully developed here, and is not brought into
relation to the idea of freedom, the practical freedom which
is asserted is actually ethical freedom, and it refers to
human action only, whereas the transcendental freedom stood
above any distinction of appearances and actions. The project-
ed plan is thus destroyed, for the freedom practically estab-
lished is neither in its presuppositions nor extent identical
with the idea of freedom before its practical realization, and
with this the unity of reason in its theoretical and practical
3
employments is given up.
In general, Schweitzer concludes, this religious philosophy
of tne Kritlk der reinen Vernunft completely ignores the plan
projected, and does not at any point presuppose the Transcend-
ental Dialectic or represent the philosophy of religion of
4
Critical Idealism, He considers the "Skizze" to be something
written earlier than the main part of the Dialectic and only
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1
imperfectly reworked for its position. What is distinctive
of it, he thinks, is the intermixture, in undeveloped form,
of two lines of thought which in the further development of
the Kantian pnilosophy of religion separate from each other
2
with ever increasing distinctness.
4. The Kritlk der praktischen Vernunft .
The Kritlk der praktischen Vernunft develops the philoso-
phy of religion of Critical Idealism the most consistently of
any of Kant's writings, according to Schweitzer, but nevertne-
less with changes in the plan, and with confusion of the re-
sults. There is, to begin witn, the characteristic difference
of method from that planned. The ideas are first independent-
ly derived from tne moral consciousness, and then have to be
identified with the ideas of theoretical reason. It is, now-
ever, Schweitzer brings out, in reality no postulate of free-
dom which is dealt witn, out the problem of transcendental
freedom. This proves to be soluble in accordance with the
3
presuppositions of Critical Idealism, by means of Tiiich it is
possible to refer natural occurrences, as phenomenal, to an
intelligible ground.
That the solution is unsatisfactory is almost immediately
Indicated, Schweitzer affirms, by the reappearance of the
problem (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. p. 121) in what he
4
calls its higher or really ethical form. This occurs through
a shift in the question from the natural necessity of action
to its order. By this change the problem is carried over
into the intelligible world, and there it cannot again be
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solved "by Critical Idealism through its method of distinguish-
ing the phenomenal and noumenal. The question then takes the
form, how change from evil to good is possible as free self-
determination in the intelligible order.
The intrusion of the ethical problem of freedom in the
Krltik is, however, only momentary, because Kant assumes that
"~
: i
it is settled in the first question. He is satisfied by a
reference to intelligible causation in place of natural nec-
essity, and regards this as moral determination. It is at
this point, however, in Schweitzer's view, that Critical Ideal-
ism shows itself incapable of taking account of morality. The
relation of the natural and intelligible orders is taken as
also that of the natural and moral orders. Since phenomena
and noumena are not two different systems, the realm of moral-
ity similarly ceases to be something other than the natural,
and is its metaphysical ground. Critical Idealism says here,
according to Schweitzer, that what presents itself to us in
the mechanism of nature is the super-sensible causality of
moral law, and conversely, that what is moral law is that
which presents itself to us in the causality of nature. In
this the power of ethical judgment is destroyed.
The transcendental idea of freedom, Schweitzer says, has
devoured the practical, and the interests satisfied are
merely the theoretical, not the ethical. Under the influence
of this result, not consciously recognized, the other two
ideas were treated simply as postulates which arise from the
moral law, though in the conclusion Kant falsely assumed that
the original plan had been carried out.
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5. Kant's Religion .
The Religion innerhalb der G-renzen der blossen Vernunft
stands, according to Schweitzer, on wholly different ground
than that of Critical Idealism. Its problem of freedom, he
says, is not the theoretical question, but the genuine prob-
lem of freedom, that of ethical personality, which derives
from the law-giving reason, not from the theoretical.
The difficulty of the conception of perfected personality,
particularly in view of the briefness and uncertainty of life,
led the Kritlk der praktischen Vernunft to formulate the idea
1
of immortality. Schweitzer rejects this way of meeting the
difficulty, however, on the ground that it is possible only
if one identifies ethical personality with metaphysical ground
as in the Kritlk , where this was seen to rest on an undevelop-
ed conception of the nature of ethical personality and to lead
when consistently carried through, to an ethical indifference
2
in regard to moral judgments of earthly conditions. That
Kant here satisfies the ethical interest in the continuation
of life in a different manner (by the idea of a moral judgment
3
in the timeless intelligence of God) , Schweitzer regards as a
sign of a deepened conception of moral personality, but he
points out that the idea of G-od as moral judge has not first
been established as a practically necessary conception, but
5
is only taken over from historical Christianity. While, then
an apparent connection has been made between the moral law and
the concept of God, which is the point of difficulty for Crit-
6
leal Idealism, it is not sound; and in reality the project of
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deriving all material from the fact of moral law has been
1
given up.
Kant's trouble with the concept of perfection, in Schweit-
zer's view, is due to the fact that the individual man is con-
sidered as the object of moral judgment. He regards it as the
high point of Kantian philosophy of religion when in the third
part of this work the individualistic point of view is abandon-
ed, the possibility of perfection is made dependent upon a
moral community of mankind, and the realization of this com-
2
munity is specified as a duty.
The duty to strive for a universal ethical society is rec-
ognized by Kant as unique in kind, since it calls on a person
to devote himself to something which he cannot know to be with-
in his power, and since it is not given in the fact of the
moral law, but to the contrary dismisses considerations of per-
3
sonal perfection. It is here made the ground for the idea of
4
G-od. Between this way of securing the concept, in relation
to the motivation of the moral activity of the individual at
the common ethical task of humanity, however, and that of Crit-
ical Idealism, which gives G-od the place of guarantor of the
correlation of happiness with goodness in the individual in
another world, there is, Schweitzer declares, "gar nichts
5
gemein.
It is only in the way of the Religion , Schweitzer thinks,
that the concept of G-od is secured in a manner in which it
6
can be brought into relation to the moral law. The idea of
G-od thus attained, however, in relation to ethical development
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ao far as it proceeds in the world, makes a use of it which
departs from the earthly world of morally developing humanity
1
unpermissible . Critical Idealism, in disregarding this, weak-
ens the significance of ethical Judgment of the present moral
development, Schweitzer declares, as evidenced by the fact
that neither of the Kritiks which have been considered takes
a standpoint from which the necessity, or possibility, arises,
of passing over to ethical evaluation of the social disposit-
ion of humanity in reference to the moral end which is thought
2
of as the highest good,
6. The Kritlk der Urteilskraf
t
.
Schweitzer points out that the Kritlk der Urte ilskraft is
a work not foreseen by the Kritlk der reinen Vernunft , but
one whose conception of judgment is later attained and is in
3
contrast to that presented in the earlier work. The real
possibilities of its suggestion that the esthetic conception
of the world can mediate between the intellectual and the
moral views of it, however, are not achieved, he declares.
In fact, the problem in that form is not even well consider-
ed, he says, because Kant, Instead of proceeding to a scien-
tific treatment of esthetics, in the method of the Krltik
der reinen Vernunft
, by showing how synthetic judgments
apriori are possible and then systematically deriving the
rational apriori principles, took them over from experience,
and through the accidental state of the esthetic thought of
the time confined himself within the limits of the pleasing,
the beautiful, and the sublime, as though the nature of
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1
esthetic judgment in general would thereby be given.
There are places where the general concepts of the intro-
2
duction break through the narrow limits of the treatment,
where the esthetic judgment stands in relation to judgment
in general and to its distinctive function of grasping the
manifold of appearances fashioned by the understanding ac-
cording to some principle of unity, where the concept of
Zweckma'ssigkeit is treated as identical with this principle
of unity belonging to judgment and accordingly as apriori and
determinative of pleasure and displeasure, and where a broad
concept of art which relates it to both nature and morality
is used. But what occurs in general is that a critique of
taste displaces the projected critique of esthetic judgment,
art is narrowed to the fine arts, and a complete reversal of
the logical relation between fitness and feeling of pleasure
3
occurs.
As in the case of the "Sklzze", there has been introduced,
Schweitzer thinks, an earlier writing which does not success-
fully carry out the plan of the work. The narrow faculty
which is discussed does not accord with the more developed
ideas of the general introduction, and it has no claim to
apriori principles. The concept of fitness is established
as an apriori principle for the judgment of nature only in
relation to the fact that it can be arrived at as a prin-
ciple of unity, not as a factor of experience, which only
reveals natural mechanism. When Kant reversed the logical
relation of the principle of fitness and feeling of pleasure.
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Schweitzer says, he lost the possibility of securing an
apriori character for the esthetic judgment and the notion
of fitness associated with it. The genuine possibility
which esthetic judgment has for the connection of theoretic-
2
al reason and moral reason was thus made impossible. Kant
felt the connection which this faculty achieves, Schweitzer
3
says, but failed to establish it.
The development in the case of the critique of teleolog-
ical judgment is considered by Schweitzer to be more propit-
ious. It proceeds in closer accordance with the originally
projected plan, and from the concept of fitness as an apriori
principle of judgment for the comprehension of natural occur-
rence. The general faculty of judgment furnishes a concept
of fitness which leads to the idea of the totality of nature
as a system in view of some end, and to the thought of an
"Endzweck der Natur," through which our faculties transcend
5
the limits of the sensible world of appearance.
What Schweitzer finds as significant in this line of
thought is, that man must be regarded as the end in relation
to which all other objects of nature form a system of ends,
but, since the pursuit by man of happiness as his goal makes
him Incapable of setting and striving for an end of exist-
ence, that there remains as his goal only the quality of
goodness of rational beings, who, holding themselves indepen-
dent of nature in their determinations, use nature as a means
in accordance with their free purpose for this end which
lies beyond nature but can nevertheless be regarded as its
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1
end. He stresses the fact, furthermore, that in this treat-
ment the concept of happiness, which was the medium of arriv-
ing at the concept of G-od in the Kritlk der praktischen Ver-
nunft, is excluded, and that the concept of the human commun-
ity is introduced as the factor through which the teleology
passes over into an ethico-theology. The transition is here
effected in view of a concept of the highest end as "das
hflcheste Gut in der Welt," which through the context is re-
lated to the community and is conceived as the perfected
2
moral society. In this line of thought the idea of G-od as
ethical Law-giver is a necessary practical assumption, since
it alone makes possible the conception of a universal ethical
existent* Thus the concept of God as World Ruler is secured
in a wa,y which does not identify the causality of natural
occurrence with that of moral law and so destroy the basis
3
of ethical judgment.
It is at this point, that of G-od's relation to the world
and. to morality, according to Schweitzer's criticism, that
the philosophy of religion of Critical Idealism encounters
its chief difficulty. He says that it does not succeed in
bringing G-od into relation to the moral law without endanger-
ing either the autonomy of the moral law or God's position as
World Creator and Ruler. The identification by Critical Ideal
ism of the moral world with the intelligible, which is not an-
other world than the phenomenal, but the actuality of its ap-
pearances, destroys moral distinctions and the reality of the
moral judgments. On the other hand, to proceed to morality
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from the moral law alone, though it Yrould preserve moral
seriousness, would threaten the position of the ethical G-od
as World Ruler. This procedure is possible only in case of
a radical dualism, which would also threaten morality.
Schweitzer says,
So muss also die religionsphilosophische Untersuchung,
will sie diese Konsequenzen nicht Ziehen, zu ihrem
Ausgangspunkt neben der apriorischen Thatsache des
Sittengesetzes noch ein Faktum zur Voraussetzung haben,
welches den G-rund zu einer Verbindung des Weltschflpf-
ers und des sittlichen G-esetzgebers enth&lt,und zwar
in der Form, dass in der Verbindung dieser beiden Be-
griffe das Prinzip des Weltgeschehens und das Prinzip
des sittlichen G-eschehens nicht ineinander ttbergehen.
Dieses Faktum bietet allein die mit der Teleologie in
Verbindung gesetzte Thatsache des Sittengesetzes: aus
derselben resultiert - mit Vermeidung des Glu'ckselig-
keitsgedankens - der Begriff des Menschen als moral-
ischen Endzwecks der SctuBpfung, verbunden mit dem
Objekt der sittlichen Beth&tigung dieses Wesens, dem
hflchsten G-ut, als der vollendeten sittlichen Gemein-
schaft des Menschengeschlechts
In the case of the Kritik der Urteilskraf
t
,
however, the
ethical theology which has been made possible is destroyed,
Schweitzer thinks, through the assumption of a relation to
the results of Critical Idealism and the displacement of the
concepts proper to the course of thought by those of that
2
system. The individual point of view, interest in immort-
ality, and the concept of happiness, enter into a line of
thought not founded upon them or capable of union with them,
and exclude the concept of the highest good with reference
to which man is regarded as the goal of creation. Thus the
foundation of the idea of God which relates Him at once to
the world as its Creator and to an autonomous moral law is
destroyed, and the attempt to develop an actually ethical
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theology fails. A satisfactory philosophy of religion (that
is, an ethical theism), Schweitzer concludes, cannot be "built
up consistently and unequivocally on the foundations of Crit-
ical Idealism, or of any thought system oriented with refer-
ence to the epistemological inquiry and dominated primarily
by theoretical problems.
7. Conclusions.
The writings of Kant which deal with philosophy of religion,
when taken together, show a development in religious thought
wnich is marked by increased ethical energy and a decreased
influence of the system of Critical Idealism, Schweitzer
asserts. He finds in Kant two lines of thought, one distin-
guished by an Individual point of view and the other by a
universal outlook which treats moral humanity as subject.
Both are present in undeveloped and unmediated form in the
"religionsphilosophische Skizze," which shows evidence of
being an early work which has been given a merely apparent
and actually artificial relation to the Critical Idealism
of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft into which it is incorpor-
ated.
The first point of view (the individual) stands in most
natural relation to Critical Idealism. It receives its most
consistent and distinctive development in the Kritik der
praktischen Vernunft
, the work that most faithfully follows
the plan for a philosophy of religion which is developed by
the Transcendental Dialectic. Here three postulates are
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developed from the moral law: freedom, immortality as a nec-
essary assumption of activity in accordance with moral oblig-
ation, and God as guarantor of the hignest good, or conjunct-
ion of happiness with moral worth.
Despite this close relation of the Krltik der praktischen
Vernunft to the Dialectic, there are deviations from the plan.
The three concepts are not taken over directly from a theor-
etical activity of reason which left them problematic, and
then proved by it in a further practical employment, but are
deduced from the inherent law of a faculty of practical
reason with the anticipation of showing their identity with
the three ideas of the faculty of theoretical reason. Then
the process of identification with the theoretical ideas is
carried out only for the concept of freedom, and in becoming
identical with the intelligible law of occurrence it ceases
to have any relation to moral distinctions and judgments.
The force of this consequence is not directly recognized,
but it sufficed to bring the course of thought to a halt
uncompleted, and left the Krltik der praktischen Vernunft
with the theoretical Idea of transcendental freedom and two
practical postulates. Thus it is seen, Schweitzer says,
that the results of the moral law cannot be coordinated with
those of theoretical reason, and that "Die Thatsache des
Sittengesetzes an sich fuhrt nicht auf das moralische Aeq-
1
uivalent der spekulativen Vernunftideen.
"
The Kritlk der Urteilskraft attempted in a new way to
unify the severed intellectual and moral reason, but failed.
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The reasons were an intrusion of a critique of taste to sup-
plant esthetic judgment in its operation as an apriori rat-
ional faculty, and a failure to carry through the principle
of teleological idealism.
What the third Kritik did accomplish, Schweitzer says,
was to bring to expression features of Kant's religious
thought which were in the "Sketch" but had dropped out of
the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft under the influence of
the system of Critical Idealism, and to unite them with the
deepened conception of moral law which belonged to the later
work, thus preparing for the development of Kant's religious
thought which is presented in the Religion innerhalb der
G-renzen der blossen Vernunft . Schweitzer says,
So weist die Ethikotheologie nach vorwarts auf die
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft,
nach rflckwarts auf die religlonsphilosophische
Skizze; in der geringen Beruhrung mit der Kritik
der praktischen Vernunft zeigt sie, dass die Kant-
ische Religlonsphilo sophie in einem Entwi cklungs-
stadium begriffen 1st, welches sich als Fortbeweg-
ung von der Religionsphilosophie des kritischen
Ideal ismus darstellt.l
In this relation the Kritik der prakt is chen Vernunft , he says,
"ist gleichsam ein enger Pass, durch den das Gedankenheer
Kant's auf dem Zuge von dem G-ebiete der vorkrltischen Unent-
wickeltheit zu dem G-ebiete der reif sten G-edankenvollendung
2
hindurchziehen musste."
The Religion Innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft
is the work, Schweitzer declares, which "stellt . . . .die hflch-
3
ste Vollendung der kantischen Religionsphilosophie dar.
In it, he says, Kant stands, by virtue of the social outlook,
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Mweit ilber seiner Zeit," and to the work there belongs, in
addition to its ethical seriousness, a modern and vital as-
pect. The moral richness of its thought, however, rests
directly in the fact that it breaks its bond of relation to
Critical Idealism. Schweitzer says,
Die Energie des sittlichen Denkens hat den G-edanken-
gang aus der engen Bahn, in welche der kritische
Idealismus die kantische Religionsphilosophie dr&ngte,
herausgetrieben; zugleich mit ihrer Bewegungsfreiheit
erh&lt sie den vollen Gedankenreichtum, den sie in
unentwickelter Form schon aufwies, ehe sie slch in
konsequente Beziehung zum kritischen Idealismus setzte.
Between the determinations of Critical Idealism and the
Kantian moral law, Schweitzer declares, there is a fundament-
al opposition which roots in the very nature of the former
and makes any thorough-going combination impossible. He says,
So 1st, auf welchem Punkt die Untersuchung auch ein-
setzt, das Resultat dasselbe: eine nach den Voraus-
setzungen des kritischen Idealismus normierte und
orientierte Religionsphilosophie 1st ein sich selbst
zersetzendes Produkt . . . .die vollendete Religions-
philosophie des kritischen Idealismus iSst sich
selbst auf .2
It is only by overstepping the bounds of Critical Idealism,
as Kant actually does through the strength of his ethical
earnestness, that a philosophy of religion is possible.
The consistent development of the philosophy of religion
of Critical Idealism, which Kant never gave, was presented
by Schopenhauer, according to Schweitzer, just directly
3
well er Kant's sittliche Tiefe nicht besass." Thus, he says,
die sittliche Indifferenz des abendlUndls chen erkennt-
nistheoretischen Problems, welche bei Kant ilberwunden
schien, bricht in dem Augenblicke wieder durch, wo
eine auf Kant fussende Persflnlichkelt, ohne die sitt-
liche Tiefe des Grinders des kritischen Idealismus zu
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begreifen, die Resultate der Krltik der relnen Ver-
nunft zu sichten und Consequent durchzubilden be-
ginnt.1
The ethical line of thought in Kant's philosophy of re-
ligion, or as Schweitzer in one place calls it, the "eth-
is che Religionsphilosophie innerhalb der kantischen Religions-
philosophie," in which "das sittliche Element pr&valiert und
die kritisch-idealistischen Voraussetzungen zerstflrt," on the
other hand, he says,
hat auch....ihre konsequente Ausbildung sptter durch
die weitere Verstlrkung des ethischen Elements dahin
erfahren, dass der idealistisch-kritische Unterbau
derselben zertflrt wurde und jede erkenntnis-theoret-
ische Begrttndung der Mflglichkeit eines UebersinnliCh-
en ohne Beziehung auf die sittliche Nfltlgung aus der
Religionsphilosophie ausgeschieden wurde
It was Ritschl who, without having clearly recognized his
relation to Kant at this point, gave this development to
Kant's philosophy of religion: - taking as subject the moral
personality in so far as it is made possible through relation
to ethical society, and securing the practical assumption of
G-od as perfect moral Personality only with reference to the
perfection of ethical humanity without being able to relate
Him to the world considered apart from man's perfection. Thus,
Schweitzer says,
bildet jede dieser beiden in der kantischen Religions-
philosophie verfolgbaren G-edankenlinien, wenn sie sich
in ihren Konsequenzen erfasst, ein religionsphilosoph-
isches System fttr sidx,wobei entweder die kritisch-
idealistischen Voraussetzungen die ethische Bedingtheit
desselben neutralisieren, Oder die letztere die erst-
eren aufhebt.3
Here Schweitzer in his conclusion, not through hostility to
religion, but in a sincere attempt to find the security of its
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foundations, out-Kants Kant himself, or, if the further bar-
barity of expression will be permitted, out-destroys the all-
destroyer. Not even on the path of a practical employment of
reason, in contrast with a merely theoretical, have the beliefs
of religion in freedom, G-od, and immortality been established.
So far as these objects of religious interest are concerned,
the outcome of Critical Idealism, while it remains true to its
presuppositions, viewpoint, and method, is purely destructive,
even in the Krltik der praktischen Vernunft .
The only positive elements in the philosophy of religion of
Kant, according to Schweitzer, are in the places where he un-
wittingly oversteps the limits of Criticism. There, out of
his own ethical depth and energy, he gives a variant and truly
ethical formulation of the problem of freedom - which is, by
virtue of that fact, not amenable to solution by the suggest-
ion of a double existence, in the chain of mechanical causat-
ion which belongs to appearances on the one hand, and in the
course of free action of intelligible reality on the other.
Thus in the early study of the philosophy of religion of
Kant there are already drawn the outlines of Schweitzer's
positivism, which in one place or stage goes far beyond that
of Kant but in so doing finds a basis for its own defeat and
a ground for belief. To the treatment of Schweitzer's posit-
ivism and his whole theory of knowledge we shall, however,
have to return later. In the meantime it is necessary to
take account of the writings of Schweitzer which, walle in a
different field, that of the life of Christ, hold an import-
ant place in the development of his pnilosophical thought.
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CHAPTER THREE
THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS
1. The Impulse of the Theological Investigation.
The transition from what was a philosophical, even though
theologically related field to a purely theological one (and
that the field of the historical life of Jesus and of the
early development of Christianity) had perhaps some external
and fortuitous conditions underlying it. After completion
of his course in the philosophical faculty Schweitzer had
entered upon theological study, and he prepared as his diss-
ertation for the degree of Licentiate in Theology a work on
Das Abendmahlsproblem auf Grund der wis senschaftli cnen For-
schung des 19 . Jahrhunderts und der historiscnen Berichte
in which certain conceptions arose which led to fuller ex-
position in the "Skizze des Lebens Jesu" ( Das MessianitaVbs-
und Leldensffeheimnls ) , and which made necessary both Die
Geschlchte der Leben-Jesu For3Chung and Die Geschichte der
paulinischen Fors Chung .
For the original choice of this field, however, and for
the prosecution of continued inquiries, the inner logic of
Schweitzer's intellectual problems would seem to be deter-
minative. With his central interest in the foundation of
our ethical ideals and activity, after the rather negative
conclusion of his inquiry into Kant's philosophy of relig-
ion, the almost inevitable place for him to turn to find

the source of the ideal elements in our civilization, under
the influence of the philosophical positivism of Ritschl,
with whose name he closes his treatment of Die Rellgions -
phllosophle Kant's , was to the field of historical religion
2. Das Abendmahl and the Geschlchte der Leben-
Je su-For schung .
(1) Introductory. What the outcome of this theological
study for Schweitzer's general philosophy was, will appear
in the course of the presentation. Its immediate effect
upon theological opinion was revolutionary and disturbing.
Eeginning with nls "Skizze des Lebens Jesu" with which he
supplemented the dissertation on the Last Supper, and bring
ing in for support his extensive and painstaking review of
the history of tne investigation of Jesus' life by G-erman
scholarship, he made an attack upon the picture of Jesus
presented by modern liberal theology, and insisted that the
historical Jesus was characterized by eschatologically con-
ditioned teachings and ministry.
The Messianitjtts- und Lelde nsgeheimnls , which first
presented Schweitzer's views on Jesus, was, despite the rev-
olutionary character of its contents and the vigor of tnelr
presentation, only a comparatively slight work, as the sub-
title would indicate, and moreover that of a new figure in
the field of theology. Its conclusions were m conflict
with the strenuous and sustained effort of liberal theology
to trace the figure of a rational and intelligible historic
Jesus; and these conclusions, if sound, were destructive of
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that figure. Its reception was such as to be cnaracterized
by Walter Lowrie, in the preface to the English translation,
as "a conspiracy of silence," though it is hardly to be sup-
posed that its treatment, or lack of treatment, was so delib-
erate as the phrase suggests.
It was the Von Reimarus zu Wrede , then, which, appearing
five years later, obliged Schweitzer's views to be noticed
and discussed. This scholarly survey of the critical invest-
igation of the life of Jesus, with which G-erman theology had
been chiefly preoccupied, could not be neglected.
For this chief theological work of Schweitzer's his choice
of titles would seem to be unfortunate. That this is true of
more of his titles might be noted in consideration of the
Kritische Darstellung unter schiedlicher neurer historiacher
Abendmahlaauffassungen and the Kritik der von medizini scher
Seite ver6*ffentli chten Pathographien uber Jesus
,
which, what-
ever their merits as dissertation topics, gain much in ex-
pressiveness by transformation to Das Abendmahl 1m Zusammen-
hang mit dem Leben Jesu and Die Psychiatrische Beurteilung
Jesu
. In the case of the work under consideration, however,
a gain in style and descriptive clarity through the change
of the title Von Reimarus zu Wrede to G-eschichte der Leben-
Jesu-For s chung in the second edition (1908) was balanced by
a loss in respect to indication both of the writer's con-
ception and accomplishment.
The work is not, as a matter of fact, a complete history
of the investigation of the life of Jesus by critical theology.
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There are a number of men, "sometimes of equally great erud-
ition " as those with whom Schweitzer deals, who have written
lives of Jesus, as W# D. Mackenzie remarks in Hastings Ency-
clopedia of Religion and Ethics, but who "have not made the
history of the circle which he is describing and their names
and works, for the most part, constitute a pathetic stream-
1
let at the foot of his pages."
(2) The Viewpoint and its Original Element. Von Reimarus
zu Wrede is for the author a suitable title just because in
the critical movement treated he sees not a number of dis-
connected attempts at construction of the life of Jesus, but
a single process, unified under the aspect of a tragedy of
the historical study of Jesus. The development, as it is
conceived, is Hegelian in its dramatic form (though Schweit-
zer does not try to present it in that mold), for it is an
episode of progress in which the liberal and rational life
of Jesus produced by the historical sense of the 19th Century
arises as antithesis to the supernatural life of traditional
theology, but reveals by its own thorough development its
inadequacy and untruth, and emerges in the eschatological
conception.
A much more apt designation for the object of study is
thus given by the English translation in its title, The Quest
of the Historical Jesus . What we have here is in reality the
epic-tragedy of a heroic quest; that to find the Christ of
modern Christianity in history, in the prosecution of which
liberal theology destroys its own faith. Summarizing this
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episode in the "Schlussbetrachtung" of the Geschichte,
Schweitzer says,
Es ist der Leben-Jesu-Forschung merkwurdig ergangen.
Sie zog aus, um den historischen Jesus zu finden,
und meinte, sie kdnnte ihn dann, wie er ist, als Leh-
rer und Heiland in unsere Zeit hineinstellen. Sie
Iflste die Bande, mit denen er seit Jahrhunderten an
den Pelsen der Kirchenlehre gefesselt war, und freute
sich, als wieder Leben und Bewegung in die G-estalt
kam und sie den historischen Menschen Jesus auf sich
zukommen sah. Aber er blieb nicht stehen, sondern ging
an unserer Zeit vorflber und kehrte in die seinige
zuHlck. Das eben befremdete und erschreckte die Theo-
logie der letzten Jahrzehnte, dass sie ihn mit allem
Deuteln und aller G-ewalttat in unserer Zeit nicht
festhalten konnte, sondern ihn Ziehen lassen musste.l
Schweitzer presents three stages in the critical study of
2
Jesus' life, connected with three problems. The first period
was concerned largely with miracle, and was brought to a close
by David Priedrich Strauss, who settled that, as far as the
main stream of scholarship was concerned, the life of Jesus
was to be purely historical rather than supernatural. The
second problem was concerned Y/ith sources, and it was deter-
mined by the Tubingen School, that the life of Jesus should
be Synoptic rather than Johannlne. The epoch concerned with
the question was closed, and a new one was opened by Johannes
3
Weiss, "by whom the general conception of the Kingdom was
4
first rightly grasped," - that is, as future and apocalyptic.
It was this third problem about the life of Jesus, eschat-
ological or not eschatological, brought to the front by Johan-
nes Weiss but so far only narrowly considered, with which
Schweitzer was concerned. To Johannes Weiss, and in some
measure to Reimarus, who was "der erste und einzlge vor Joh-
annes Weiss....der es erkannt und ausgesprochen hatte, dass
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1
Jesu Predigt nur eschatologish war," Schweitzer attributes
one of the most illuminating suggestions for the solution of
the problems in the life of Jesus, and for the creation of a
true historical picture, in so far as that is possible.
Schweitzer* s criticism of the eschatological school was
that it had not used this suggestion to the full extent of
its value. He says,
Es 1st geradezu unerklfcLich, dass die eschatologische
Schule mit der Elnsicht in die Eschatologie der Reich-
gottespredigt nicht auch zugleich auf den G-edanken des
Dogmatischen in der G-eschichte Jesu kam. Eschatologie
1st ja nichts anderes als dogmatische G-eschichte, wel-
che in die naturliche hineinragt und sie aufhebti 1st
es nicht schona priori dass einzig Denkbare, dass der-
jenige, der seine messianische Parusie in Ba*lde erwart-
et, in seinem Handeln nicht mehr von dem naturlichen
G-ang der Ereignisse, sondern nur von jener Srwartung
bestimmt wird? Das chaotische Durcheinander in den
Berichten hltte darauf fuhren imHssen, dass hier die
vulkanische Natur eines unermesslichen Selbstbewusst-
seins, nicht irgend welche Nachl&ssigkeit Oder Manier
in der Ueberlieferung, die Ereignisse durcheinander
geworfen hat. 2
It is this thought, "of the 'dogmatic' element in the history
of Jesus," which is the unique feature in Schweitzer's view
of Jesus and which makes it so revolutionary.
(3) Rejection of the "Liberal Life of Jesus." The liberal
life of Jesus which Schweitzer rejects as artificial and un-
true is that which modern critical scholarship had constructed
to displace the supernatural Christ of traditional theology.
In it the miraculous has received rational explanation, and
the eschatological sayings have been rejected as spurious.
Its Jesus is the ethical teacher who sublimated the popular
conceptions of Messiah and Kingdom of G-od, who taught an ad-
vanced morality, who inaugurated a new society of men charact-
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erized "by trust of G-od and human brotherhood, and who died
for its establishment.
With this picture, which he regards as a historical fals-
ification, Schweitzer makes no quarter. His pronouncement is,
Der Jesus von Nazareth, der als Mess las auftrat, die
Sittlichkeit des G-ottesreiches verkilindete, das Himmel-
reich auf Erden grundete und starb, urn seinem Werke
die Weihe zu geben, hat nie existiert. Es ist eine
G-estalt, die vom Rationalismus entworfen, vom Liberal
-
ismus belebt und von der modernen Theologie in ein
geschichtllches G-ewand gekleidet wurde.^
The rationalistic bias of our age has led us to project back
into the past what belonged to our own time. It has created
the historical Jesus in its own image, and offered to the
race not the spirit of Jesus itself but a Jesus "constructed
by modern theology." Jesus as a man who enters into our age,
one like ourselves, he asserts, never existed. Thus, he says,
zwischen dem modern-historischen und dem eschatolog-
ischen Leben Jesu keine Vermittlung existiert 2 .,...
G-esetzt dass nur die H&lfte, nur ein Drittel der
Wrede und der Skizze des Lebens Jesu^gemeinsamen
kritischen Beobachtungen sich als richtig erweist,
so ist die modern-historische G-eschichtsauffassung
urn ihren Besitzstand gebracht.4
The critical objections which are here referred to are
5
chiefly these. Theology reads in between the lines of the
Markan accounts, by means of psychological conjecture, a
development of Jesus' conceptions, and an education of the
disciples, of which there is no word in the evangelist. It
makes an unproved distinction of an "historical kernel,"
which means really a use of its conception as a criterion
of historical validity. It has put connecting links of con-
struction between the sections of the G-ospel narrative where
there are really breaks. The complete want of connection in
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the incidents is due to the fact that a dogmatic element
(the Messianic secret of Jesus and all the concealments which
go with it) determined the course. If one adopts the eschat-
ological solution, it"at one stroke raises the Markan account
as it stands, with all its disconnectedness and inconsisten-
cies, into genuine history. 11
1
(4) Schweitzer's Life of Jesus. Schweitzer's picture of
the life of Jesus differs both as regards inner consciousness
and outer circumstance from that with which we are familiar.
Schweitzer recognizes that it is strange, "but because there
is "something quite incomprehensible" to us in the ministry
of Jesus itself.
Jesus' public ministry, according to Schweitzer, lasted
less than a year. After coming in contact with John the
Baptist, He appeared in Galilee proclaiming the near approach
of the Kingdom of G-od. He expected this about harvest time,
and so after a few weeks at the most He sent out His disciples
to make known as speedily as possible what was to happen. He
23
told them in plain words (Mt. x ) that He did not expect to
see them again in the existing age, but the Parousia of the
Son of Man, identical with the dawn of the Kingdom, would
take place before they could make a hasty journey through
Israel to announce it.
Though thus publicly announced, the coming of the Kingdom
was in a sense a secret. There was nothing in the outward
circumstances to justify this prediction, or that of imminent
suffering such as was foretold at the sending out of the
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Twelve. The grounds were not historical, hut were in the
subjective ethical earnestness of Jesus cast in the doctrin-
al mold of the time.
Jesus had also a second secret - the conviction that in
the "time of the end" Ke was destined to be the Messiah. The
only persons to whom this was revealed were Peter, James,
and John, until Peter, in spite of a promise of secrecy, in-
advertently let it be known to the other disciples. About
it, Jesus enjoined secrecy upon the Twelve, but Judas reveal-
ed it to the High Priest, and its confession by Jesus upon
question was the ground of His condemnation.
A third secret, that of the Passion, developed after the
return of the Tw/elve from their mission, and on account of
the delay of the Kingdom and of its antecedent period of
suffering. Jesus' conviction of the imminence of these
events was not weakened, but, since they did not come, it
seemed that something beyond the movement of repentance had
to be done. Jesus conceived that G-od had heard the prayer
for deliverance from tribulation which had accompanied that
for the coming of the Kingdom, and had made possible its
vicarious accomplishment in a definite voluntary suffering
in His own person. He accordingly went up to Jerusalem with
the purpose of suffering for others and thus bringing in the
divine Kingdom.
Schweitzer thinks that a liberal and rational construct-
ion of the life of Jesus presents insurmountable difficult-
ies and incomprehensible problems, but that these difficult-
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ies and problems are overcome "by the eschatological concept-
ion. However unnatural the eschatological outlook may be to
us, to attribute it to Jesus explains what is puzzling in
His life. What is peculiar in His life is due to the fact
that its course was not governed by historical events but by
doctrinal presuppositions.
In this representation of the life of Jesus there are
several especially striking and significant differences from
the usual picture. Jesus 1 Kingdom of God was a wholly future
1
one, and was to be established by Divine intervention. Of
it Jesus was not a founder, but only an announcer. His diff-
erence from John the Baptist was only in His secret Messianic
consciousness. Not only was His Messianship not proclaimed
to the public, or suspected by it, but it was for Jesus Him-
self a wholly future state in which He was to appear in the
2
universal transformation. In no case did Jesus use the term
"Son of Man," as theologians have supposed, for an existent,
humble, ethical Messiahship, or to educate the public to
such a conception. He had two uses of the term, one with
those who knew His secret, and another with the uninitiated,
in which it was not apparent that He thought of Himself as
identical with the coming Son of Man. Jesus' purpose in
general was not pedagogic. He sought to educate neither the
public nor His disciples. The prediction of the coming of
the Kingdom was His only message, and beyond that His words
were in parables which contained a supernatural knowledge
which was only for those who had ears to hear - that is, who
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were chosen of God. That His ministry was not one of teach-
ing was determined by the fact of His apocalyptic outlook.
This involved also the further consequence that Jesus taught
no positive ethics, but only a probationary righteousness in
1
view of the impending "end of all things." Social situations
and ethical precepts would be transcended in the Kingdom upon
whose threshold they stood, and what Jesus taught was an
"interims-Ethik. " It was not meant to be a permanent and uni-
versal code of conduct, but a statement of what was fitting
as occasion and preparation for the coming of the Kingdom.
It was not an absolute ethics, but relative.
With the death of Jesus, the divine intervention in human
affairs did not occur, however. There was no apocalyptic
coming of the Kingdom nor Parousia of the "Son of Man." The
early Christian Church accordingly began to reconstruct both
its eschatology and its Christology. Jesus, v/ho had not
thought of Himself as a present but only as a future "Son of
Man," was represented as Messiah in His earthly life. This
reconstruction of viewpoint occurred in some measure even in
2
Mark, but is manifested most fully in the G-ospel of John.
The latter deliberately transforms the eschatological elements,
and destroys the historical Jesus in order to present His
earthly life as that of the Messiah. There arose the concept-
ion of a spiritual Messiahship, and of an inner Kingdom. The
"Interims-Ethik" became an absolute ethics. The eschatologic-
al expectations were transformed into the Christian conception
of immortality
•
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3. The G-eschichte der paullnischen Fors Chung .
(1) Occasion and Field of Investigation, In advancing
such a new and divergent conception of the ministry of Jesus,
it became Schweitzer's task to show how this set of beliefs
and events developed into early Greek theology. If there is
no natural and possible transition, the theory is condemned
by the facts of history, regardless of any degree of consistence
and applicability in its relation to the G-ospel material. Hie
responsibility for this further inquiry Schweitzer recognized
and undertook in his G-eschlchte der paullnischen Forschung
t
1911, to which he refers as "die Fortsetzung meiner Von Reim-
arus zu Wrede betitelten, 1906 erschienenen G-eschichte der
1
Leben-Jesu-Fors chung .
"
The work follows the general method of that which dealt
with the critical investigation of the life of Jesus, present-
ing a history of the study of Paulinism, but in this case,
instead of attaching his own views to the historical survey,
Schweitzer has left them to be developed in a later work,
under the title Die Mystlk de s Apostels Paulus , which has
not yet appeared. Here, beyond the historical treatment of
the Pauline study, only an analysis of the problem which it
confronts, and the limiting conditions of its solution, are
definitely offered.
In marked contrast to Schweitzer's superlative praise of
German scholarship in its investigation of the life of Jesus
are his judgments upon its work in Pauline theology. "Die
paulinische Forschung," he says, "stellt nicht eben eine
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G-lanzleistung der Wissenschaft dar. G-elehrsamkeit wurde
reichlich aufp;ewandt; aber es fehlte am Denken und Ueber-
1
legen." The faults which have made It so impotent have
"been want of plan, and failure to see the scope of the prob-
lem. Schweitzer says, "Statt eine geschlossene Diagnose zu
versuchen, behandelte man die einzelnen Symptome fur sich
2
mit den Mitteln, die gerade zur Hand waren," with the result
that the investigation has followed intricate paths and en-
gaged in long and devious wanderings.
(2) Paul's Independence from Greek Thought. According to
Schweitzer, "Das Problem (of Pauline study) h&ngt in den
beiden grossen Fragen, was die Lehre Pauli mit dem Urchrist-
3
entum und was sie mit dem Griechentum gemeinsam habe." A
serious, though not insurmountable, difficulty for the sol-
ution of these problems arises out of the fact that the gen-
eral features of the dogma of early Christianity have to be
derived from Paul, but, on the other hand, the problem as a
whole is simplified by the fact that the second of the fund-
amental questions has been clearly answered by the history
of the Pauline study. The answer is that,
Paulinismus und Griechentum haben nur die religiose
Sprache, aber keine G-edanken miteinander gemeinsam,
Der Apostel hat das Chris tentum nicht hellenisiert
.
Seine Vorstellungen sind von denen der griechischen
Philosophie und denen der Mysterienreligionen in
gleicher Weise unterschieden.^"
The bulk of the book is given to the demonstration in
detail of the above conclusion. It treats both the "theolog-
ians" who assert the influence of philosophic Hellenism and
the "students of comparative religion" who refer Paul's
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theology to the Oriental mystery-religions, who in their
contradictory derivations of the features of Paulinism give
"a case of Satan's "being driven out by Beelzebub."
There are two general types of considerations on which
the conclusion is based. The first is that when the assumpt-
ion of Hellenic influence has been adhered to with courage
and logical consistency, it has led to results which are com-
patible only with a radically altered tradition and history
of Christianity, in which either the oldest Christian writings
are referred to the second century or else Christianity is
regarded as originally a product of Hellenistic-Oriental syn-
cretism. On the other hand, Schweitzer says,
Die Erkl&rung. . • .die zeigt, dass das System des Heiden-
apostels aus den elementarsten eschatologischen Premiss-
en erwMchst, und die zugleich begreiflich macht, warum
die folgende Generation auf der von lhm betretenen Bahn
nicht weiter-gehen kann hat seine Urchristlichkeit und,
in dieseni Sinne, auch die „Echtheit" der Hauptschrieben
bewiesen.
The second objection to attributing Hellenic influence is
that the alleged affinities cannot stand an examination which
takes account of their real essence and of differences in
which the analogous features are conditioned. Paul's concep-
tion of the spirit in general, Schweitzer says, is not Greek
as is commonly assumed because of the antithesis of spirit
and flesh, but is a development of primitive Christian doc-
trine. The conception is not wholly spiritual but "natur-
haft," and it stands in indissoluble relation with a doctrine
of the future age which is not ethical but physical.
Paul's doctrines of sacraments and of redemption are the
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features which are sometimes referred to the mystery-relig-
ions, since they are without basis in Late Judaism, but
several points of caution against this view need to be ob-
served. First, Paulinism must be kept distinct from any
general New Testament religion governed by Johannine doctrine,
which in common v/ith the Greek Fathers and the mystery- relig-
ions uses the conception of rebirth, over against Paul, who
1
speaks always of death and resurrection. Secondly, the ex-
tension of these cults was from the beginning of the second
century onward, and "Paulus die Mysterienreligionen, wie sie
uns vorllegen, wohl nicht gekannt haben kann, weil sie in
2
dieser ausgebildeten G-estalt damals noch nicht existierten 1.1
Thirdly, no such general mystery-religion as the persons
interested in making the comparison develop from the various
3
mystery-ideas actually existed.
Schweitzer does not leave the case to be settled thus,
however, but considers the special cases of analogy in sac-
rament. So far as the cultus meal is concerned all that is
certain is that in both cases such a meal existed, and no
4
connection direct or indirect has been shown; it would be
only by violence to his words that anyone could ascribe to
Paul the conception of a sacramental eating and drinking of
5
the body and blood of Christ. The attachment of signific-
ance to lustrations belongs to all religions and does not
constitute a connecting peculiarity. For Paul's distinctive
conception of baptism, which has nothing to do with purific-
ation but effects a possession of pneuma, the mystery-religions
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1
have no analogy. According to Schweitzer,
Zu beachten ist, dass das ischatologiacne in den
Sakramenten Pauli u"Derail durchbricht. Sie wirken
hicht Wiedergeourt , sondern Auf erstehung. Etwas, was
in der nScnsten Zukunft offenbare RealltSt sein wird,
machen sie vorgreifend schon jetzt unsicntoar wirk-
lich. Die griechischen Mysterien sind zeitlos . . . .Bei
Paulus ist das Sakramentale zeitlicn begrenzt. Die
heiligen Kandlungen existieren erst zeit kurzem und
sind auf diese letzte G-eneration beschra*nkt. Ihre
Kraft kommt innen von dem her, was sicn In der Welt
der Endzeit abspielt. Sie macnen die GlaMibigen dem
Herrn darin glelch, dass sie sie einige Weltaugen-
blicke vor der Zeit auferstehen lassen, wenn auch
nach aussen nichts davon offenbar wird. Es handelt
sich urn elne PR0DR0MAIER3CHEINUNG des nahen Weltendes.
Wollte man von der Eschatologie abstrahieren, so
wilirden die paulinischen Sakramente sinn- und wirkungs-
los. Sie sind in die Zeit zwischen der Auferstehung
Jesu und seiner von der Totenauferstehung begleiteten
Parusie eingespannt. Ihre Energie ruht in der vergang-
enen und der noch au3stehenden Tatsache .der
kommende Auf erstehungszustand fiHr die kurze Zeitspanne,
die dem jetzigen Weltablauf noch bleibt, schon vor-
weggenommen wird. Die Wiedergeourt aber setzt eine
uneschatologische Weltanschauung voraus, in der das
Individuum mehr Oder weniger mit einer normalen Lebens-
dauer rechnet, ftfr die es ein neben und u*ber dem ird-
ischen einhergehendes, inneres, go'ttliches Sein sucht.
Erst in dem Augenblick, wo die Eschatologie zurflck-
tritt, kann der griechis ch-mysteriehhaf te Begriff der
Wiedergeburt den alten mystisch-eschatologischen der prQ-
leptischen Auferstehung verdr&ngen. Darum taucht er bei
Justin und im vierten Evangelium alsbald auf. Von da an
wirkt die Taufe die Wiedergeourt. Bei Paulus schuf sie
nur vorzeitiges Sterben und Auferstehen. 2
The solution of the question of the relation of the second
factor, the mystical doctrine of redemption, to the mystery-
religions has already been suggested in what has been said
about the sacraments and their effect. What is brought about
is not a regeneration, but a proleptic resurrection which is
relative to the coming end of things, - it is "keine Vergott-
ung. .. .sondern nur die Versetzung in die tfbersinnliche Kdrper-
lichkeit, die mit einem kommenden neuen Weltzustand gegeben
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1
1st." "Orientalisch-griechische und paulinische Mystik als
entsprechende G-ro'ssen behandeln, " Schweitzer says, "heisst
ein Stillck in Zweiviertel- und eines in Dreivierteltaxt mit-
einander auff&iren und dabei einen einhe it lichen Rhythrnus
2
heraush$ren.
"
Of the fact that Paul does not present a Hellenization of
Christian thought, his relation to the later history of dogma
would give further evidence, Schweitzer says. It is in the
doctrine of rebirth, as has already been noted, that Paul
differs from both John and the mystery-religions. The differ-
ences which exist between Paul and Jesus are also differences
between the early Christian community and Jesus which arose
3
as the logical consequences of His death and resurrection.
They consist of the theories of what pertains to the special
time between the latter event and the expected Parousia. The
most radical change in Christian thought (due to the delay
in the fulfillment of this expectation) was the decline of
the eschatological element, and it falls between Paul and the
4
Fourth Evangelist. The fact is, that Christian dogma does
not, and through the force of historical development could
5
not, base itself upon Paul. It is through recognition of
the eschatological character of his doctrines that the fact
of its independence from him becomes understandable.
(3) Paulinism a Development of Eschatological Doctrine.
All that is distinctive in the mission and doctrine of the
Apostle to the G-entiles develops naturally out of Late Jud-
aism and of the Christian intensification of the eschatologic-
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al conception, Schweitzer "believes. How this is true in
the cases of Paul's doctrine of sacraments and doctrine of
redemption has already been shown. Furthermore, this view
of the origin and character of Paulinism reveals the Apostle's
universalism and attitude toward the Law as neither mere
practical attitudes nor Hellenizations , but as positions
reached "Rein durch die Art, wie er die urchristliche Lehre
1
systematise!! zu Ende dachte.." "Den zureichenden G-rund f^lr
diese Anschauung findet er," Schweitzer says, "in der besond-
2
eren Weltlage zwischen Tod und Parusie Christ!."
(4) Conclusion. Schweitzer does not profess to give a
thorough constructive investigation of Pauline doctrine in
the G-eschichte der paulinischen Fors chung
.
However, it is
apparent from the above treatment that he does go beyond his
criticism of the attempts to find elements of Creek philos-
ophy and Oriental mystery-religion in Paul to suggest that
the apparent confusion and lack of unity in Pauline doctrine
may be resolved, and the problems of Pauline study may find
solution, in the eschatological viewpoint.
While this work is helpful for understanding Schweitzer's
whole thought system, it has fewer contributions of a phil-
osophical nature than the Ceschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung .
This may be attributed to both its more strictly historical
character and its definite place in the justification of the
eschatological conception of Jesus. The philosophical pre-
dispositons of the author strike fire, however, in the con-
cluding paragraphs, where he says,
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Freilich ko'nnte es sein, dass diese „positive Krltik"
denen, die auf alsbald dogmatisch und homiletisch aus-
milnzbare Srgebnisse sehen, arg „negativ" vorkommt. Das
hat aber nichts zu bedeuten. Es 1st das Los der Klein-
glaVibigen der Wahrheit, dass sie alfl echte Petriner r8m-
ischer und protestantischer Observanz jammernd da ver-
sinken, wo die an den G-eist glaubenden Pauliner auf dem
Meere der Ideen ruhig und sicher einherschreiten.
1
4. Schweitzer's Attitude Toward Eschatology.
Definition of Schweitzer's attitude toward eschatology is
needed. In finding the thought of Jesus and of the early
church dominated by es chat o logical expectations, Schweitzer
does not, as some have supposed, mean to force these upon
Christianity, as belonging to its essence. With Jesus they
were not abnormal phenomena, but were the chief values in his
spiritual inheritance. In His attitude to them, He was relat-
ed in a rational way to a prospect which was socially regarded
as possible. It is only when today, after the course of hist-
ory has shown that this idea is not G-od's plan, persons still
try to cherish that hope, that it can be regarded as a phan-
2
tasy.
For Schweitzer the life of Jesus is "die Tat der grdssten
Selbstbe jahung der Eschatologie, zugleich aber auch....der
3
Eschatologie Ende." It inaugurated, he says, a spiritualizat-
ion of which the final consequence was to be that the values
of its supersensuous elements were to be realized only in
present earthly spirituality, and their transcendental feat-
ures were to be regarded as only the rubbish of an eschatolog-
4
ical world-view. Jesus' Messianic consciousness introduces,
he asserts,
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jene selbstherrliche Vergewaltigung des Jenseits durch
das Diesseits . .welche wir riUckblickend als die G-eschi eli-
te des Christentums erfassen, die wir an uns selbst als
das Wesen des religiflsen Fortschreitens und Erlebens
erleben, deren Ende wir nicht absehen noch ahnen
In gewaltiger Revolution wurde, im G-eiste der Urtat des
Selbstbewusstseins Jesu, im Widerspruch rait gewissen
der gewissesten seiner Worte die Ethik weltbejahend.
G-ewaltiger aber wird die Revolution sein, wenn die letzt-
en stehengebliebenen Trimmer der jenseitig-iilbersinnlichen
Weltanschauung werden abgetragen werden, urn den Platz ftfr
die rein diesseitig-wirkliche geistige Welt freizulegen.
Alles widerspruchsvolle Vermitteln und Aufbauen der mod-
ernen Theologie 1st nur ein Versuch, die letzte Enteschat-
ologisierung der Religion aufzuhalten, ein notwendiger
und ausslchtsloser Versuch. .Bei dem letzten Schrei am
Kreuz ist die ganze eschatologisch-u'bersinnliche Welt in
sich selbst zusammengestflrzt, und als reale geistige
Welt blieb nur die diesseitige, an die Sinnlichkeit ge-
bundene, die Jesus mit seinem allma'chtigen Wort in der
Welt, die er verneinte, erschaffen hatte.l
2
Schweitzer's view of Jesus is to be treated later, but it
needs to be said here, that it is an equally great misunder-
standing of Schweitzer, on the other hand, to suppose that he
regards the eschatological expectation in Jesus and in the
early church as a negative element which detracts from their
3
significance. Jesus 1 theoretical world-view is not what is
significant for our day, and is not the measure of His value.
It does not matter how Jesus conceived of the Kingdom or of
the way in which it was to be brought about; what is of con-
sequence is that He had such intense faith in the overthrow
of the actual by the ideal, and that He centered His whole
life upon the realization of this. In these features He
exhibited the true nature of man, and revealed God.
Jesus* outlook was otner-worldly and worid-negating. It
was world-accepting only in that it strove to bring the super-
natural into the present, and in the fact that "er durch die
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Erfahrung der Jahrhunderte in der G-eschi elite zur Weltbejahung
1
fortschritt . " Our modern view, on the contrary, is world-
accepting, and does not rest in Jesus' outlook. The norm,
Schweitzer says, is
Fi!ir das Allgemeine, unsere Welt- und G-esellschafts-
formen: Weltbejahung, im bewussten Widerspruch mit
der Anschauung Jesu, weil die Welt sich selber be-
jaht hatl Diese allgemeine Weltbejahung aber, wenn
sie christlich sein soli, muss in dem Einzelgeist
durch die persflnliche Weltvernelnung, welche Jesu
Worte predigen, verchristlicht und verkl&rt werden. 2
When we are freed from dogmatic supernatural prepossessions
such as ruled in the thought-world of Jesus, world-affirm-
ation occurs in us automatically, Schweitzer says, but it
needs to be the energetic affirmation of the spiritual ideal
against the actual. Schweitzer declares,
Aus diesem Kampf allein kann unserer Zeit die relig-
iose Energie kommen. Es war aber G-efahr, dass die
moderne Theologie, urn Ruhe zu haben, die antiprotest-
antische Weltverneinung in den Worten Jesu aufhob,
den Bogen entspannte und den Protestanti sinus aus
einer religio'sen eine Kulturmacht werden liess.3
The spirit of religion cannot be one of conformity to the
world; it must be one of otherness, even while it is not
transcendental and while its spirituality is related to earth-
ly existence. G-enuine religion and morality must derive from
the personal spirit, not from consideration of the world or
from adaptation to it. Thus, though the particular eschat-
ological view of Jesus was transient, the spirit of His life
was eternal. Schweitzer says,
Man hat gemeint, dass die eingestandene Eschatologie
die Bedeutung dieser Worte fiHr unsere Zeit aufheben
wurde Nun besteht aoer das Ewige der Worte
Jesu gerade darin, dass sie aus einer eschatologischen
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Weltanschauung heraus gesprochen und von einem Geiste
aufge stellt sind, fuY den die damalige irdische Welt,
ihre geschichtlichen und gesellschaftlichen Zustande
schon nicht mehr exlstlerten. Sie passen daher, wie
sie sind, in jede Welt, denn in jeder Welt heben sie
den, der ihnen ins Auge zu sehen wagt und nicht daran
deutelt und dreht, aus seiner Zeit und seiner Welt
heraus und machen inn innerlich frei, dass er geschickt
wird in seiner Welt und seiner Zeit schlichte Kraft
Jesu zu sein.-1-
The eschatological view of the history of the world falls
away, but, within an affirmative attitude toward natural exist-
ence, the spirit of critical distinction from the actual world,
and of earnest effort to bring the spiritual into the present,
which belongs to the ethical subject and is exemplified in
Jesus, continues to work. It is not necessary to reconstruct
the life and viewpoint of Jesus as a model for the modern
Christian, Reconstructions of the consciousness of Jesus,
conforming with our own psychology, are powerless and ineffect
ual, but His words, without reference to His theoretical views
(which were, at any rate, certainly those of His own day and
not of ours), are able to convey their meaning and to work
their influence in the life of the individual.
5» Die psy chiatrische Beurteilung Jesu .
In the interpretation of Jesus' outlook as eschatological
there is for Schweitzer no depreciation of Him. Hogg appreh-
ends this clearly where, in an article in the International
Journal of Missions , he says, "We must realize that he rev-
eres our Lord, because of, more than in spite of, that aspect
in his understanding of Christ's life enterprise which offends
the average Liberal Christian." Throughout his whole treat-
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merit it is Schweitzer's assumption that Jesus was not a
visionary enthusiast in devoting Himself to the actualizat-
ion of the eschatological expectation, "but a morally earnest
spirit addressing himself to the most spiritual and ethical
feature which belonged to the social tradition and conscious-
ness.
The direct examination of this question of the mental
health of Jesus, Schweitzer took up in the dissertation which
he presented at the University of Strassburg for the degree
of Doctor of Medicine, under the title Kritik der von mediz-
inlscher Selte verffff ent lichten Pathographien iliber Jesus , and
in the later slightly enlarged form of this entitled Die
1
psychiatris che Beurte llung Jesu . his purpose, as he express-
es it in the preface, is to give the conjecture that Jesus was
somewhat psychopathic, vrhich had first been offered by David
Friedrich Strauss and oft repeated, a thorough examination.
Along with the special obligation for this investigation which
he acknowledges as a result of his conclusions in the histor-
2
ical field, he points, quite properly, to his special qual-
ifications for the task as established by his former theolog-
ical and historical studies and his medical training.
Schweitzer first makes the criticism of the writers who
have interpreted Jesus' consciousness as pathological, that
3
they are uncritical in their choice and use of sources. In
a preliminary sketch of the results of critical study of the
literature Schweitzer excludes the Talmud and Apocryphal
Gospels and the single tradition of Luke, and urges caution
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about the Fourth G-ospel, from whose doctrinal representation
of Jesus three-fourths of the evidence of mental abnormality
1
is drawn. Matthew, with the exception of the first two chap-
ters, and Mark, allowing for some misunderstandings and con-
fusion of the tradition, are regarded as dependable, and in
certain particulars as of striking genuineness.
From this exclusion of the fanciful youth stories and of
the transcendent claims of the Fourth G-ospel, Schweitzer does
not, hov/ever, profit as much as might be expected, since the
Jesus whom he finds in the Markan narrative is not the ethic-
al teacher known to liberal theology, but a purely eschatolog-
ical prophet. He represents the conclusion of historical
research to be "dass die Erwartung der messianischen Wieder-
kunft das Zentrum der G-edanken Jesu bildet und sein Empfinden,
Wollen und Handeln viel stUrker beherrscht, als man bisher
2
annahm," and "dass Jesus sich filir den Messias gehalten und
seine glanzvolle Wiederkunft auf den Wolken des Himmels er-
3
wartet hat."
Schweitzer sketches the life of Jesus briefly and on the
lines of his earlier writings. Of the period before Jesus'
public ministry little is known. With four brothers and some
sisters, He v/as a member of the family of a carpenter. That
He was descended on His father's side from David, Schweitzer
4
thinks, "darf als gesichert gelten," though this claim has
been represented as an instance of the expansive disposition
of paranoia. The public ministry was characterized through-
out by the proclamation of the nearness of the Kingdom of G-od.
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The implications of this message did not need to be described
in detail, for the system of thought was familiar to the hear-
ers. Of the ruler of the future kingdom, however, there were
diverse conceptions. The prophetic expectation of a descend-
ant of David, and the apocalyptic notion of a neavenly being
who would have the form of a "Son of Man", were both current.
For this unreconciled contradiction, Jesus, in the expectation
of the imminent appearance of the Kingdom, had a personal sol-
ution - namely, that He was appointed to the dignity of future
Messiahship, and that in the transformation to be effected by
the coming of the Kingdom He would be revealed as "Son of Man."
This He did not Include in His proclamation of the Kingdom, and
only toward, the last did it become known to his disciples.
Througn its betrayal to the High Priest, and Jesus' confession
of it under question, it became the occasion of His death,
which He welcomed as a vicarious fulfillment of the sufferings
of the final time, which it appeared He must voluntarily bring
upon Himself in order to usher in the Kingdom.
This representation of the life of Jesus, Schweitzer thinks,
does not give ground for the assumption of a delusional devel-
opment such as is asserted by the writers whom he considers.
Such a supposition "Schon a priori wenig Wahrscheinlichkeit
1
fu*r sich hat," Schweitzer asserts, because, despite the common-
ness of such religious paranoia with accompanying illusions,
which Blnet-Sang le' shows by a long list of clinical observations,
one must not forget that these cases "zumeist bald nach Ausbruch
ihrer Krankheit interniert werden und dass es gerade diese
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Formen nicht sind die sich Anhitnger und JiUnger erwerben und
1
Sekten gmHnden." Neither an origin of a delusional idea
nor a development of a delusional system can be exhibited.
For the wider question, whether Jesus' declarations and
conduct give warrant for one to conceive of a pathological
consciousness, Schweitzer says, it is to be taken as a rule
that whatever religious conceptions He shared with His con-
temporaries and took over from tradition are not to be re-
garded as pathological no matter how alien and inconceivable
2
they may be to our way of thought. Disregard of this con-
sideration, along with an uncritical attitude toward the
sources, has been a chief fault of the pathographers , who
have, without show of warrant, promptly classified as an ab-
normal phenomenon whatever was unique and strange from our
point of view.
The conceptions involved consist of belief in the rule of
this world by evil spirits and in demon-possession; in the
imminence of the coming of G-od's Kingdom; in the appearance
of the Messiah and of good angels with the beginning of the
new age; in the accompaniment of the coming of the Kingdom
by a period of tribulation, damnation of the wicked, resurr-
ection and transformation of the righteous and elect, and a
glorification of nature with super-earthly fruitfulness ; in
the vicarious suffering of the Messiah; and in a period of
earthly humanity of the Messiah. The final idea does not
appear in the confused thought of Late Judaism about the per-
son of the Messiah, but for one who attempted to conceive and
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clarify the divergences, Schweitzer says, "gab es keine andere
LiJsung als die, dass er inn noch in der irdischen Weltzeit aus
den Nacn&ommen Davids geboren sein und dann bei der Verwand-
lung, die fiitr alle Erwab.lten mit dem Weltende gegeoen war, in
die ftberirdische Herrlichkeit des Messias-Menschensohnes er-
1
hoben werden lless," It being understood that for Jewish
thought "dies mit einer Abstammung von Gott in metaphysischem
2
Sinn gar nichts zu tun hat." The belief in the imminence of
the events was not general, but it was prepared for by the
movement which arose from John the Baptist. Together with the
former idea it meant that the future Messiah was already to be
sought among the living descendants of David. As a human
being he would be destined to endure with the nation the period
of the tribulation, or, as Jesus came to think (under the in-
fluence of Isaiah 53) when there was delay of the expected
suffering, to undergo it voluntarily in their behalf. These
special ideas had thus a normal character within the general
frame of the others, all of which were elements of social
belief and tradition. However strange they may be to us, they
are no more pathological, Schweitzer might say, than a modern
man's assumption of a heavenly future state.
That Jesus applied His conception of the Messiah directly
to Himself is striking, but it falls far short of being evid-
ence of a pathological condition, and there are no indications
of a course of development of the idea governed by inner
causes. The relations of Jesus to His opponents, who were
real not fancied, appear also to be quite diametrically opposite
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to those of the psychopath, being not restrained but open and
active. So far as illusions are concerned, the evidence comes
cniel'ly from tne traditional and less authentic elements in
the G-ospels, or depends upon over- literal interpretation. In
any degree to which they are estaolished by the dependable
sources, they would not indicate a psychopathic condition.
Most of the questioned features are understandaole and ration-
al from the point of view of Judaic thought; even Jesus' de-
termination to bring about His own death, strange as it is,
is a necessary feature of the es chat o logical outlook. The
judgments of the writers who find a psychopathic condition in
Jesus, Schweitzer concludes, "weder der Kritlk des G-eschichts-
1
forschers noch der des Psychiaters standhalten.
"
6. Theological and Philosophical Conclusions.
(1) The Figure of Jesus. We have already quoted Schweitzer
as declaring that the Jesus who appeared as Messiah, founded
the Kingdom of God on earth, and died to consecrate His work,
2
never existed. He recognizes, to be sure, a true historical
Jesus, for one result of the eschatological conception is to
establish the credibility of the Markan account, but He is a
purely escnato logical Jesus. He belongs to His own age, and
will not be modernized. The historic spirit, when it is
sincere and relinquishes its apologetic purpose, destroys
the modern life of Jesus which it had created, and the true
historic Jesus who appears is one who is to us, in our diff-
erent thought system, a stranger and an enigma.
It is apparent that so far as the ethical Jesus of our
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modern religion, the Jesus in whom we can rind our humanitar-
ian ideals and base their authority, is concerned, Scnweitzer's
results are solely destructive. Schweitzer states this con-
clusion as directly and clearly as it could be put for him.
"Es gibt nichts Negativeres , " he sets down at tne conclusion
of nis work, "als das Ergebnis der Leben-Jesu-Forschung."
In nis intellectual inquiry he appears indifferent to
religious interests and to what might be left as a basis for
religion. In fact ne declares,
Wer als ein Bewunderer des Rechts und der Kraft des
wahren Rationalismus die Unbefangenheit der modernen
Theologle, welche im G-runde nur ein historisierender
Epigonen-Rationalismus ist, verloren hat, freut sich
der Ohnma'chtigkeit und Klemneit inres vorgeDlichen
historischen Jesus, freut sicn aller derer, die an
diesem Bilde irre werden, freut sich der Ungerechtig-
keit, mit der man es Dek&mpft, rreut sich an seiner
Zerstflrung mitzuarbeiten.^
"It seemed," so Oskar Pfister expresses it, "as though the
spirit of David Friedrich Strauss had come back to life in
2
tne brains of the young Strassburg professor." In the
Gescnichte der Leben-Je su-Forschung of the latter there is,
in truth, throughout the attack on the conception of Jesus
of traditional orthodoxy and of rationalism aliKe the same
clear, calm, inexoraole spirit as characterized tne Leben
Jesu of the former whicn "macht ihn iliber Nacht zum beriilhmten
3
Mann....und vernicntete seme Zukunft."
Back of this intellectual freedom with reference to the
facts of the life of Jesus lies also such an "innere Befrei- .
ung des G-ennHts und Denkens von gewissen religio'sen und dog-
matischen Vorstellungen" as Strauss in his preface claimed
to be his advantage over his contemporaries . Schweitzer says
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of Strauss:
Hegel's Phllosophie hatte ihn befreit; sie hatte ihm
das Verh&ltnis von Idee und Wirklichkeit aufseklSrt,
ihn zur hflheren Erkenntnis der spelmlativen Christ-
ologle gefiUhrt und ilim die Augen filir jene geheimnis-
volle Durchdringung von Endlichkeit und Unendlich-
keit, Qott und Mensch gedffnet.
Die G-ottmenschlichkeit , als die h^chste Idee des
menschlichen Denkens, realisiert sich wirkllch in
der historischen Persflnlichkeit Jesu. Aber w&hrend
das befangene Denken meint, dass diese Realisierung
als Ph&nomen vollkomnien sein muss, weiss das Denken,
welches durch wahrhaftige Kritik zur hflheren Unbe-
fangenheit eingegangen 1st, dass keine Idee sich
historisch vollkommen realisieren kann, ihre Wahr-
heit auch nicht von dem Erweis ihrer vollkommenen
natilirlichen Darstellung abh&ngt, sondern dass die
Vollendung zu stande kommt durch das, was die Idee
in die G-eschichte hineintrllgt Oder durch die Art,
wie die G-eschichte zur Idee erhoben wird
die Tatsache, dass Jesus jene Idee dargestellt und
in der Menschheit zum Leben erweckt hat, ist wirk-
lich und durch keine Kritik nlickga'ngig zu machen.
Sie lebt von dort an bis heute und in alle Ewigkeit.
In dieser Befreihung des G-eistes und in dem Be-
wusstsein, Jesus als Schflpfer der Menschheitsreligion
nicht antasten zu kflnnen, geht Strauss an die histor-
ische Arbeit und schl&gt den Verputz herunter, wiss-
end, dass sein Pickel dem Stein nichts anhaben kann.^
The passage might well apply to Schweitzer himself. In
fact Schweitzer might be said to attribute to Strauss at
this point what in a positive way belongs only to himself.
Schweitzer fills in the dim outline which "hinter dem
mytnischen Vorhang bewegt," of which, Schweitzer admits, a
clear coherent conception "bei ihnen nicht vorausgesetzt
werden darf . " That Strauss 's presentation permits one to
do this, Schweitzer even designates as one of its chief merits.
(2) The Significance of Jesus. This really historical
Jesus, of course,
kann der modernen Theologie nicht mehr die Dienste
leisten, welche sie von dem ihren, halb historisch-
en, halb modernen, in Anspruch nahm
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er (1st) nicht der Jesus Christus, dem unsere religiose
Zelt nach altgewohnter Weise ihre Anschauungen und Er-
kenntnisse in den Mund legen kann, wie sie es bei dem
ihrigen tat.
But, Schweitzer says, the modern Jesus was after all a poor
and weak Jesus, too small because we had forced Him into the
mold of our standards and psychology, weakening His imperious
sayings and making Him of no effect upon our spiritual life.
The value of Jesus is not primarily to the community, in pro-
vision of general religious conceptions such as the fatherhood
of G-od or brotherhood of man, but in His effect upon the in-
dividual, who must reconcile his world-optimism with the world
negating spirit of Jesus. Theology thought to bring our time
to the Jesus who is a spiritual power, through the historic
Jesus; its merit is that through the true historical picture,
it closed this round-about way. Like Jacob of old, it had
wrestled with the Lord to make Him serve it, but had been
obliged to let Him go. But, Schweitzer says,
segnen tut er die, welche mit ihm gerungen haben,
dass sie, ohne ihn mitnehmen zu ktfnnen wie er 1st,
als die so G-ott von Angesicht gesehen haben und
deren Seele genesen 1st, ihre Strasse Ziehen und
mit den M&chten der Welt ka'mpfen. 2
Jesus' significance rests in the fact that He dealt earnest'
ly with the es chat o logical conception. Through the ethics of
repentance and penance He sought by human worth to occasion
the Divine establishment of the Kingdom. He strove to unite
men in the effective enterprise of wresting the Kingdom to
themselves which had been in process since John, and to set in
motion the eachatological development. Then, when the Kingdom
delayed and the general tribulation was withheld, He sought to
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fulfill in Himself the necessary suffering of mankind and to
usher in the Kingdom.
In presenting Jesus' thought as e schat o logical, Schweitzer
has no thought of detracting from His significance. The im-
portance of Jesus is not to be sought in the conceptions which
He held, according to Schweitzer, but in the spirit which His
life manifested, - a spirit which so filled as to shatter the
es chato logical system in which it found itself. He says,
Jesus 1st unserer Welt etwas, well eine gewaltige
geistige Str^mung von ihm ausgegangen ist und auch
unsere Zelt durchflutet. Diese Tatsache wird durch
eine historische Erkenntnis weder erschuttert noch
gefestigt. Sie ist der Realgrund des Chrlstentums
"Nicht der historisch erkannte, sondern nur der in den liens ch-
en geistig auferstandene Jesus kann unserer Zeit etwas sein
2
und ihr he Ifen, " he declares; and
Das Ewige und Bleibende an Jesus ist von geschlcht-
licher Erkenntnis durchaus unabh&ngig und kann nur
aus seinem jetzt in der Welt wirkenden G-eist heraus
begriffen werden. Soviel G-eist Jesu, sovlel wahre
Erkenntnis Jesu .3
(3) Implications for the Philosophical Problems. There
are represented here the elements, both negative and positive,
which go into the formation of Schweitzer's philosophy. Just
as the Kantian idealism had failed to give a deduction of, and
sound philosophical foundation for our religious and ethical
ideas
, so the historical Jesus ceases to be their fountain-
head. "Wir moderne Theologen, " Schweitzer says, "sind zu
stolz auf unsere G-eschichtlichkeit . . . .zu zuversichtlich in
unserem G-lauben an das, was unsere G-eschichtstheologie der
4
Welt geistig bringen kann." History cannot, after all, furnish
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the content and authority for our ideals. The modern theol-
ogy, Schweitzer says, "will ihre Welt-be jahung bei Jesus
1
wiederf inden. Darin liegt ihre Schwa'che." The efforts of
history to provide the basis of our outlook and ideals are
vain. All that it performs is a feat of legerdemain, ex-
tracting from the past what it has imported into it from the
present. Our ethical outlook is new, and cannot be justified
historically; neither, on the other hand, can we bring our-
selves to give it up. The difference, however, should not be
denied; that is to falsify history and to hobble the free
dynamic expression of our own spirit. Our ethical optimism
should find its real spring, and should discover the grounds
of justification which it carries in itself.
The result of the historical inquiry is emancipation from
the dominance of the historical Jesus and relation to His
2
living ethical spirit. This spirit is that which strives
with irrepressible power toward the spiritualization of the
present, though in a mood of world-affirmation which is not
common with the eschatological viewpoint of Jesus or derived
from Him. Jesus comes to us as a stranger, as He did to the
young men He called as disciples, Schweitzer concludes,
giving the same command to follow Him,
Und denjenigen, welche ihm gehorchen, Wei sen und Un-
weisen, wird er sich offenbaren in dem, was sie in
seiner G-emeinschaf t wirken, kSmpfen und leiden dilirfen,
und als ein unaussprechllches G-eheimnis werden sie
erleben, wer er 1st... "3
The theological studies have thus not only a negative, but
also a positive side. Though history has failed to secure
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what was sought from it, Schweitzer has faith in the exist-
ence of a sound foundation for our ethical ideals, and he
turns in his search to the active moral spirit itself.
There is suggested not only the direction of philosophical
thought, "but even the shadowy outline of the features which
"belong to the later philosophy of respect for life. The
seed of his mystical rationalism is planted.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ARTISTIC ACHIEVEMENTS
1. Musical Training.
Schweitzer's interest in music began at an early age.
Within the family circle a love for music existed, and was
inspired in him. Of his passion for the organ he says,
Sie lag mir im Blute. Mein Grossvater militterlicher-
seits, Pfarrer Schillinger aus Miltalbach, hatte sich
viel mit der Orgel und Orgelbau besch&ftigt Er
soil sehr schSn improvlsiert haben. Auch mein Vater
besass diese G-abe. Stundenlang habe ich ihm als
Kind zugehoVt, wenn er abends in der Dltmrnerung auf
dem alten Tafelklavier, das vom G-rossvater Schill-
inger stammte, phantasierte
.
Instruction, encouragement, and opportunity were also
given him early, both in the home and outside it. "Schon
vor meiner Schulzeit," he says, "hatte mein Vater begonnen,
2
mich auf einem alten Tafelklavier in Musik zu unterrichten.
"
In the church at G-ilnsbach, also, while he was still a child,
the organist allowed him to use the organ, he tells us, both
on account of friendliness and of his usefulness as a sub-
stitute, which was such that at the age of nine he took the
position in church service.
For Schweitzer, organ-playing was not a social accomplish-
ment to be painfully acquired, nor was a musical composition
something to be mechanically reproduced. Music seems to have
been to him (like spoken language, though more plastic) a
form of spiritual expression to be understood and reexpressed
with personal independence. From childhood it provided a
fluent and free medium for thought and feeling.
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Besides favoring conditions, it appears that he possessed
a natural aptitude for music. One element in this was strong
esthetic sensibility. Some of the early experiences of music,
he relates, stirred his emotions profoundly:
Wenn..der zweistimmige G-esans „Dort drunten in der
Mdihle sass ich in sills ser Ruh Oder „Wer hat dich, du
sch6*ner Wald" einsetzte, musste ich mich an der Wand
halten, urn nicht umzufallen. Die Wonne der zweistimm-
igen Musik lief mir iliber die Haut und durch den ganzen
Korper. Auch als ich die ersten Male Blechmusik hoVte,
schwanden mir fast die Sinne.-1-
Beyond this impressionableness , he had also an active and
creative imagination. The facility for expression in music
was possessed early, and it was taken, along with speech, as
a matter of course. An incident in this connection is related
in the memoirs of childhood and youth which is Indicative of
the sensitiveness and strength of natural social sympathy in
him. He says,
Meine Freude war, zu improvisieren und Lleder und
Choralmelodien mit selbst erfundener Begleitung
wiederzugeben. Als nun in der Gesangstunde die Lehr-
erin fortgesetzt den Choral Note filir Note ohne Be-
gleitung anschlug, empfand ich dies als nicht sch^n
und frug sie in der Pause, warum sie ihn nicht richt-
ig mit Begleitung spiele. Im Eifer setzte ich mich
an das Harmonium und spielte ihr ihn schlecht und
recht mehrstimmig aus dem Kopfe vor....Aber selber
tippte sie den Choral auch weiterhin immer nur mit
einem Finger. Da ging mir auf , dass ich etwas konnte,
was sie nicht konnte, und ich scha'mte mich, ihr mein
Ko'nnen, das ich fuV etwas ganz Selbstverst&ndliches
angesehen hatte, vorgemacht , zu haben.
It is not to be supposed that there was no serious study
and discipline for the sake of artistry, however. At the
home of a great-uncle in Mfllhausen to which he went at the
age of ten in order to attend the Gymnasium of that city, he
recounts, "Nach dem Mittagessen musste ich Klavier flben, bis
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es Zeit war, wieder in die Schule zu gehen, " and again in the
evenings "waren. . • .die Schulaufgaben gemacht, so musste ich
1
wieder ans Klavier." That this discipline was not always
willingly submitted to is indicated by reference to arguments
with which the aunt hustled him to the piano. For the music
teacher in M&lhausen, as well as for the teachers in school,
2
he says, "habe ich anfangs wenig Freude gemacht." This he
attributes in part to the fact that in the practice hours he
played at sight and improvised instead of applying himself to
the assigned piece, but even more to a reluctance to express
his feelings in music Defore the teacher. His statement of
this, and description of the incident which aroused him to
genuine achievement, is worthy of repetition at length:
Ich brachte es nlcht u*ber mich, ihm preiszugeben, was
ich in einem scnflnen Musikstiilck erlebte. Vielen Musik-
schiUlern ^eht es wohl ebenso. So erzijirnte ich ihn mit
meinem t,holzernen Spiel". Als ich ihm in solcher Be-
fangenheit wieder eine noch dazu schlecht geiUbte Son-
ate von Mozart heruntergeleiert hatte, scnlug er miss-
mutig das kurze Lied ohne Worte in E-Dur von Mendels-
sohn-Bartnoldy vor mir auf . „Eigentlich bist du nicht
wert, dass man dir scho'ne Musik zu spielen gibt. So
wirst du mir auch dieses Lied ohne Worte versudeln.
Wenn einer halt kein G-efilihl hat, so kann ich ihm auch
keines geben." tiOho," dachte ich bei mir selber, >.dir
will ich doch zeigen, dass ich G-efiHhl habe." Die ganze
Woche iHbte ich elfrig an dem Stillck, das ich schon so
oft vom Blatt gespielt hatte. Ich probierte sogar,wozu
man mich bisher nie gebracht hatte, die besten Finger-
sStze aus und schrieD sie auf. In der na*chsten Stunde,
als ich die Fingertfbungen und die Ettfde gliUcklich hin-
ter mir hatte, gab ich mir einen Ruck und spielte das
Lied ohne Worte so, wie ich's im Herzen spillrte. Mein
Lehrer sagte nlcht viel, sondern scnlug mir nur fest
auf die Schulter und spielte mir selber em neues Lied
onne Worte vor. Dann bekam ich ein Sttfck von Beethoven
auf. Nach einigen Stunden wurde ich wilirdig befunden,
mit Bach anfangen zu diHrfen. Und wieder einlge Stunden
spSter wurde mir erdJffnet, nach meiner Koni'lrmation
dUrfte ich auf der grossen schtfnen Orgel der Stephans-
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kirche Orgelunterricht nehmen. Damit sing ein im
St i lien gehegter Traum In Erfflllung. Denn meine
Sehnsucht war von jeher auf die Orgel gerlchtet. 1
Schweitzer's training in the field of music is broad and
thorough (that of a professional), involving not only technic-
al facility but also wide knowledge of the means of tone pro-
duction, the history of music, the structure of musical in-
struments, the principles of musical composition, and the
products of musical art, in amazing fineness of detail so far
at least as German music Is concerned. On almost any of the
musical instruments he has some ability, but the organ is the
one on which he is most accomplished and for which he has the
most love. On its construction as well as playing he is a
critic and an authority, and among the books he has written
2
is one on French and German organ-building and playing.
2* Some Esthetic Theory.
Know ledge of the instrumental means of tone-production,
even of principles of music and laws of harmony, and skill in
execution are for Schweitzer, master of them as he is, subord-
inate matters. They relate only to an essential apprentice-
ship on the materials in which the spirit speaks. It is not a
faculty of expression with paint, with words, or with tones,
which primarily makes an artist, even though he would be dumb
3
without this, Schweitzer says. That which makes an artist is
an idea which dominates him and which attains expression to
the degree of his mastery of the language which best suits him.
Music is not constructed by mechanical application of the laws
of harmony, but is an expression of the spirit. The place of
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the laws or narmony in relation to it is comparable to that of
the laws of good manners in the case of conduct. Sometimes,
just as the latter may "be disregarded for the dictates of the
heart, the former may be overwhelmed by the vital flow of
music, or disregarded at the behest of the spirit of music,
1
"der lllber alien G-esetzen steht."
There is a universal art, Schweitzer asserts, not different
arts, except in "the purely external division" determined by
2
the medium of artistic expression. "In reality the material
in which the artist expresses himself is a secondary matter.
3
He is not only a painter, or only a musician, but all in one,"
he says, and the artistic idea is not first fixed in one form
or another, but is capable of expression in any; "Neither is
there such a thing as an absolute art....Art in itself is
neither painting nor poetry nor music, but an act of creation
4
in which all three cooperate." The artist is one who seeks to
express the world about him, and he chooses that material with
which he can best depict it. In the case of some of the great
artists - e.g. Michelangelo and G-oethe - their genius found
satisfying expression in any one of several media; in other
cases, artists have struggled to express themselves in a mater-
ial which was not that best suited to them. Nietzsche,
Schweitzer says, in an incidental but suggestive criticism,
was one whose form of expression was more properly musical
than verbal. The force which governs the structure of his
writings, he asserts, is that of musical composition rather
than of thought and grammar. He says,
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His works are symphonies. The musician does not read
them; he hears them, as if he were going through an
orchestral score . What he sees are not v^ords and
letters, but themes developing and interlacing. In
Jenseits von Gut und B6*se he even finds those little
fugued intermezzi into which Beethoven often diverges
....Moreover, it is evident ... .that the poet of Also
sprach Zarathustra worked out his idea not in word-
logic, out in tone*- logic, as musical motives. 1
Keen esthetic sensibility characterized Schweitzer from
childhood, and he confesses to several boyhood attempts to
represent the impression made upon him by the beauty of nature
in verse and drawing, but without success. From then on, he
says, "ergab ich mich darein, das Schdne rein beschaulich zu
geniessen, ohne es zu Kunst zu verarbeiten, " and "Nur im Im-
provisieren von Husik verhielt und verhalte ich mich scho'p-
2
ferisch.
"
In the field of music, again, Schweitzer is not precisely
an original creator. To composition,he has turned his hand,
but not seriously or strenuously. Music has, however, from
his boyhood, with its intense but reserved spirit, furnished
him an emotional outlet, and in the music of that most diff-
icult of organ masters, Bach, he has found a congenial spirit-
ual expression. To the rendering of it, in turn, he has brought
new understanding and beauty. C. M. Widor, the great French
organist, describes thus his first acquaintance with Schweitzer
and impression of his ability in interpreting Bach:
In the autumn of 1893 a young Alsation presented him-
self to me and asked if he could play something on
the organ to me. "Play what?" I asked. "Bach, of
course," was his reply.
In the following years he returned regularly for
longer or shorter periods, in order to "habilitate
"
himself - as they used to say in Bach's day - in
organ playing under my guidance.
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One day in 1399 » when we were going through the
chorale preludes, I confessed to him that a good
deal in those compositions was enigmatic to me.
"Bach's musical logic in the preludes and fugues,"
I said, "is quite simple and clear; "but it becomes
cloudy as soon as he takes up a chorale melody. Why
these sometimes almost excessively abrupt antitheses
of feeling? Why does he add contrapuntal motives to
a melody that have often no relation to the mood of
the melody? Why all these incomprehensible things in
the plan and working out of these fantasias? The
more I study them the less I understand them."
"Naturally," said my pupil, "many things in the
chorales must seem obscure to you, for the reason
that they are only explicable by the texts pertain-
ing to them."
I showed him the movements that had puzzled me the
most; he translated the poems into French for me from
memory. The mysteries were all solved. During the
next few afternoons we played through the whole of
the chorale preludes. While Schweitzer - for he was
the pupil - explained them to me one after the other,
I made the acquaintance of a Bach of whose existence
I had previously had only the dimmest suspicion. In a
flash it became clear to me that the cantor of St.
Thomas ' s was much more than an incomparable contra-
puntist to v/hom I had formerly looked ut> as one gazes
ud at a colossal statue, and that his work exhibits
an unparalleled desire and capacity for expressing
poetic ideas and for bringing word and tone into unity.
3. Biographer and Interpreter of Bach.
Seldom has the name of a musician been so closely connected
with a composer as that of Schweitzer with Bach. This is due
chiefly to the almost insurpassable manner in which he has
made himself the expositor of Bach in the thorough and well-
written two-volume work, Johann Sebastian Bach. Widor gives
the history of this biography. It grew out of the incident
related above and of his request that the same help in the in-
terpretation of Bach be made available in writing to other
French organists. The task, however, was not simple. Widor
says,
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la petite etude que je lui avals demandee devenait un
gros travail d' ensemble. II fallalt e'crire tout un
chapitre 3ur l'histoire de la musique religieuse en
Alleniagne . . . .11 fallait, de plus, laisser entrevoir
1' invasion de la musique dramatique dans la liturgie
des Sglises Allemandes a cette epoque. II fallait
re"server enfin tout un longe chapitre aux notes et
aux documents biographiques indispensable s .
*
Thus the originally projected plan grew by inclusion of mater-
ial which seemed necessary, through several years of work,
into the monumental treatment of Bach for which music-lovers
in all countries recognize a great debt of gratitude to
Schweitzer. It was first published in French in 1905. In 1908
a considerably enlarged version appeared in G-erman, and from
this an English translation, containing some alterations and
additions by the author, was made, and published in 1911. Nov;
it has run through four editions in French and in German, and
a reprinting in English.
In the presentation of Bach's music to the public and in
creation of a demand for it, Schweitzer has done much. With
the appearance of his work on Bach, he was made organist of
the Paris Bach Society. Then, in 1912 and 1913, he published,
with G. M. Widor, a complete collection of Bach's preludes and
fugues in four volumes, with an additional volume of sonatas.
Three more volumes were planned in the series, but have not
yet been published. When Schweitzer went to the tropics, he
took along, as a gift of the Paris Bach Society, an organ,
which was enclosed in a metal case to protect it from the
white ants. In noon siesta time, in evenings, and in the
period of inactivity caused by the war, he found time, and, he
says, new insight to prepare for publication some of the un-
known works of Bach, but it seems that the aged French organ-
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ist has been too greatly affected by the emotions of the war
to again work in collaboration with his former friend and
colleague.
In the years preceding his medical work in Africa, Schweit-
zer gave Bach concerts in many of the capitals and leading
cities of Europe, and a considerable part of the funds for his
mission was secured in this way. He says of the aunt who in
his boyhood admonished him, HDu weisst nlcht wozu dir die Musik
einst im Leben sein wird," that "Preilich konnte sle nlcht
ahnen, dass die Musik mir einst mit dazu he Ifen wilrde, die
1
Mittel zur G-Hlndung eines Spitals im Urwald zus aminenzubringen. H
Again, in the years 1917-1923, which were spent in Europe
for physical and financial recuperation, he appeared in con-
certs in Paris, London, Birmingham and other centers, manifest-
ing an artistry which was acclaimed by the critics and which
was eloquent of his attachment to music and of his unbounded
energy during the strenuous years of medical work.
4. The Role of Music.
Music has never appeared to Schweitzer in the guise of a
vocation. For him it has stood alongside the business of life
as belonging to its spiritual refreshmant and expression. From
childhood he found in it esthetic pleasure, emotional release,
and creative expression. In the furtherance of his work of
mercy it was capable of giving help. In the cultural isolat-
ion of the tropics it could give inspiration; and in the
weariness from ministering to the sick, it could refresh and
encourage.
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If the spirit of the phrase "art for art's sake" is that
of real art, not of dilettantism as one suspects, Schweitzer •
is no citizen of the realm. Here, as in every phase of his
life, humanity is before his eyes. He thinks, naturally and
without apology, of a mission of music to the human spirit.
This, in a matter-of-fact way, is his first consideration.
The work on Bach, for example, is presented not simply as a
contribution to musical knowledge, nor as a help to correct
performance, but as an aid and incentive to the extension of
1
a spiritual message and influence.
Schweitzer holds a symbolic theory of art, and regards it
as a key to the understanding of Bach's artistic creations.
The formal work of art - sculpture, painting or composition -
he considers only as the token of an idea. What is executed
is merely the language of a conception. "All art," he says,
"speaks in signs and symbols," and "The part of a work of art
that is perceptible by the senses is in reality only the inter-
2
mediator between two active efforts of the imagination." The
greatness of a work of art is not in its degree of formal
perfection, but in the greatness of imagination which it em-
bodies. The works of art, he declares, are but "suggestive
symbols, by which the imagination of two artists hold converse
together." All artistic feeling, that of the onlooker or
listener as truly as of the creator or producer, is a spirit-
ual act. Of the artistic attitude toward the world, artistic
creation is only a special case. It is a capacity for trans-
lating esthetic associations of ideas, or of "stimulating
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others to that vivacity of imaginative feeling which we call
art, in contradistinction to what we hear and see and exper-
1
ience in our ordinary moments."
The particular artistic viewpoint which belonged to Bach
and which can be translated to us in his compositions, is,
moreover, a profoundly religious one. "Music is an act of
worship with Bach," Schweitzer says; "His artistic activity
2
and his personality are both based on his piety." Further,
the spirit is that of mystical religious experience. Schweit-
zer says
,
Bach's real religion was not orthodox Lutheran! am, but
mysticism. In his innermost consciousness he belongs to
the history of German mysticism. .. .nowhere is his speech
so moving as in the cantatas in which he discourses on
the release from the body of this death. The Epiphany
and certain bass cantatas are the revelation of his
most intimate religious feelings.'
This representation of Bach is further strengthened and sup-
plemented by C. M. Widor where he says in the preface,
what speaks through his works is pure religious emotion
....It is the emotion of the infinite and the exalted,
for which words are always an inadequate expression, and
that can find proper utterance only in art...His canta-
tas and Passions tune the soul to a state in which we
can grasp the truth and oneness of things, and rise above
everything that is paltry, everything that divides us.
These passages indicate the kind of influence which the
music of Bach has exercised on the sensitive spirit of Schweit
zer. Moreover, it appears probable that the appeal of Bach to
Schweitzer, and the latter 's sympathetic understanding of the
composer, have an explanation in kinship of spirit, Schweitzer
himself gives confirmation of this when he says, "Only he who
who sink3 himself in the emotional world of Bach, who lives
and thinks with him.... is in a position to perform him proper-
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1
ly." Thus the spiritual revelations which are conveyed in
Schweitzer's artistic activity should throw iigat on the
nature of his own "most intimate religious experiences" and
philosophical outlook, Just as, in turn, the philosophy
should give new understanding of the artistic expression.
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CHAPTER FIVE
WORK AS MEDICAL MISSIONARY
1. The Plan and Its Inception,
Schweitzer refers the awakening of hie interest in missions
to his father's Sunday afternoon services in the G-flnsbach
church during his boyhood, which v/ere devoted on the first
Sunday of each month to accounts of the life and work of the
missionaries. Kis first concern for the negroes of Africa is
attributed to the statue to Admiral Bruat at Colmar, done by
Bartholdi, on which there appears the figure of a negro whose
tragic expression deeply affected him with a consciousness of
1
"dem Elend des dunkeln Erdteils."
The definite idea of going to Africa as a medical mission-
ary, however, came just at the age of thirty, when Schweitzer
was already established on the faculty at Strassburg and was
beginning to be Internationally known both as musician and
theologian. When twenty-one years old he had made a resolve,
he tells us, to follow the pursuits of theology, philosophy,
and music until the age of thirty, and then "einen Weg des
a
unmittelbaren Dienens als Kensch betreten, " but the nature of
this service was undetermined at the time, and the decision
to go to Africa as a doctor was made, he says, only "nachdem
3
mich Plane andersartigen Keifens vorher bescbJJftigt hatten."
This plan of Schweitzer for his life had its basis in his
keen sympathy with suffering, and in his sense of steward-
ship in any unequal enjoyment of the benefits of life, two
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factors which entered Into what he designates as the profound-
1
est experiences of his youth. In the case of the physical
suffering of the negroes of Africa, he felt the conviction
that like Dives we sin against the poor man at our gate in
that we take as a matter of course the advantages of our med-
ical science and do not put ourselves in his place, and let
heart and conscience tell us what to do. There was a work of
humanity which needed to "be recognized. So, Schweitzer set
himself the task of medical training, while at the same time
his wife equipped herself as a nurse.
The place, Lamoarene on the Ogowe River in Equatorial
Africa, was determined because Alsatian missionaries in the
service of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society told
him of the need for a doctor there, and the Society offered
him both one of their mission houses at the station and per-
mission to build a hospital on their grounds. The money for
the undertaking was secured by Schweitzer himself from the
2
profits of his books and, as was previously recounted, of
his concerts. Kelp also came through contributions by
friends. On G-ood Friday of 1913, then, having secured his
medical degree at Strassburg early that year and taken a
short special course in tropical diseases at Paris, he set
out for this scene of his work.
2. The First Years in Africa.
Of the conditions and incidents of Schweitzer's life in
Africa we have a good account. The narrative Zwischen Wasser
und Urwald
, written from notes and from reports which were
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sent every six months to friends and supporters in Alsace and
Switzerland, covers the first period, of four and a half years,
before he revisited Europe; and two series of letters, Mltteil-
unp-en aus Lambarene , Heft 1 and 2, report the period following
his return to Africa.
The medical work was at first beset by very serious material
handicaps. These were gradually overcome, however, and good
fortune in the treatment of the sick soon spread the reputation
of the doctor. A two-room hospital of corrugated iron, with a
wide thatched roof, was built, and then two other buildings,
like large native huts, to serve as waiting-room and ward. In
all of this construction the doctor himself, impatient with the
slowness and uncertainty of native labor, was obliged to take
part, not merely as foreman, but as manual laborer.
One of the strongest impressions which Schweitzer' s writings
transmit is that of the amazing amount of illness, and of the
great need of medical help. "TUglich erdulden Tausende und
Tausende," he says, "Grausiges an Schmerz, was Srztliche Kunst
1
von ihnen wenden kflnnte," and a single doctor is able "Hunder-
te von Menschen, die slch sonst verzweifelt in ihr Schicksal
ergeben mu'ssten, aus der G-ewalt der Qual und des Todes zu
2
befreien."
The note of intense personal joy and satisfaction in the
work also runs through the books. What do all the disagreeable
features (the meagerness of means, the exile, the unhealthful
conditions) count for, he says, "im Vergleich zu der Freude:
hier wirken und helfen zu dilirfeni In reference to a critical
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case which was rushed to him for operation, he says,
Wie meine G-efuhle beschreibeni . . . .Weil ich hier bin
....let er -vile die, die in demselben Falle vor ihm
kamen und nach ihm kommen werden, zu retten, w&hrend
er anders der Qual verfalien ware. Ich rede nicht
davon, dass ich ihm das Leben retten kann. Sterben
mdssen v/ir alle. Aber dass ich die Tage der Qual von
ihm nehmen darf , das ist es, was ich als die grosse,
immer neue Gnade empfinde . • . .
.
So lege ich dem Jammernden Menschen die Hand auf
die Stirne und sage ihm: uSei ruhig. In einer Stunde
wirst du schlafen, und wenn du wieder erwachst, ist
kein Schmerz rnehr"!
A deep religious interest and feeling also find expression.
In the account of the above case, for example, he continues:
Die Operation ist voriliber. Unter der dunklen Schlaf-
baracke iHberwache ich das Aufwachen des Patienten.
Kaum ist er bei Besinnung, so schaut er erstaunt um-
her und wiederholt fort und fort: ttlch habe ja nicht
mehr weh, ich habe ja nicht mehr wehi " Seine Hand
sucht die meine und will sie nicht mehr loslassen.
Dann fange ich an, ihm und denen, die dabeisitzen,
zu erz&hlen, dass es der Herr Jesus ist, der dem
Doktor und seiner Frau geboten hat, hier an den Ogowe
zu kommen, und dass weisse iienschen in Europe uns die
Mittel geben, urn hier fiHr die Kranken zu leben
Wir..Schwarz und Weiss, sitzen untereinander und er-
leben es: nlhr aber seid alle Bnlider." 2
That the simple African is incapable of appreciating the
message of Christianity, Schweitzer denies. Although the
historical and doctrinal elements are almost impossible for
the savage to understand, he is more reflective than is
generally supposed, he declares, and has, furthermore, an
elemental experience of salvation. Of its meaning for him,
Schweitzer says,
Das Chris tentum ist fiHr ihn das Licht, das in die
Finsternis der Angst scnemt. Es versichert ihm, dass
er nicht der G-ewalt von Naturgelstern, Ahnengeistern
und Fetischen ausgeliefert ist und dass kein Liensch
unneimliche Macht u*ber den andern besitzt, sondern
dass in allem G-eschen nur der Wille C-ottes waltet.
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nlch lag in schweren Banden,
Du kommst und machst mich los."
Dieses Wort aus Paul Gerhardts Adventslied spricht
wie kein anderes aus, was das Chri stenturn ftfr den
primitiven Menschen ist. Immer und immer wieder
muss ich daran denken, wenn icft auf einer Missions-
station am Gottesdienst teilnehme.^-
A strong interest in the evangelistic side of mission work
appears in Schweitzer's writings. Though it is the relief of
physical suffering which he has felt as a particular duty, he
is not less concerned about the spiritual woes of the native
and tne salvation which Christian doctrine brings to him. He
says,
Im Naturmenschen schlummert ein ethischer Rationalist.
Er hat eine natuVliche Empfa'nglichkeit fiHr den Begriff
des G-uten und was in der Religion damit zusammenklingt
.
....Sowie er mit den hSheren sittlichen Begriffen der
Religion Jesu bekannt wird, kommt etwas in ihm zur
Sprache, das bisher stumm vorhanden gewesen war, und
wird etwas entbunden, das bisher gebunden war.. Die Er-
lo'sung durch Jesus erf&hrt der Eingeoorene also als
eine doppelte Befreiung. Aus der angstvollen kommt er
zur angstlosen und aus der unethischen zur ethischen
Weltans chauung
•
2
This redemption is conceived in a less theological and more
ethical fashion than with many. It is, however, in its
essence religious, and is a spiritual salvation which lies
in the power of the religion of Christ and constitutes the
nature of Cnristian experience and piety.
That Schweitzer maintains his medical service in a certain
degree of independence from the organized v/ork of any religious
denomination is not due to a critical attitude toward the miss-
ions or toward evangelistic Christianity. This is based in
part on general independence of character, dislike for organ-
ization and its destruction of direct personal relations,
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doctrinal liberality, and an ability to make provision for
his work outside of missionary resources. More truly, how-
ever, Schweitzer has wished to make his hospital "Mberkon-
fesslonell und international," because, as he says in a pass-
age which brings out the deepest and most recurrent motive in
his thought, "Es war meine tfberzeugung und 1st es noch heute,
dass die humanitaVen Aufgaben in der Welt dem Menschen als
solchem, nicht als dem Angehflrigen elner bestimmten Nation
1
oder Konfession nHher gebracht werden m&ssen."
Despite the engrossing and exacting nature of his work,
cultural interests were not allowed to languish. He says,
G-eistige Arbeit muss man haben, um sich in Afrika
aufrecht zu erhalten. . . .Belm Lesen eines ernsten
Buches h6*rt man auf , das Ding zu sein, das sich den
ganzen Tag in dem Kampf gegen die Unzuverl&ssigkeit
der Eingeborenen und die Zudringllchkeit des G-etiers
aufreibt, und wird wieder Mensch. Wehe dem, der hier
nicht so lrnmer wieder zu sich selbst kommt und neue
Kr&fte sammelt. 2
Darkness came early, and medical treatment by lamplight was
not only difficult but involved danger of mosquitoes and
fever infection. The hours after the evening meal were given
to study of the history of thought on ethics and history of
civilization, for which his own supply of books was supplement-
ed through the cooperation of Professor Strohl of the Univer-
sity of Zurich. Then there was also the organ. "Die Stunde
zwischen dem Mittagessen und der Wiederaufnahme der Arbeit im
Spltal," he wrote in one of his letters, "1st der Musik gewid-
met, der auch die Sonntagnachmittage gehflren." In his music,
as well as in philosophical reflection, he attributes to the
primeval solitude and isolation a helpful Influence; "hier
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merke ich," he says, "den Segen des weltfernen Arbeitens.
Vlele Bacnsche OrgelstiHcke lerne ich einfacher und innerlich-
1
er auffassen als friUher."
3. Effects of the War.
In leaving Europe, Schweitzer had sound financial provision
for two years. Additional contributions kept coming in, and
the work was continued for four and a half years. Drugs and
supplies were used in large quantities, however; and when the
war came, Schweitzer was cut off from the replenishment of
materials and funds alike. Furtnermore, hardships were brought
about along the Ogowe. Trade and industry stopped, and food
was scarce. Finally in 1917 » already in debt for the contin-
uance of the work, depleted of stores, and with the health of
his wife and himself Impaired, he was ooliged to go oack to
Europe
.
To lay the foundation for return to Africa was difficult.
Many of the supporters had been reduced to poverty by the war,
and they were divided by national feeling. Lectures and con-
certs were necessary to discharge debts for the earlier work.
In the face of such unfavorable conditions, raised prices
meant heavier expense for tne work. Two operations were nec-
essary to restore Scnweitzer's health, and that of his wife
was not such as to make her return safe. However the diffic-
ulties were faced and overcome, and in the beginning of 1924,
althougn obliged to leave his wife behind in Europe, Schweit-
zer again set sail for Lambarene. He was accompanied only by
an eighteen-year-old Oxford student of cnemistry, who helped
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him during the first difficult months and until other assist-
ance came
.
4. Restoration of the Mission.
When, after a slow trip along the coast, Schweitzer arrived
at Lambarene on Easter Sunday, 1924, he promptly and vigorously
oegan the reestablishment of his hospital. The buildings were
in a dilapidated state, particularly their thatched roofs, and
the repair work and new construction which was necessary were
made difficult because of the effect of the war upon lapor and
materials. The demands whicn this work made upon Schweitzer's
time and strengtn were almost overwhelming, and with them went
an increase of several fold in the amount of sickness to "be
treated, spread by the mobilization of natives as troops and
carriers. The patients were, furthermore, of a different
type than before, being almost-wild natives brought from the
interior to work in the forests. With many of them it was
impossible to communicate, and it was virtually impossible to
maintain discipline among them without constant personal
supervision.
Relief from the worst pressure of the work came to Schweit-
zer, when it was critically needed, through the arrival, in
quick succession, of two nurses and two doctors to help him,
but even so the burden was heavy. In spite of the aid, and
the encouragement which their coming gave, expressions of
fatigue, illness, and nervous strain, creep into the recital
in a way which is without precedent in the Zwischen Wasser und
Urwald
. The unwavering optimism and confidence of the former
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work are lacking here. Schweitzer writes,
Dass so nach und nach Ordnung in den Spitalbe trieb
kommt, kflnnte uns neuen Mut zur Arbeit geben, wenn
die durch Platzmangel, Dysenterie und Hungersnot ge-
schaffenen VerhSltnisse nicht so trostlos waren
Durch die noch immer zunehmende Dysenteric gestaltet
sich die TStigkeit im Spital immer schwieriger. Wir
sind alle erscho'pft und entmutigt. Verge bens suchen
wir die Verseuchung des Spitals auf zuhalten. Schon
habe mehrere Patienten, die wegen anderer Krankheiten
kamen, bei uns Dysenterie bekommen. . . .Einige davon
konnten wir nicht retten. . . .Vergebens reiben wir uns
auf , die Polizei im Spital zu machen, damit die zur
Vermeidung der Dysenterie erlassenen Vorschriften
elnigermassen befolgt werden. Die Versta'ndnislosig-
keit unserer Wilden ftfr derlei Dinge macht alle uns-
ere Bemilihungen illusorisch. 1
If, however, in comparison with the story of the first
period in Africa, the Mitteilungen may be said to lack romance,
confident strength, and artistic quality, these later writings
nevertheless possess a striking cnaracter. In their concern
about nails, the sawing of timbers, the hunting of bamboo, and
the recovery of drifted canoes they remind one of Robinson
Crusoe. More noteworthy, however, is their resemblance to
the letters of Paul; though it is not the practical, resource-
ful Paul who was "in peril oft on land and sea" of whom we
2
are most reminded, despite the common features here, but
the Paul of great transitions from reproof to rejoicing, from
practical matters to spiritual values. The monotonous and
wearying concern with daily chores and difficulties is broken
"by Joy over the healing of a case of sleeping sickness taken
early In its course, the successful outcome of a difficult
operation, or the saving of a badly infected arm. A chief
whose shattered hand has been saved forgets the sorely-needed
thatches he has promised, but Schweitzer concludes, "trotzdem

1
"behalte ich ihn in lieber Srinnerung. " A patient who has
proved to be a valuable assistant in building, leaves him in
a time of need, but after a passage as crisp as that of Paul
about Mark, Schweitzer adds, "Trotz des Schmerzes, den er
2
mir antut, bewahre ich ihm ein gutes Andenken. " When a pat-
ient slipped away before a cure was completed, he lamented,
"Alle Mflhe und alle Ausgaben mit diesem Fall waren also um-
3onstl " but promptly continued,
Solchen entmutigenden Fallen stehen aber viele andere
entgegen, die einen mit Freudigkelt erfAllen ko'nnen.
Im allgemeinen sind die Kranken und ihre Angebilrigen
wirklich dankbar • • . . Nur darf ich an tats&chlicher
Dankbarke its leistung nicht zu viel begehren.3
One wonders at the spirit in which the work is maintained!
What Is the source of it, and what is its support? Schweitzer
is Imposed upon in the feeding of the sick and their attend-
ants, and in the care of the aged and hopelessly ill who have
no relatives. The native will stand by with complete indiff-
erence, and will decline help, if he or his relatives are not
concerned, or, when he has learned to read and write, if man-
ual labor is involved. While dysentery rages, the wild tran-
sient from the interior will dip water from the river rather
than go a few steps farther to the spring, and will cook and
eat from the same bowl with the sick, if vigilance is relaxed
for tne briefest time. He has no idea of value, and will
waste and destroy, with utter unconcern, precious medical sup-
plies about whose care he has been strictly admonished. He is
without sense of ownership, and steals the fruit and chickens
of the mission station without conscience. He cannot be de-
pended upon to present himself at the dispensary for his treat-
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merit, but must "be hunted and brought there by the arm. In
the face of these dispiriting difficulties, of the unceasing
stream of illness, of the heedless and irresponsible attitude
of the patients, of the lack of gratitude, and of the indiffer-
ence of the African to the needs of his fellows, what is strik-
ing is that effort is sustained. Yet Schweitzer's devotion
and joy do not fail. For every case of suffering and woe, no
matter what the circumstances, there is fresh sympathy. Toward
these wild and undisciplined natives who are so trying, who
make their own relief so difficult, and who are so unresponsive,
there is unfailing compassion and love. How Schweitzer is
affected is indicated by the following passage:
Welch trauriges Schauspiel. wenn solch abgemagerte
Leute, die slch durch ihre Zuge gleich als Wilde aus
dem Innern verraten, mit ihrem armseligen Mndel bei
uns abgesetzt werdenl Mag man es so und so oft erlebt
haben: immer wlrd man aufs neue durch dieses Elend
bewegt. Ein unsagliches Mitleid mit den armen Fremdling-
en erfasst einen. Und wie oft ist es hoffnungs loses Mit-
leid, da beim ersten Blich deutlich ist, dass der An-
kflmmling hier seinen letzten Atemzug tun wird, fern von
den Seinen, die auf seine Mckkehr und auf das Geld,
das er mitbringen soil, warten.l
Schweitzer never loses, in the press of work, anxiety, diffic-
ulties, and unresponsiveness, the sense of humanity and of the
reality and poignancy of its spiritual experiences.
The work of Albert Schweitzer as a medical missionary among
the blacks of Africa is to be regarded as more than a mere bio-
graphical fact. It is the logical conclusion of a line of
thought carried through from the Religionsphllosophie Kant's
,
by way of the G-eschichte der Leben-Jesu-Eorschung
, to this
result. Each step in the line of thought was necessary to
reach this end, but together they led to the missionary activity,

95
as inevitably as the premises of a syllogism to their con-
clusion. It is not to be supposed that it is simply a human-
itarian reaction to a religious disillusionment, or a more or
less accidental substitute for a worn-out object of devotion.
It represents in a non-theoretical form those conclusions of
his studies which for Schweitzer are fixed beyond doubt. Thus
it sums up the results of the previous studies, and anticipat-
es the philosophy of civilization which is its theoretical
expression. For that philosophy it is both practical express-
ion and datum. In it there is exhibited an independence of
Jesus' spirit from His own, or any other, world-view. It is
not the world-view which produces the spirit; it had other,
and more fundamental grounds. In the intellectual-religious-
ethical compound of the human consciousness, the cosmological
theory may be independently varied, and is found not to be the
condition of the ethico-religious spirit. The spring of the
latter is different. The Christian may demonstrate not only
what the early church first showed, the possibility of the
living spirit of Jesus dissociated from the world-view which
it accompanied in Him, but more generally, the absence of vital
bond between ethical spirit and any interpretation of the world.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE PHILOSOPHY OP CIVILIZATION
1. Its Place in Schweitzer's Work.
It was during the period of recuperation in Europe that
Schweitzer's Kulturphi
l
o sophi
e
appeared. It was first present-
ed as lectures, in 1922, at the University of Upsala and at
Oxford, and then published in both German and English, under
the general subject of a philosophy of civilization, in two
volumes, entitled Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur ( Decay
and Restoration of Civilization ) and Kultur und Ethik ( Civil-
ization and Ethics )
.
How he had been engaged during the academic period in
Strassburg and the medical labors in Africa, with the line of
thought which appears in them is recounted in the preface of
the English edition and in a letter of the date of Christmas,
1915. He wrote of his daily routine in Africa,
War der Tag nicht gar zu anstrengend, so vermag ich
nach dem Abendessen zwei Stunden an meiner Arbeit
u*ber Ethik und Kultur in der G-eschichte des Denkens
der Menschheit zu schaffen. . . .Es ist ein merkwilirdiges
Arbeiten. Mein Tisch steht an der auf die Veranda hin-
ausfflhrenden G-itterttfr, damit ich mdglichst viel von
der leichten Abendbrise erhasche. Die Palmen rauschen
leise zu der lauten Musik, die die G-rillen und Unken
auffiilhren. Aus dem Urwald tflnen hassliche und unheim-
liche Schrele heriliber . • • .In dieaer Elnsamkeit versuche
ich, G-edanken, die mich seit 1900 bewegen, zu gestalten
und am Wiederaufbau der Kultur mitzuhelfen. Urwaldein-
samkeit, wie kann ich dir jemals danken fu*r das, was
du mir warst I . • • •
Hegel has said, in a suggestion which, though only a partial
truth, contains a keen historical insight, that "the owl of Min-
erva flies by night," or that the theoretical formulation of a
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philosophy Is the latest fruitage of the spirit. The appreh-
ension of a spiritual reality in the form of idea comes only
after it has existed as original, internal and creative im-
pulse and has externalized itself as objective fact. The
practical function is, thus, an essential part of the conscious
process, and only through it is know ledge completed. The im-
pulse comes to a knowledge of itself, or to self-consciousness
,
and is thus philosophy. An individual or a civilization comes
to a conscious knowledge of the principles of its own life, but
not before they have been realized in its life, - only after-
ward. It is, as a fact, in accordance with this historical
theory that the spiritual development of Schweitzer has pro-
ceeded, and that his activity has terminated in the philosophy
of civilization. Without the philosophy, his life would have
lacked completeness and unity. In it there appears the prin-
ciple which interprets the antecedent process, completes it,
and achieves its synthesis.
A sketch of the general features of the philosophy is all
that will be given here. As a critical analysis and statement
of it is planned for a later point in the treatment, it is
considered possible to leave the examination of details to
that place. All that is desired is to provide an acquaintance
with the philosophy of civilization in its main outlines, as
it appears among Schweitzer's works, in such a way as to fur-
nish the background for the critical notices which have been
given it and for the later critical study.

9S
2. The Decay of Civilization.
1
Schweitzer, in common with Spengler and many other Europ-
ean thinkers, is convinced that modern civilization fails to
embody factors of permanent significance for man, and that
its decay is in process, Schweitzer takes this as almost
self-evident, and considers that the business of thoughtful
men is not to prove the fact, but to diagnose the causes.
The only reason we can fail to see this clearly and universal-
ly, is that we are confused by a striking advance in mechanic-
al power and material prosperity. This is a phenomenon which
has never before occurred except in conjunction with an intel-
lectual and moral advance. Our satisfaction with It has led
us to overlook the fact that such development is not in itself
an advance in civilization, and that in this case it was not
accompanied by that ethical spirit which is the basis and
content of genuine civilization. Only when our civilization
began to crumble for want in general thought of any rational
convictions which would serve to maintain ethical conduct, did
it become apparent to some that our civilization was bankrupt
and in process of collapse.
Schweitzer explicitly rejects the easy-going faith in prog-
ress which has associated itself with the theory of evolution.
The course of natural processes and the realization of genuine
civilization are two distinct and unrelated things for him.
This idea of an inexorable evolutionary development is, he
says, Mden entgeistigten Wirklichkeitsoptimismus . .der uns seit
2
Jahrzehnten in der Irre herumftfhrt
.
H We have enjoyed a false
confidence, "als ob die in der Welt auftretenden Gegensa'tze
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sich von sich aus miteinander im Sinne eines zweckmHssigen
1
Fortschritts auseinandersetztenj and have shunned the true
alternative, that genuine progress in civilization depends
upon the power of ethical ideas which are arrived at "by-
reason and supported by the activity of the ethical spirit.
A recognition of the defects and evils of civilization is
urgently needed. Any hope for the renewal of civilization
depends upon a consciousness of the absolute indefensibility
of the material and spiritual conditions under v/hich we live
- that is, upon an apprehension of the character of what is
and of what ought to be , in their contrast.
The disproportionate attention given to our material prog-
ress, and the conditions of life with which that material
progress has been associated, have confused us in regard to
the true nature of civilization and robbed us of the opportun-
ity and power for reflection about it. While the material
progress of society is an element in civilization, it is not
2
an unqualified element nor the essential one. The essence
of civilization is ethical; it lies in the development of the
motive to raise life, in so far as we can determine it, to
3
its highest degree of value. It is this element, Schweitzer
believes, which has been decaying in our western world. Our
society is characterized by lack of freedom, over-organization,
subjugation of the individual mind to group thought, and in-
difference toward human life and sensibilities. So, even
while the wave of material progress has risen to its crest,
the essential factor of civilization has been on the decline,
and civilization has no longer either creative vigor or endur-
ance.
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3. Philosophy's Responsibility.
The essential reason for the plight of our civilization is
its lack of a rationally defensible world-view as foundation
for the ethical ideals upon whose operation in society its
soundness is dependent. During the period of Rationalism the
ethical ideals which are necessary to civilization were sup-
ported by a living, popular philosophy that interpreted real-
ity in such a way as to find meaning in it for human life and
values, and to maintain enthusiasm for civilization. But
that naive and dogmatic metaphysic, in spite of the support
it received from Kant and Hegel, fell, under the criticism of
pure thought, and the popular mind was left without a rational
set of ideas which would put conviction and enthusiasm behind
ethical purposes and activity.
Philosophy, it is true, undertook the task of replacing the
ridiculed metaphysical structure of Rationalism by an inter-
pretation of the world which would be more empirical and in
closer accord with the findings of the natural sciences, but
in doing so it lost touch with human values and neglected its
real duty. Its obligation was to maintain civilization by
putting into general circulation a secure philosophical out-
look which would engender enthusiasm and activity in the ad-
vancement of life. Philosophy further betrayed civilization,
Schweitzer asserts, by cherishing the view that such an optim-
istic and ethical outlook could be based on our interpretation
of the world. The failure of pure thought to secure an optimist-
ic and ethical outlook for life in this way is not the fault of
philosophy, Schweitzer thinks, but it is a fact which it might

1
be expected to have recognized and admitted.
4. Schweitzer's Philosophy of Civilization.
Schweitzer regards the optimistic-ethical world- and life-
attitude which has been a constant trait of Occidental theory
as its distinctive characteristic. The west presents only
this one world-attitude, in distinction from the alternative
world-view of the Orient, which is that of resignation and
world-negation. Our philosophical systems have all alike had
the one aim of giving a rational basis to the ethical attitude,
to which we have tenaciously clung even when they were found
to be faulty. Temporarily some of them, among these notably
Eighteenth Century Rationalism, succeeded in giving support
to our ideals, and stimulated civilization, but ultimately
each system revealed defects to pure thought and ceased to
command the conviction which made it a civilizing power. Thus
Schweitzer sees the history of philosophy, which he reviews
in the second volume of the Kulturphi lo sophl
e
, as the tragedy
of the Occidental world-view. It is regarded as having left
our ethical attitude toward life without rational grounds.
The scientific merit of the methods of modern philosophy
of nature is not questioned by Schweitzer, nor the general
soundness of its results, but only its relative importance in
the comprehensive business of philosophy. Philosophy has been
too engrossed with its idea of solving the mysteries of the
universe, he thinks, and too confident that when it did this
it would find its ethical ideals grounded there. It has been
oblivious to the fact that the ethical elements in our civiliz-
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ation have been perishing while it has "been holding out an
empty hope of a scientifically established metaphysics which
would lay their foundation in objective reality.
There are several objections to the program philosophy has
set. One is, that the demands of optimistic activity cannot
brook the delay and uncertainty of a metaphysical foundation
which, as empirical, is never final. Another is, that it is
not (Socrates to the contrary) the purely rational element of
understanding which gives impulse and direction to conduct,
but for it there are non-rational grounds. Finally, there is
no antecedent assurance that metaphysical inquiry, if it
could arrive at a final world-interpretation, would offer the
help to human life and value that is sought.
Schweitzer declares:
Meine Lo'sung des Problems ist die, dass wir uns ent-
schliessen mu'ssen, auf die optimistisch-ethische Deut-
ung der Welt in jeder Weise zu verzlchten. . . .Weder die
Welt- und Lebensbe jahung noch die Ethik ist aus dem,
was unsere Erkenntnis iHber die Welt aussagen kann, zu
begrilinden. . . .Der einzige Fortschritt des Erkennens ist,
dass wir die Erscheinungen, die die Welt ausmachen, und
ihren Ablauf immer eingehender beschreiben kflnnenl Den
Sinn des G-anzen zu verstehen - und darauf kommt es der
Welt-anschauung an 1. - ist uns unmo'glich. 1
Thus, with general disillusionment about the worth of our
mechanical and material progress Schweitzer combines denial
that our scientific knowledge is directly or necessarily a
step toward the attainment of genuine progress, and that it
gives any assurance of unity of the actual and ethical.
To renounce the attempt to interpret the objective world
in such a light as to find in it meaning for human life and
for its aims does not mean to Schweitzer, however, a renun-
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1
elation of the optimistic and ethical world attitude. He
says of himself,
Ich glaube der erste im abendlflndischen Denken zu
sein, der dieses niederschmetternde Ergebnis des
Erkennens anzuerkennen wagt und in bezug auf unser
Wissen von der Welt absolut skeptisch 1st, ohne
damit zugleich auf Welt- und Lebensbe jahung und
Ethik zu verzichten. 2
It is Schweitzer's theory, and a distinctive principle of his
philosophy, that the basis of such an attitude is not to be
sought in knowledge of the universe, but to be rationally
deduced from the facts of ethical volition. His view is, that
the "will-to- live", by which he does not mean an instinct of
self-preservation but a will to preserve and advance all life,
can not only stand by itself, but can support a philosophical
system instead of resting upon one. What our civilization
needs in order to be living and progressive is respect for
life, not founded upon an uncertain interpretation of the uni-
verse but upon our will to live and to perfect life, and upon
recognition of that will in all life.
The ground of man's hope for a perfection of civilization,
and of his enthusiasm for life, cannot be a rational one, ac-
cording to Schweitzer. The actual world offers no warrant
for such a hope and enthusiasm; and they are not justified by
any presentation of evidence for them. They spring from the
will-to-live itself, and depend upon it.
The actual world does not furnish our ethical ideals, but,
to the contrary, they demand that it conform to them. It has
been our weakness to look to reality to produce progress in-
dependent of human effort to work out ethical ideas by reason
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and to incorporate them In reality. We are not to place de-
pendence in some interpretation of the world to give a sig-
nificant metaphysical position to human values, but to trust
directly and immediately in the optimistic-ethical will.
The value of conscious life is accepted without rational
reason for it, either religious or philosophical. It is in-
volved in the will-to-live, and, without demonstration to
reason, it is accepted by the ethical will as its controlling
principle. The respect for life is thus founded not upon
beliefs, but upon a volition. It is in itself non-rational,
but it is the position, Schweitzer says, to which reason
leads us. True rationalism is eventually mysticism. It leads
to, and builds from, an experience in which the individual
accepts, and identifies himself with the general 7/ill-to-Live
.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CRITICS
1. Criticisms of the Theological Works.
(1) Schweitzer's Contribution, and the Values Claimed. It
manifestly cannot fall within the limits of our treatment to
criticize in detail, or even to pass a general judgment upon
Schweitzer's theological work or tneories. Of the scholarly
cnaracter and the general value to theology of Schweitzer's
G-eschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung there can be no question.
The critical investigation of the life of Jesus is justly
characterized by Schweitzer as "die grtfsste Tat der deutschen
1
Theologie" and "eines der bedeutendsten Ereignisse in dem
2
gesamten G-eistesleben der Menscnneit," and his careful and
monumental survey of this enterprise is a valuable contribut-
ion to scholarship. F. C. Burkitt speaks of it, in the pref-
ace to the English translation, as a work wnich offers to the
public "as no other book has ever done, the history of the
struggle which the best equipped intellects of the modern
world have gone through in endeavoring to realize for them-
selves the historical personality of our Lord," and, in the
article "Gospels" in Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and
Ethics
, as "the most instructive introduction to the general
3
trend of Gospel criticism during the Nineteenth Century."
It is a book, Reinhcld Niebuhr says, "through which all New
4
Testament criticism was profoundly affected."
That Schweitzer's theological views are fully acceptable
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to either Christian feeling or Christian scholarship in
general is not to be expected. His conceptions of the life
of Jesus and of the course of religious progress are "both too
individual s.nd vigorous, and too much at odds with our famil-
iar ways of thought and traditional religious values to be
either readily favored or to be compromised with. From
Schweitzer's side also, as has been indicated, there is said
to be no compromise between the modern historical and eschat-
ological life of Jesus. "Der Fortschritt besteht jedesmal,"
1
he says, "in der Einseitigkeit , im Ni chtmehrvere 1nenkdnnen.
"
The eschatological life of Jesus gives us a wholly different
view of Kim, and demands that we orient ourselves toward Him
quite differently than in the case of the modern historical
Jesus
.
The eschatological conception of the life of Jesus which
Schweitzer adopts is not, of course, original with him. He
gives in his G-eschichte der Leben- Jesu-Forschung a full
account of its development, pointing to its appearance in
2
Reimarus, Ghillany, Johannes Yfeiss and Wrede. To him, how-
ever, we may attribute a la.rge part in securing the open
recognition of the alternative "eschatological or not eschat-
3
ological," and also some development of the conception, and
extension of its use as a principle of interpretation. In
distinction from Wrede, in his simultaneous publication,
Schweitzer regards the doctrinal, that is, eschatological,
element in the life of Jesus as historical rather than liter-
ary. He is not content to recognize an eschatological element
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merely in Jesus 1 words, "but thinks that apocalyptic expectat-
ions are the governing element of His ministry and passion.
Schweitzer urges in behalf of his view that it is first of
all valid history. It makes "an end of 'qualifying clause
theology' of the 'and yet' the 'on the other hand' and the
'notwithstanding'." It is the result of critical investigat-
ion, free, as it may well be with quiet mind, from apologetic
purposes. It carries with it, furthermore, he says,
eine fortschreitende Rechtfertigung der evangelischen
Ueberlief erung. . . .eine Relhe von Perikopen und Reden,
die gef^hrdet waren, weil sie vom Standpunkt der zum
Massstab der Ueberlieferung genommenen modernen Theo-
logie sinnlos erschienen, sind jetzt gerettet.l
Moreover the figure of Jesus, though it belongs to an alien
thought world, is, he thinks, larger, more majestic, and a
more potent spiritual force. Modern theology, in turn, is
liberated from historical bondage and is able to manifest
itself as it is. It can become conscious of its own inmost
essence. It is freed "von der falschen. . . .geschichtlichen
Rechtfertigung, " and can "den ganzen Ideenreichtum entfalten,
2
der bis jetzt durch eine falsche Historizita't gebunden war."
(2) Reception of the G-eschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung .
With such an appraisal of the practical, progressive value of
the e s chat o logical viewpoint, as well as its general truth,
Kirsopp Lake agrees where, after quoting Schweitzer as having
"very truly said" that the historical Jesus will not be one
who can any longer perform the service modern theology has
been accustomed to secure from its half historical and half
modern Jesus, or in whose mouth it can put its views and

108
knowledge, but must be allowed to return to His own time, he
says, "The attempts to use the teaching of Jesus as a final
solution of our problems neglects this f act . . . .When, however,
the teaching of Jesus is allowed to belong to its own century,
and is interpreted in that light, it gains in strength and
pointedness and it becomes an inspiration and a guide, for
1
the 'will 1 of Jesus becomes plain."
Most theologians, however, have been loath to exchange for
these values claimed by Schweitzer those which they had secured
in the rational, universally intelligible Jesus who had been
won by modern critical study. The academic theologians in
general, particularly in Germany, held to the critical liberal
life of Jesus, and, after a few vigorous condemnations of
Schweitzer's thorough-going e s chat o logical theory, proceeded
with their program as though it had never been presented.
In England, it is true, the e s chat o logical conception at
first had a hearty reception. Professor William Sanday in
his Life of Christ in Recent Research, 1907, welcomed the
G-eschichte der Leben- Jesu-Forschung as the most helpful of the
recent books in that field, and said, "it would be no more
tnan just to describe a full half of these lectures as really
based upon Schweitzer's labours. At least they would have
taken a different and less satisfactory shape if I had not had
Schweitzer's work before me. If I should succeed in giving to
my treatment of the subject definiteness and logical coherence
2
of outline it will be very largely due to him."
In this work Sanday recognized Schweitzer as "the latest
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1
and most thorough-going representative" of the eschato logical
school, and with reference to the eschatological conception
says that "Schweitzer applies it more thoroughly than had ever
"been done before, even by the school to which he himself be-
2
longed." He is not inclined to agree in all respects with
Schweitzer, but things tnat the public ministry of Jesus was
probably of greater length than a year, that the political
conception of the Messiah was more firmly established than
Schweitzer recognizes and Jesus worked to recast the popular
anticipation, that in general Schweitzer overstates the case
against Jesus as a teacher, and that the journey to the north
3
was in all liKelihood a flight from opposition. In reference
to Schweitzer's eschatological conception he cautions that it
is "as great a mistake to try to explain everything in terms
of eschatology as to treat the eschatology as a mere appendage,"
but concludes that, "Speaking broadly and with much reserve as
to details, I should be disposed to defend the main outlines
4
of his arguments."
The defense, however >, collapsed rather abruptly and quite
completely. This happened when what was apparently the posit-
ion of established and official scholarship in Germany on the
issue was made plain by Ernst von DobschiUtz, a Professor Ordln-
arius of the Theological Faculty at Strassburg, where Schweit-
zer was Privatdocent
.
Von DobschiUtz gave first a paper at the Congress on the
History of Religion at Oxford in 1908, and then a series of
lectures at Oxford in 1909, printed in the Expositor in the
early part of 1910 and reprinted the same year under the title
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Eschatology of the G-ospels , which v/ere in direct opposition
to Schweitzer's views. Eschatology had been receiving an
overempnasis , he said, which accompanied a general modern in-
terest in what is alien and strange. That Jesus held eschat-
ological expectations m common witn his time, he did not deny,
but they had not, he said, exercised any considerable influence
on Jesus or His disciples. There is no evidence that Jesus
dreamed of hastening the "end of things," according to Von
Dobschilitz, and in Jesus' conception,
the Kingdom of God is not to be Drought about by a
miraculous act of G-od-^-. .. .Jesus in His own opinion
is not only preparing the future Kingdom of G-od...
but He is actually bringing it in2 ....His belief
was that this work and His own person could not be
overthrown that His work should gain universal
importance and He be acknowledged by every man^...
When we ask what is the kernel of early Christian
religious feeling we shall find that there is no-
thing eschato logical aDout it.^" Many sayings
of Jesus and Paul are.. only fully intelligible if
we recognize that escnato logical terms are used by
them m a new sense; they discard all external,
political, miraculous significance, but take the
inward moral meaning as already full* llled-?. . . .The
Kingdom is at hand, it is present in His person...
in Jesus' preaching everything is at once present
and future ... .In the two-sidedness of John's doc-
trine it is the very attitude of Jesus and Paul
which we recognize.'
In spite of the very detailed opposition to Schweitzer's
views Von Dobschilitz does not in the first paper refer to him
except as a "recent author." In the later lectures, hov/ever,
he mentions him by name after elaborately and as indirectly
as possible explaining his inferior academic rank. For sever-
8
al pages he comments upon the current tendency to see the
early Christian writings with early Christian eyes and the
prevalence of "these rather strange eschato logical views"
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which is such "that many of our recent German students will
find themselves quite at home and will think this form of
interpretation to be the usual, the only natural one." Partic-
ularly "there has always been some tendency in this direction
in Strassbarg," he says, and then, deprecatingly, "So you will
easily understand how it came to pass that one of the most
clever junior Strassburg men, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, also well
known as an ingenious interpreter of Bach's music, happened to
put forth his so-called theory of 'consequent escnatology ' .
"
"Now I wonder," he continued ingeniously, "how it happened
that this theory, put forth in the form of a mstory, or rather
an historical review, of the research on the life of Christ in
the last hundred years 'from Reimarus to V/rede' 1906, met with
much more appreciation in England than in G-ermany." For the
puzzle, nowever, ne nad some partial explanation, for after
calling the roll of V/ernle, Ju'licher and Holtzmann m the
opposition, he comolained that Sanday gave the book "a splen-
1
did advertisement .
"
However bold the spirit of Sanday may have been under this
attack, it might well have made nim look with care to his own
reputation and to the good name of British scholarship. At
any rate, in an article under tne title of "The Apocalyptic
Element in the G-ospels" in the Hibbert Journal for October,
1911, Sanday chose to soften as much as possible his agreement,
and shows evident regret for his earlier ill-considered en-
thusiasm. For the interest in England in the quest of the
apocalyptic element in the G-ospels, he admits, "the strongest
impulse came from Schweitzer's book Von Reimarus zu Wrede ,"

112
and some responsibility for the circulation of the views be-
longed to him. His retraction is almost, as Lowrie character-
izes it, "pathetic, " but he is not entirely free from his
former endorsement. The objection urged, is not the untruth
of the eschatological conception, but a too consistent and
logical application of it. Sanday forgets that he had before
said, "The conspicuous merit of the writer is that from first
1
to last he holds a single clue firmly in nis nand." There is
recognition of the same quality in the author, but a different
value put upon its results.
To the question of the soundness of Schweitzer's theory
Von DobschiUtz in reality contributed nothing. The circumstances
of oral delivery no douot imposed limitations upon the extent
and character of his treatment, out it is merely of the nature
of unsubstantiated assertion. He gets no whit fartner tnan
tne force of tne arguments ad hominem, ad verucundiam, and ad
populum will carry him. No one of the most ardent admirers of
Schweitzer would claim tnat ne nas struck into the difficult
and complex field of the historical life of Cnrist with a
theory that supercedes all previous research in tne subject
and stands as a single body of truth in which nothing can be
called in question. Tnere are good grounds on which one may
differ witn Scnweitzer's interpretation of many details in
the ministry of Jesus, or of His wnole consciousness, out to
minimize the greatness of the work or its originality can
only reflect upon the critic.
The merits of Schweitzer's voluminous and ooldly sincere
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work on the life of Christ and of his masterly treatment of
Bach are not those implied by Von Dobschu'tz' terms "clever
junior Strassburg man" and "ingenious interpreter of Bach,
"
and the origin of such works is not aptly described by saying
that "it came to pass" that they "happened" to be written.
Some concerned and hostile, but not professionally jealous
critics have better to say of Schweitzer's work. JiHlicher,
even though, to quote Sanday, he "is evidently stung.... and
sits down with no less evident intention of demolishing his
1
opponent," recognizes Schweitzer as "the best read and most
undaunted critic" in the field in which he writes; and Wernle
says, "Wir haben keine G-eschichte der Leben Jesu Forschung
die sich nur anna'hernd mit Schweitzer's Buch vergleichen
2
liesse .
"
On the score of originality, it seems very improbable to
suppose that it was a theory so familiar that recent German
students would "think this form of interpretation to be the
usual, the only natural one" which met such uncompromising
hostility from the academic circles in which they were train-
ed, and which one of the theological leaders characterized as
3
a dumb-f oundingly original romance.
Professor Wernle is one of the most severe critics, but he
lays his finger with precision and fairness upon what is its
distinctive position. He notes the relation of Schweitzer to
Johannes Weiss, which the former had himself emphasized, but
says, "i!lber Johannes Weiss hinausgehend, betonte Schweitzer
den aktiven, G-eschichte schaffenden Charakter der Sschatologie
Jesu.
"
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In this connection Professor Wernle has also some comments
to make about the title of the work. "Der Titel des Buchs
:
,Von Reimarus zu Wrede' ist • . . .falsch, " he objects, "er muss
heissen: Von Reimarus zu Albert Schweitzer, denn auch Wrede
gehflrt in das ungeheure Leichenfeld der grossen Leben-Jesu-
1
Schlacht, als deren einzig lUberlebender Schweitzer dastsht."
It i3, of course, no demerit in Schweitzer that he has his
own distinct viewpoint, or that in holding it he regards it
as the most reasonable conception. This is an inevitable
esteem that we have for our own opinions, but it makes diffic>
ult the writing of an unbiased history. Historians should
hold no strong convictions of their own. But, though it is
virtually impossible to write history without representing
the development of what one regards to be true belief as the
line of progress, there is justice in Wernle ! s criticism of
Schweitzer for treating the history of such a field of re-
search as the life of Jesus from a partisan point of view.
The work, he complains, in spite of the tribute which we
quoted above, is "mehr Kritik als G-eschichte ... .Kritik von
dem fertigen eschatologischen Standort des Verfassers aus...
. . . .von da aus wjLrd etwas anderes als eine einseitige G-e-
2
schichte der Leben Jesu Forschung gar nicht m^glich sein."
The soundness of this criticism, so far as it applies to
method, Schweitzer seems to have admitted in the different
plan of his G-e
s
chichte der paulini schen Fors chung .
Concerning the book as a whole, then, Wernle praises the
extensiveness of its material, which is such that "wenig
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Leser nicht mlt Dankbarkeit vieles ihnen Neue darin finden
1
werden, " and the form, of which he says, "die Sprache ist
glanzend, filir mich schon zu bilderreich, der Stoff meister-
haft geordnet mit nur se Itenen Vergewaltigungen. Nirgends
ein Verweilen bei Nebendingen; das Zentrale und Neue wird
2
uberall mit Sicherheit erfasst," but he objects to its lack
of Impartial objectivity. He gives an exceptionally concise
and fair summary of Schweitzer's conception of the life of
Jesu3, taken from the I.lessianit£ts- und Leidensgeheimnis , and
takes exception to the introduction of eschato logical deter-
minations into the life of Jesus, the notion that Jesus con-
ceived of forcing the Kingdom, the Interims-Ethik, and the
trust in the Synoptic tradition. He agrees that Schweitzer
has much justification for his criticism of the psychological
constructions of the Liberal-Jesus-theology from Keim to 0.
Holtzmann, but points out places in which Schweitzer's views
themselves also involve alterations in the text and construct-
ions which go beyond it: e.g. in Jesus' ideas in the incident
about John the Baptist, the interpretation of the phrase about
the violent who force the Kingdom, and the purpose of Jesus at
Jerusalem. On the point of relation to the sources, however,
beyond thus countering Schweitzer's attack, his chief critic-
ism is of the latter' s general acceptance of the reliability
of the Synoptic tradition. Here, where Schweitzer had regard-
ed Wrede as holding common views with himself because of the
emphasis on esch-tology , Wernle classes him as an opponent on
the basis of the latter' s criticism of the sources. "Der
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einzig sichere Ausgangspunkt miisste aein, " he declares, dass
wir eln direktes Wissen iHber Jesus ttberhaupt nicht besitzen,
dass uns bekannt bloss G-laube und l!Jberlieferung Urgemeinde
1
30-40 Jahre nach seinem Tod sind;" and with regard to this
ooint he charges Schweitzer's work with lacking "das ABC in
2
Kenntnis der traditionsgeschichtlichen G-esetze." The practic-
al interest of the theologian in the peaceful and undisturbed
prosecution of his own outlook, however, appears at the end of
the treatment in a manner that is slightly humorous. Since
Schweitzer had ventured to differ from the established view,
there was nothing to be expected from a second work except
provocation of his discomfiture; he might have left history
to decide between the views, and been quiet, rather than
bringing scandal upon the field of critical investigation by
a show of dissension.
Of these closing remarks we are somewhat reminded by the
heated and sarcastic tone of JiUlicher's Meue Linlen in der
Krltik der evangel! schen flberlief erunff . Schweitzer's
"schrille Schrei: „Ss gibt nichts Negativeres als das Ergebnis
der Leben-Jesu-Fors chung, " JiUlicher say3, "kiJnnte verstanden
werden als Schmerzensschrei " but "Nein, jener Ruf 1st bei
Schweitzer ein Jubelruf." The exasperating thing, apparently,
is that he will not recognize the desirability of the preser-
vation of the liberal picture and strive to keep, as nearly
as possible, its original lineaments. "Er ("der reine Histor-
iker Schweitzer'') macht kein Kehl daraus, dass er sich aller
derer freut, die an dem Bilde des liistorischen Jesus der mod erne
n
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Theologie irre werden, dass er sich freut, an seiner Zerstflr-
ung mitzuarbeiten, sich sogar der Ungerechtigkeit freut, mit
der man es bekHmpf t . . . .well der Platz dadurch frei wird fu*r
die Wahrheit," he complains, - all to serve the one idea that
"man kflnne mit geschichtlicher Erkenntnis ein neues lebens-
1
kr&ftiges Christentum aufbauen."
For the decision of the question of an eschatological in-
terpretation, again, there is nothing contributed by jfllicher's
work. "Ich verzichte hier darauf," he says at the beginning,
"Einzelheiten in dieser Konstruktion der Kritik zu unterziehen.
Nur als Erzeugnis einer lodernden Phantasie und eines starken
2
V/iilens erweckt sie Interesse." Were the theory in reality a
mere vagary, there is much in its reception which is difficult
to understand. One would expect that its inadequacy would be
manifest, or else that it could be readily and convincingly
shown by the expert. The definitely argued position of a man
of such established position and abilities as Schweitzer, how-
ever, cannot be so cavalierly dismissed. All that is true in
this criticism is that Schweitzer's choice and evaluation of
works on the historical life of Jesus is made from the view-
point of belief in the eschatological theory. It is a"super-
cilious" review, in the terms of Lowrie , translator of the
Messianlt£ts - und Leidensgeheimnis , and according to Sanday
an example of "rather conspicuous injustice." While the
critic is honest, Sanday says, he is a "party man" and "perhaps
the first motive which prompted him to take up the pen was the
sharp attack delivered by Schweitzer against the headquarters
of theological Liberalism."
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H . J. Holtzmann, although he made no such attack upon
Schweitzer, also came forward in defense of the modern
historical conception of Jesus. The Messi anlsche Bewusst -
sein Jesu
, 1907, and two articles on "Die Marcus Kontroverse
in ihrer heutigen G-estalt" written in the same year for the
1
Archiv fflr Re llgionswissenschaf
t
,
aim, he says, at a reversal
of the death sentence which the Von Re 1marus zu Wrede believed
had "been given to the modern theological re search in the life
of Jesus by the simultaneous appearance of Wrede' s Ivies sias -
gehei mnls in den Evangelien and Schweitzer' s Messianit&ts -
und Leidensgeheimnis .
Holtzmann recognizes the propriety of much of the criticism
of psychological reconstructions of the life of Jesus. He says,
Psycho logische Vermutung, dilettantehhaf tes Phantas-
ieren und abenteurlich.es Herumraten spielen in der
ganzen, von A. Schweitzer zu genussreichster Dar-
stellung gebrachten Literatur eine fast so verh&ng-
nisvolle Rolle wie dogmatisch motivierte Karrnonistik
und Vergewaltigung der Quellen. 2
He objects, hov^ever, to Schweitzer's sweeping view of the
whole modern-historical construction as only a sharply retro-
grade movement on the ground that it depends on the help of
modern psychology and is arbitrary in its use of history. The
consistently escha to logical view, with its rule that the
historical is what is not understandable in a natural way,
leads, he holds, to equally unhistorical constructions.
Along familiar lines Holtzmann reaffirms that the conscious-
ness of Jesus was Messianic, but with an ethical interpretation
of the office. In this he represents the firmly established and
conservative position of the forces of Christian theology at
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large. In it they were momentarily startled by the sharp front-
al attack of Schweitzer, but from it they have had no idea of
retreating.
A striking criticism of Schweitzer 1 s theory from a differ-
1
ent point of view is given by Professor F. G-. Peabody. He
believes that "the most important contribution of this gener-
ation to Biblical interpretation has been made, beyond question,
through the appreciation and analysis of New Testament eschat-
ology," and that it is "likely to remain a permanent factor in
critical research," but he thinks that the prevailing tone of
the ethical teaching does not show the quality of indifference
to the world's affairs or of complete preoccupation with a
supernatural category, and that it does not fit in with the
plot of an eschatological drama. He thus proposes that the
ethical element in Jesus, which seems the most solidly founded,
and, even more definitely, the habitual attitude of Jesus to-
ward nature and life, are corrective of the extreme eschatolog-
ical view.
The weight of Jesus' ethics is not, however, so definitely
against Schweitzer's theory as Professor Peabody assumes. It
is the ethical earnestness of Jesus which is the impulse of
his eschatology, according to Schweitzer; and Professor Evans
is able to describe the ethics as pessimistic, with its only
hope a transcendent one (the apocalyptic, catastrophic coming
of the Kingdom) , and with its distinctive characteristic a
spirit of detachment from lesser values in relation to the
2
one great end of the Kingdom.
As a matter of fact, Professor Peabody' s criticism begs
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the question. The universal ethical elements in Jesus are
the most soundly established only through the subjective fact
that they are what our ethical sense accepts as valid and
authoritative. What the argument amounts to is, that, when
we have accepted the rationalistic representation of the
consciousness and ministry of Jesus as directed to a develop-
ing ethical Kingdom, the es chato logical conception is not in
harmony with our view.
(3) Neglect of the G-eschichte der paulinischen Forschung .
Tne appearance of Schweitzer's book on the history of Pauline
investigation, in 1911, was not an event comparable to that
of tne publication of the earlier work on tne Le ben-Jesu-
Fors chung. Reasons for this may be found in tne more immed-
iate concern which Onristiamty nas m the conception of the
teaching and life of Jesus (together with tne radical nature
of Schweitzer's suggestions relative to it), and in tne al-
ready mentioned inferiority of the critical research whose
history is recorded. Again, Schweitzer's "konsequente Eschat-
ologie" was already known, and a position toward it nad been
taken in theological circles. Further, in the present work
tne constructive study of Paulimsm m accordance with the
theory, whicn might nave struck fire, is not presented with
the nistory, though its features, as tne previous exposition
shows, may be found by search and by the assembling of assert-
ions.
The G-eschichte der paulinischen Forschung, then, made little
stir in theological circles. Except as a collection of an ex-
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tensive and scattered body of material, no significance was
attached to it. It may be said, however, that the work cannot
be either neglected or lightly dismissed by a theological
scholarship which is both honest and thorough in the construct-
ion and validation of its results. Either the evidence which
Schweitzer presents must be conclusively overthrown, or it
must be recognized that in the course and development of
early Christianity there is not only agreement with, but also
confirmation of Schweitzer's conception of the life and min-
istry of Jesus, The result of the work, if it stands, would
be not only to confirm the eschato logical vievf of Jesus but
also to demand a completely revolutionized view of Pauline
doctrine as containing a less spiritual and ethical but more
material theory of redemption governed by eschatological
presuppositions
•
(4) judgment of the "konsequente Eschato logie" . What is
most original in Schweitzer and what most vitally concerns
theology, however, centers in the life of Jesus, The theol-
ogians who deal with Schweitzer, Dobschilltz excepted, recog-
nize that in the suggestion that eschatological expectations
not only entered into the thought of Jesus, but also played
an important, in fact the determinative part in His message
and ministry, Schweitzer introduces something new into the
field of critical study of the life of Jesus,
It is precisely on this theory of "konsequente Eschatol-
ogie" of Schweitzer's, it must further be recognized, that
opposition in regard to eschatology centers. Even though
it was at one time, in the heyday of rationalistic
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lives of Jesus, the fashion to reject or weaken all the
eschatological passages in the sayings of Jesus, their
historicity is now better established, "The eschatolog-
lsts proved beyond a doubt," W. D. Mackenzie says in
Hastings 1 Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, "that the
eschatological sayings of Jesus are of assured authenticity"
and that "they are not occasional utterances ... .foreign
1
to his main principles." Modern theologians are admitting,
with no great reluctance, that Jesus' thought and express-
ion were colored by eschatology; what they will not accept
is that Jesus 1 ministry was guided by these ideas, and
that our conception of a developing ethical and spiritual
kingdom did not belong to Him. For Schweitzer these are
the main facts which emerge from the research.
That Schweitzer is too consistent and logical in his
application of the eschatological principle is a criticism
made by several of the theologians. His own observation
regarding Strauss and his mythical theory, "das war sein
Recht. Wer entdeckt ein wahres Prinzip, ohne damit die
2
Wahrheit zu vergewaltigen? " could apply also to himself.
In the case of a number of incidents and sayings in the life
of Jesus it would appear that he carries the theory too far
by his unvarying reference to the one principle of explanat-
ion. There might be mentioned as such cases the explanation
of Jesus 1 wonder at the disbelief of the people of Nazareth,
which he refers to the nearness of the Kingdom, his inter-
pretation of Jesus' reply to the question of John the Baptist,
II
I
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the theory of the feeding of the multitude, the interpret-
ation of the confession of Peter, the view of Jesus 1 purpose
at Jerusalem, and the explanation of the nature of Judas 1
disclosure, in all of which Schweitzer's interpretations are
so different from the customary. To many of his interpret-
ations one might reply, as both Wernle and Holtzmann remark,
in his own so-oft-repeated phrase, "Davon steht aber nichts
im Text."
The strongest impression to the reader of Schweitzer's
writings, however, is that of how naturally and adequately
the theory fits and interprets practically all of the life
of Jesus, how well it explains His "hard sayings," and how
simply it takes care of some of the stubborn features of any
rationalistic view. The theory includes all that the former
did, and some things which always remained foreign to it. It
amazes one with its comprehensiveness and coherence. These
qualities are too pronounced in the relation of the theory to
the sources to credit them, with Jillicher, wholly to the
"bewunderungswlirdig.
. . .Kunst, mit der unser Autor sein selt-
1
sames G-espinst aus F&den alter lUberlieferung komponiert."
It is not necessary to the theory, of course, to maintain
that every incident in the recorded life of Jesus is explain-
ed by His eschato logical expectations. Schweitzer remarks
that features in the life of Jesus are to be attributed out-
side of the eschatological considerations to His traits of
sympathy and ethical earnestness. In his exegesis, however,
he seems to forget this and to go farther in the application
of this single principle than the theory requires or the
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material justifies. This is not unnatural, and in fact
it is wholly desirable from every point of view that
Schweitzer should present the interpretation in terms of his
eschato logical conception of every feature in the life and
words of Jesus which permits of it. It is for the author of
a new idea to show how far it will possibly serve as a
positive principle of explanation; others may later test the
definite points and the general range of the agreement with
the data that has been claimed.
Schweitzer believes that the eschato logical theory makes
intelligible the great body of features in the ministry of
Jesus, and that it offers solution of the stubborn problems
of critical research. That it does both of these with consid-
erable plausibility has to be admitted, and under its influence
the theology of the schools has gone a long way in the accept-
ance of eschato logical features in the gospels. Its life of
Jesus, no less than that of the critical theology of the past
century, is an interpretation which has good foundation in the
sources. Whether either the consistently eschatological life
of Jesus of Schweitzer, or the liberal life of Jesus of rat-
ionalistic theology, can be excluded, on the one hand, or
established, on the other, through detailed work on the sources,
could be settled only by extensive critical work of unbiased
specialists. There is apparent so much: first, that the
theory has made it possible for the critical theology to be
dogmatic and has required it to validate its resulte; and
secondly, that for Schweitzer himself the "convictions he has
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either learned from, or been confirmed in, by his study of
the historical Jesus are ... .nothing less than a releasing or
1
redeeming Gospel* N
The determination whether Schweitzer's theory is actually
an advance in the direction of correct historical knowledge
of Jesus is, however, not of primary importance for our
purposes. What is pertinent to this investigation is rather
the nature of his conclusions, and their bearing upon his
whole philosophical outlook.
The history of Christianity will bear witness that the
conception of Jesus has always been a function of two factors:
the historical sources, and the prevalent thought systems of
the time. Schweitzer believes that he bases the life of Jesus,
with historic truthfulness, upon the former and cuts it loose
from the latter (which is in this case ethical humanism of a
theological sort)
•
Whereas the usual picture of Jesus represents not alone
what is historically given, but what is natural and reasonable,
according to the point of view of the age, Schweitzer's port-
rait of Him is one largely unintelligible to us. This Jesus
does not belong to a common realm of thought with us, and seems
to be without meaning for our consciousness.
This was as true for Schweitzer as for others. The first
harvest of the eschato logical conception was disillusionment.
It meant withdrawal of one of the accepted pillars of our eth-
ical ideas, and it was the foundation of these that formed the
central interest of Schweitzer, yet he found through further
reflection that history might show that the consciousness of
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Jesus was esch.itological, that our ethical outlook did not
belong to Him, and still that both the transcendent claim of
the spirit of Jesus and the authority of our ethical ideals
remain unshaken.
A historical religious foundation for ethics is lacking,
even as theoretical foundation in Critical Idealism had also
been. But, just as in the philosophy of Kant the ethical
will had shown itself to be the real source of the ethical
postulates, so here the active moral will of Jesus presents
itself as the positive spiritual, and spiritualizing, element
in His world and ours. The eschatology - or, at any rate,
its supernaturalism - is an accidental and extraneous feature
which we cannot accept. The world-negation is transcended,
out the religious spirit which distinguishes itself from the
world and seeks to spiritualize it is of abiding significance
and validity.
2. Concerning the Missionary Activity.
When Schweitzer's G-eschichte der Leben-Jesu-Porschung
appeared there were those who saw in it nothing more than the
startling declarations that "Es gibt nichts Megativeres als
das Ergebnis der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, " and that "Der Jesus
von Nazareth, der als Messias auftrat, • die Sittlichkeit des
G-ottesreiches verkilindete, das Himmelreich auf Erden grflndete
und starb, urn seinem Yterke die Weihe zu geben, hat nie exist-
iert." To them he was an"arch intellectualist" under whose
wholly unfeeling criticism every element of religious value
disappeared. These persons "who think of Dr. Schweitzer only
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as a left wing higher critic should read of his work in
1
Lambarene 1,' is Micklem's comment. The ones who have such
acquaintance with his missionary enterprise have been brought
first to a pause and then to sharp reversal of judgment. The
attitude has in general been one of mystification how Schweit
zer combines with his views of Jesus such genuine Christian
spirit and zeal. The latter, at any rate, have been evident
and convincing, and whatever was unfamiliar in the theory has
been let pass on their certification. A fellow missionary
writing in the International Review of Missions says,
it is clear from his present volumes on civilization,
and from his recent earnest and beautiful lectures on
Christianity and the Religions of the World , tha,t he
still adheres to the central result of his earlier in-
vestigations, namely, that a mistaken conviction of
the imminence of the end of the existing world-order
was a dominating factor in the work and thought of
Christ
,
and though
There must be many Christians to whom this will seem
a degree of unorthodoxy almost amounting to blasphemy
. . . .He has counted everything but loss that he may be
true to his vision of the Christ and that he may be a
minister and a witness of the things in which he has
seen our Lord.^
"No man who shall do a mighty work in my name shall be able
quickly to speak evil of Lie," he reminds us that Jesus said
of one who had healed in His name.
The critical theologians of Germany who think bitterly of
Schweitzer as a colleague who, from within their ranks, would
destroy the results of their patient research and the struc-
ture of their laborious apologetic should be aware that this
striking example of Christian practice has been the one thing
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which has most strongly shaken the popular conviction of
critical scholarship's lack of religion. The average Christ-
ian echos the opinion of W* D. Mackenzie, that "the radical
school has put forth no higher proof that the grace of G-od is
1
within reach of its view of Jesus."
There have not been lacking, of course, some who interpret
Schweitzer's course as a flight from the field of theology,
2
which no longer held promise of advancement for him, or which
had ceased to be attractive to him. Of this T/erner gives
refutation by features from the life of Schweitzer. He declares,
Das sind Missdeutungen, mit denen man ihm schwer Un-
recht tut. Er selbst erzShlt la in seinen Jugend-
erinnerungen, wie er als 21 jahriger Student beschloss,
bis zu seinem dreissigsten Jahre dem Predigtamt, der
Wissenschaft und der Musik zu leben. Dann, wenn er hier-
in geleistet, was er vorhatte, wollte er den Weg des
unmittelbaren Dienens als Mensch betreten. Dieser Ent-
schluss hatte ganz andere G-riUnde als den, der ihm von
solchen untergeschoben wird, die ihn nicht kennen. Und
auch als er dann diesen Weg wirklich ging, flilichtete er
in Wahrheit keinesv;egs aus der Theologie. Wie schlicht
erz&hlt er in seinem Buche „Zwischen Wasser und Urwald"
davon, mit welcher Freude er auch noch als Arzt den
Negern in der Kirche der Missijisstation zu Lambarene
predigei Und in all seiner auf'reibenden Arbeit f$r den
Wiederaufbau seines a'rztlichen Missionswerkes nach dem
Krieg hat er auch noch Zeit gemacht, urn ausgerechnet
in einem englischen Seminar fitr QuSker-Ivlissionare Vor-
tr&ge zu halten lUber die beste Verteidigung der christ-
lichen Grundwahrheiten gegeraliber den heute so anspruchs-
voll und lllberlegen auftretenden Religionen des Ostens!
1st dies „Flucht aus der Theologie"? Mflglicherweise
k<3nnte manchem unserer Theologen, der von Albert Schweit-
zers nFlucht aus der Theologie" redet, durch die LektuVe
dieser Schweitzer 1 schen Vortra'ge der eigene, oft etwas
gesunkene Mut neu gest&rkt werden, der Mut, ein flber-
zeugter christlicher Theologe gerade heute zu sein und
zu bleibeni 5
Even more decisive in the establishment of this conclusion
is the evidence from the growth of Schweitzer's course out of
his personal traits and experiences, of which more will be
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said later, and from the organic unity of this course with his
whole theology and philosophy. Hogg gives testimony for this
latter point, though without reference to such a view of
Schweitzer's missionary work. He says,
In a very outstanding degree this man's thought and his
life are one.... no discerning reader of his recent books
can fail to perceive that his self-dedication to medical
work among the neglected is the morally fitting express-
ion of his whole outlook on life and God and duty. It
was religious as well as humanitarian devotion that im-
pelled him.l
The theory of a "Flucht aus der Theologie" has a superficial
plausibility, but it is only such as rests upon lack of famil-
iarity with Schweitzer and with the inner logic of his life.
The criticism regards the medical-missionary activity as a
break and change in the life of Schweitzer, whereas it is a
step in a unitary progress. It is not a flight from theology
or from religion, but an expression of theological belief and
of religious faith. It is not an abandonment of Christ or of
Christianity, but an unusually complete determination of the
whole life by Christ and an uncompromising commitment of it
to the Christian principle.
3. Concerning Schweitzer's Music.
The unity of Schweitzer's character in its various manifest-
ations is impressive at every point. As theologian, the phil-
osophical spirit and outlook are a constant background; as
philosopher, the ethical interest and religious attitude are
made central; and as musician, philosophy and religion are not
left behind, but only secure another (the artistic) expression.
Of a concert of Schweitzer's in Bingharnton in 1923 a musical
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critic wrote that it was "not merely a display of brilliant
1
technique but an act of v/orship and a sacrament." Again,
Widor says of Schweitzer's work on Bach,
I rank it among the works the significance of which
consists in the fact that while they are founded on
a thoroughly professional knowledge, they treat their
subject from the standpoint not of a single art but
of art and science in general. Schweitzer is a phil-
osopher through and through. .. .To read Schweitzer's
Bach is not only to get to know the composer and his
work, but to penetrate also into the essence of music
in general - the 'art per se'. 2
4. Criticisms of the Philosophy.
To the task of philosophy Schweitzer comes with some unique
qualifications. These are not primarily in his academic train-
ing in philosophy, which is good though not unusual, but in the
coordinate high development of the several phases of the human
spirit - intellectual, esthetic and practical. We have al-
ready had occasion to note in him a rigorous intellectualism,
a keen esthetic sensibility and a practical energy which are
unusual in combination. It is not common for these character-
istics to be joined in a single personality; and in this time,
when strict specialization is as a rule so necessary for real
achievement, it is rare to find an individual with so broad
and comprehensive an outlook'. Dr. Hermann von Mililler gives
an excellent statement of this completeness of spirit in
Schweitzer where he says,
In ihm verkflrpert sich noch jene Vielseitigkeit geist-
iger Herrschaft und Leistung, die dem Elick umfassende
Weite gibt....Und endlich hat Schweitzer das, was er
lehrt, durch sein persdnliches Leben vorgelebt und da-
mit ein Vorbild der Einheit und Folgerichtigkeit von
Wort und Tat, von Gesinnung und Handlung gegeben. ..3
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These are not, however, the usual credentials of a profess-
ional philosopher, and. Schweitzer has never been that. More-
over he has written not in a technical manner, but for the
general public. In professional circles, then, his philosophy-
has received little notice. "Die grossen Pers^nlichkeiten,
die Trager grosser Ideen, M Dr. Von Mdller says in his article
on Schweitzer, "sind selten. Die Zeit ruft nach ihnen - und
1
hiJrt doch oftmals nicht, wenn sie zu ihr sprechen."
The paucity of notice is probably due in great measure, as
was remarked, to Schweitzer's position outside the academic
field, and to the tendency in German scholarship, as observed
2
by Mackenzie, to be well acquainted with everything which
goes on in its particular circle but oblivious of what is out-
side. Another contributing factor is that Schweitzer was
already too well known as a theologian and musician. We are
so accustomed to specialization in ability and knowledge in
the run of. scholars that we but grudgingly, if at all, allow
an individual eminence in a third or fourth field. We must
recognize, however, in the case of Schweitzer, not only that
we are dealing with a personality of unusual vigor and versat-
ility, but also, as cannot too often be said, that the varied
activities are not mere diverse pursuits, but constitute a
unitary spiritual expression. The variety of detail is governed
by a single and inflexiole personality of which they are the
manifestations, and all the diversity is subordinate to a single
principle of life. As Oskar Pfister says, "Albert Schweitzer
is like the rainbow, which gleams in every color, and yet main-
3
tains a magnificently complete unity."
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Most of the critical notices which the philosophy has re-
ceived have not been m the professional journals, and have
not in general "been of a technical nature. The majority have
given tiie pnilosophy only a popular review, or, on the other
hand, have either misconstrued Schweitzer's meanings or failed
to note the distinctive features of his thought. It serves as
a slight but suggestive indication of the philosophical mis-
understandings that Hogg refers to Bertrand Russell as holding
1
a viewpoint sympathetic to that of Schweitzer, while Reinhold
Niebuhr, under the title "Can AlDert Schweitzer save us from
Bertrand Russell?", hails Schweitzer's Christianity and the
Religions of the World as "the best answer to Russell's What
2
I Believe ."
Niebuhr, in this last mentioned article, gives a striding
review of Schweitzer's philosophy, but one that is essentially
unsound. It is one of the most appreciative of the reviews,
but its estimation rests upon a false representation. Niebuhr
values Schweitzer's philosophy as a possible answer of relig-
ion to such .cynicism as tnat of Bertrand Russell, but mis-
understands and underrates the answer. He says,
Albert Schweitzer in his memorable book Civilization
and Ethics maintains tnat the ethical life is rooted
in optimism and that the decay of ethics in our day
is due to the defeat which the optimistic will-to-live
has suffered because it was supported by an untenable
optimistic metaphysics. In other words, the universe
is not as sympatnetic to the human spirit as tradition-
al religion has assumed, and when ethics is rooted in
this assumption it must finally suffer shipwreck.
Nieouhr's misunderstanding of Schweitzer is a very easy and
natural one; but, even in what is so apparently a faithful
representation of Schweitzer as tne above statement, there are
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several serious errors. In the first place, there is a subtle
transformation of Schweitzer's judgment that the unfortunate
state of civilization and ethics today, as compared with that
which they occupied in the period of Eighteenth Century Ration-
alism, is due to the theoretical weakness of the optimistic
metaphysics upon which they rested, into a criticism of the
optimistic metaphysics qua optimistic. This is the very re-
verse of what Schweitzer says. The fault of this philosophy
in Schweitzer's eyes was that it proved untenable, not that
it v/as an optimistic metaphysics. Through this misreading,
Niebuhr arrives at such a statement as the second sentence,
"in other words, the universe is not as sympathetic to the
human spirit as traditional religion has assumed." This is
to put foreward a positive metaphysical view which does not
appear in Schweitzer; and it would be impossible to find war-
rant in his wri tings for such a declaration. Schweitzer does
not definitely deny that the universe is sympathetic, but only
the right to assume it, or the possibility of proof of it on
theoretical grounds through a philosophy of nature or an
epistemology
.
Niebuhr is nearer to the apprehension of the element in
Schweitzer' 3 thought which has misled him - namely, the pos-
itive religious spirit - where he says in conclusion, "When
ethics is rooted in this assumption (of the ethicality of
nature) it must finally suffer shipwreck." The ethicality of
nature may be a fact, according to Schweitzer; it is, in truth,
a fact of which he is ready to make assertion, but the princip-
les of its ethical operation, he holds, are unclear to us.
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Neither the foundation or our etnics nor its principles are
given in what we can ooserve of nature's workings, but these
are found m the ethical will of tne human spirit, which may
even condemn and oppose what it sees in nature.
Trutn and error, accordingly, keep close company in the
criticism when iuiebuhr says "Religious assurance is made
entirely dependent upon mystical and moral experience and
tne problem of evil is eliminated as a peril to religious
faith." On the r'irst point he is not entirely wrong, but
only half ri^ht; not merely religious faith is dependent
upon moral experience, but also philosophical belief rests
upon it, mystically interpreted (though not mystically ap-
prehended}. On the second part, he is half right and half
wrong. He is half wrong here, because among the distinctive
features of Schweitzer's thought are a keen consciousness of
evil and an intellectual rigor that will not permit an easy
and spurious solution of the problem it offers. He is half
right, because Schweitzer does eliminate the problem of evil.
This is not, however, as Niebuhr supposes, through a frank
adoption of dualism, but through an act of self-assertion of
the ethical will.
"The universe is simply too blind to the needs of man and
too ruthless with personal and spiritual values to warrant
the theory that a good God is in essential control of all its
forces," Schweitzer thinks, as Niebuhr represents him, and
accordingly it must be distinguished from the moral and re-
ligious G-od as alien to Him in nature. The way in which the
review misrepresents the author receives interesting illust-
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ration here. The statement must be accepted as a correct
representation in the meaning that the world with its feat-
ures of disvalue would not establish beyond all uncertainty
the belief in a single and moral Being as its explanatory
principle, and is not to be regarded as having given rise to
the idea; but it is entirely untrue to Schweitzer's tnought
in the meaning which Niebuhr gives it, that the aspects of the
universe are such as to be wholly incompatible with the assump-
tion "that a good G-od is in essential control of all its forces.
It is only as the result of such confusion that Niebuhr can
say,
In his little book ( Christianity and the Religions of
the World ) Schweitzer maintains that Christianity is
the final religion because it opposes the religions
of absolute optimism and of absolute pessimism with a
naive dualism which permits of both pessimism and op-
timism, pessimism in regard to the world and optimism
in regard to the life of man. Metaphysics, in Schweit-
zer's view, is the bane of religion. Metaphysical
systems which have been prompted largely by the prob-
lem of knowledge and not by any ethical or religious
problem have been made to serve apologetic purposes.
The absolute at which they arrive was supposed to give
rational sanction to the theism of religion; but phil-
osophical absolutism has been a questionable ally of
religion. It has greatly aggravated the problem of
evil and caused the very reactions of which Mr. Russell
is typical. To make God responsible for the universe is
to rob him of his goodness. The facts of life are
simply too confused to warrant faith in a G-od who is
at once good and omnipotent.
The justification for Mr. Niebuhr to hold any of the positive
theory above as his own philosophy is not contested here -
and what is Schweitzer's and what is Niebuhr' s are not clearly
distinguished. The setting and form suggest, however, that
this is a summary of Schweitzer's thought, and while it would
be correct to represent it as affirming that the facts of life,
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if thereby experience of the objective world is meant, are too
confused to be the warrant of such a faith, it is utterly un-
true to represent it, as Niebuhr does, as offering a limited
and transcendent G-od opposed to an unethical natural principle.
If Schweitzer's philosophy possesses moral and religious
potency, as Niebuhr asserts, it is not on the grounds to which
he refers it - namely, that it adopts the "naive dualism" and
"emphasis upon transcendence" which it found to be the secret
of the spiritual power of Hebrew theism, instead of following
the example of liberal theology, which in discarding the devil
"has attempted the impossible task of safeguarding the charac-
ter of God even while it involved him more completely with the
universe," and in attempting to absorb the discoveries of mod-
ern science has adopted new insistence on the immanence of
G-od, working in and through the processes of the natural world.
Schweitzer, it is true, has attributed the spiritual power
of Hebrew religion to these factors in it, but has not regard-
ed such philosophical views as final factors in religion or
morality. It is a case of petitio principii in the form of
Complex Question when Niebuhr asks, "is Schweitzer not right
in insisting that' religion can maintain its spiritual power
in our day only by returning to the naive dualism of prophetic
religion?" He would need first to show, as he cannot, that
Schweitzer urges such a course. Niebuhr' s "resulting picture
of the world" as "one in which personality is in conflict with
nature" or, as he later more specifically says, with its in-
ertia, is one which bears few points of resemblance with that
of Schweitzer. Further, between Niebuhr' s conception of
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spiritual victory, which"may be gained only by complete trans-
cendence" and by the soul's "preserving its peace and happiness"
despite the worst outrages against it "by the blind cruelty of
nature',' and the thought of Schweitzer, there is little kinship.
Several factors contribute to the misunderstanding. There
is, first, the factor which we spoke of above as Schweitzer's
"positive religious spirit." Secondly, Niebuhr in attributing
such a dualism to Schweitzer is drawing what seems to him to
be the inevitable conclusion of Schweitzer's positions. He
completely misses, in its reference to the natural universe
at least, Schweitzer' s doctrine of the ethical basis of know-
ledge, which is the only thing that saves him from that con-
clusion. The point, however, will have to be discussed more
1
fully in another connection.
No more correct, either, is the contradictory assertion
which Niebuhr makes in the same passage, that "Metaphysics, in
2
Schweitzer's view, is the bane of religion." He makes the
common, but uncritical error of confusing rejection of a cer-
tain type of metaphysics with rejection of metaphysics alto-
gether. The whole text for the assertion has reference to
metaphysical systems prompted by problems of knowledge rather
than problems of morality, and to philosophical absolutism as
the sanction of religion.
These last mentioned attacks on post-Kantian idealism are
the most disturbing feature to Dr. A. G-. Hogg, mentioned
above. He says,
That Idealism has fallen in hopeless ruins is one of
the premises of Dr. Schweitzer's own proffered phil-
osophical construction. With this premise I am entirely
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unable to agree.... I must confess to holding that,
whatever disrepute Idealism may suffer in quarters
that are temporarily prominent, its main contribut-
ions to philosophy have been too solid to be per-
manently departed from.l
From the standpoint of a Christian and a fellow missionary
he thoroughly approves of the fruit which Schweitzer's phil-
osophical system bears, but not of the plant itself. "For the
ethical attitude at which this is Dr. Schweitzer's way of ar-
riving I feel profound reverence," he states, "But for the
terms and conceptions in which he has formulated it I have no
manner of use; and at his way of reaching it I rub my eyes in
bewilderment .
"
That to which he takes exception so strongly is the fact
that "Dr. Schweitzer will have nothing to do with any attempt
to establish peaceful relations between philosophy and science
by distinguishing the types of validity at which they respect-
ively aim," and that he surrenders the philosophy on which he
counts for support of religion. It is his understanding that
Schweitzer's views constitute a "rejection of idealism," since
Schweitzer very clearly discards his type and its reading of
nature. However he senses something wrong with this as a
judgment upon the final nature of Schweitzer's philosophy when
he says that his "sniff of contempt, as at an admittedly ex-
ploded fallacy" is "in spite of the fact that his own 'life
view' is a kind of voluntaristic idealism." This "life view",
however, in Hogg's opinion, "rests upon so flimsy a sub-
structure of argument that seemingly it must collapse unless
2
somehow propped up by the epistemology which he despises."

139
Schweitzer's judgment of the failure of transcendental
philosophy is, to Hogg's mind, without sufficient justificat-
ion. He says,
I have been driven, I confess, to the reluctant con-
clusion that in some way which I do not understand,
Dr. Schweitzer must be temperamentally unfitted to
do justice to the post-Kantian idealism. .. .Over and
over again he refers to what he calls ' epistemo logic-
al idealism,' but never once does he examine it. A
sniff of contempt, as at an exploded fallacy, and his
attention turns to some other alternative.
^
Of course what has thus, in some way not understood by Hogg,
"unfitted" Schweitzer to do justice to epistemological ideal-
ism is his study of it in the Religionsphilosophle Kant 1 s
.
The Ku Iturphi lo s opni
e
takes the conclusions of that work for
granted and proceeds directly from its results. If Hogg is
totally unaware of this background, he cannot well be in a
position to understand the determining considerations, which
he then classifies as "temperamental." It is true that, in
his relation to this system, Schweitzer has not played the
games of the epistemo logists and cosmologists to the end under
their leadership; that of which he has satisfied himself is,
that from its side it provides no explanation of the sphere of
morality. It is amusing to find Hogg charging Schweitzer with
such a misunderstanding of the relation of phenomena and
noumena as to suppose them to be two distinct sets of entities
when it is through the correction of that common misunderstand
ing of critical Idealism that Schweitzer shows its moral in-
difference. The failure with which Schweitzer charges post-
Kantian idealism, along with other systems, is not theoretical
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inaccuracy, but lack of inherent relation to morality. An
idealistic philosophy of life is not developed from epistem-
ology, he holds, and, in the test of historical use, epistem-
ological idealism has shown itself incapable of supporting the
ideals upon which civilization rests.
Hogg believes that the activist type of morality involves
"optimistic faith in Nature," and that "doubt of Nature
threatens to rob it of enthusiasm," but recognizes in Schweit-
zer's Philosophy of Civilization
,
despite its surrender of the
hope of finding such a purpose, "a work whicn not only is a
marvel of erudition and industry but breathes throughout an
1
apostolic fervor and conviction." It is, however, a fervor to
which (from a Hegelian viewpoint) he has no title. "For the
unitary teleology of the objective world," Hogg says, "he sub-
stitutes an infinity of diminutive teleologies. In some ob-
scure manner he persuades himself that if Nature has no unitary
ethical will, at any rate each structurally individuated exist-
ent possesses a will to perfection (for no less than this is
2
what he means by will-to-live)." Schweitzer appears convinced
that service of these, "no matter how useless, is profoundly
worthwhile," Hogg thinks, but generally there is needed faith
in a unitary purposiveness in nature and an assurance that
active service of ideals will secure their actualization.
"The new teleology," which Schweitzer seeks to substitute,
"is too microscopically pulverized," he asserts.
The full answer to such a criticism must be the work of the
later analysis of Schweitzer's philosophy, but one may reply
directly, that, except where absolute fixity of philosophical
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viewpoint has occurred, there is no obscurity in the suggest-
ion that the ethical will of persons furnishes a clear in-
stance of moral purposiveness , whatever the case in regard to
nature, and that such an assertion in no way commits Schweit-
zer to a judgment against the cosmic nature or security of
moral ideals. "His outlook is dominated by a great cosmico-
ethical intuition," Hogg then complains, "which he expects
others to share as soon as he has expressed it." This is
essentially true, and yet in Schweitzer's system there is no-
thing undemocratic or esoteric. Its life- and world-view are
the result of the application of the universal rational faculty
to common experience. Beyond the apprenticeship of disillus-
ionment with the function and service of cosmo logical and
epistemo logical systems, which Schweitzer seeks to share with
his readers, they assume only the fact of ethical will in the
philosopher, without which, in Schweitzer's view, he would be
lacking in the faculty for true philosophical apprehension of
reality.
That Schweitzer finds the basis of his philosophy in immed-
iate experience is recognized by W. Montgomery in an article
1
in the Hibbert Journal for July 1925. He says,
As Descartes, driven back to the fortress of the self
as the basis for reality, began with his famous Cogito
ergo sum , so Schweitzer, too, proposes to go back to
the ultimate content of consciousness. But what he is
concerned with there is not self-consciousness in its
most abstract intellectual form, but our consciousness,
as the ultimate vital thing in us, of the will-to-live. 2
In this statement, however, he fails to do justice to the full
qualification of the basic consciousness in Schweitzer's
thought; and later, to the rationalistic side of the system.
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In the transition from this subjective beginning to an oblig-
ation to serve the will-to- live universally he finds the
greatest difficulty for Schweitzer's philosophy. He says,
It cannot claim to be demonstrative, for....he
(Schweitzer) deliberately confesses that the trans-
ition is a mystical act. But when we call in Myst-
icism, we renounce the attempt to be demonstrative
and our theory can be convincing only to those who
accept Mysticism as a method, and who find the
results to be of self-evidencing value. Only those
whose mental attitude is that of what may be called
- using the term in a wide sense - a Neo-Platonic
mysticism will be likely to accept Schweitzer's
theory wholly, or to find its basis more irrefragable
than that of the older theories.
1
This is to misunderstand, however. When Montgomery says
that the obligation to serve the wi 11- to- live universally
"cannot claim to be demonstrative" he ove: looks the fact that
Schweitzer claims for it just that. It is an ethic, the
2
latter says, "conceived as intellectually necessary." It may
not, to be sure, claim to be demonstrative in the sense of
having a foundation which is completely and purely rational,
or theoretic. The older rationalism, which proceeded more
geometrico from innate ideas, or from principles supposed to
be rationally self-evident, has been wholly discredited. If,
however, by demonstration there is meant necessity for re-
flective thought , working on. the material of immediate exper-
ience, Schweitzer's philosophy does lay claim (which Is sub-
ject, of course, to examination) to be demonstrative. So far
is it from the truth, that "only to those who accept Mysticism
as a method" will it prove convincing, that any philosophical
system which is based on experience must, in common, begin
with elements which are non-rational. The mysticism which
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Schweitzer "deliberately confesses" is not primarily in the
transition from the conscious will-to- live to the general
principle of respect for life, but in the fact of this non-
rational beginning; in so far as mysticism is involved in the
transition it is a matter of reflective interpretation, and is
subject to rational criticism. This is what was meant when it
was said that the basic experience is mystically interpreted,
not so apprehended. There is in Schweitzer nothing of v;hat is
commonly understood from the expression "Mysticism as a method."
Keeping clear of any reference to inclination toward plur-
alisms or monisms, it may be said that Schweitzer does not
belong to the class of "tender-minded." In the field of men's
most sensitive religious feelings he was the intellectualist
"who seemed to place under a kind of soul microscope every
emotion that hindered his studies until it vanished like a
1
snow-flake in a warm room." Recourse to feeling for that of
which reason can give no assurance is foreign to his disposition.
Equally alien to Schweitzer is that attitude which Dr. Von
Mller's representation suggests as belonging to his outlook.
Von Mililler gives one of the most comprehensive and sympathetic
2
reviews of Schweitzer's work as a whole. He is familiar with
his activity in all its forms, and liberal in his praise of
Schweitzer's personality and genius. He seems to think, how-
ever, that Schweitzer voices the need of a philosophy which
would combine the ethical and religious interest of civilizat-
ion with the ideas of true reason, but resigns as vain the
effort to find it, offering his principle of unmediated
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respect for life as a practical substitute. Accordingly he
summarizes Schweitzer's views in the Kulturphi lo sophi
e
thus,
Eine Weltanschauung muss zur Herrschaft kommen, die
in Ankralipfung an den wertvollen Kern des Rationalis-
mus die Ideen wahrer Vernunft begrillndet - der Ver-
nunft, die nicht dillrrer Verstand, sondern der Ihbe-
griff aller Funktionen des G-eistes in ihrem lebendig-
en Zusammenwirken ist. Nur eine solche Weltanschauung
kann dem Optimismus und der Ethik eine feste G-rund-
lage geben und so die Zukunft der Kultur sicherstellen.
Wird es der Zukunft gelingen, diese ungeheure Auf-
gabe zu lflsen, an der sich vergangene G-enerationen
umsonst gennliht haben? Schweitzer weist die Versuchung
zur Resignation von sich. Selbst wenn es dem Denken
nicht gelingen so lite, den Sinn der Welt erkennend zu
verstehen, muss die Weltanschauung den Sinn des Lebens
aus dem Willen zum Leben, der in uns ist, zu begrelfen
suchen Den Sinn der Welt zu erkennen, bleibt
unerreichbar . Aber der Sinn des Lebens liegt in ihm
selbst. .
.
However strong the practical and humanitarian bent of Scnweit-
zer's character, one of the most certain features in it is his
virtual inability to make truce with an unsettled problem.
What Schv/eitzer suggests is not the relinquishment of meta-
physics, but a revolution of method in which the universe is
interpreted by life not life by the universe.
Von M&ller is nearer the truth when he says that the incom-
patibility of theoretical knowledge and ethical will ("der
Dualismus von erkennender Weltanschauung und willentlicher
Lebensbejahung") "bleibt ihm unlo'sbar. Daher stellt er die
Lebensanschauung ilber die Weltanschauung. Die Weltanschauung
muss aus der Lebensanschauung erwachsen, nicht umgekehrt." The
fact of the matter is, then, not tnat the dualism of theoreti-
cal apprehension of the world and affirmation of life is
"unerldlsbar" in Schweitzer's view, but that they manifest a
diversity which makes a definite problem for reflection. Von
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Muller, in nis representation "Den Sinn der Welt zu erkennen,
bleibt unerreichbar, " stands in company with the critics in
general, who take the element of respect for life as the
heart of Schweitzer's ethics merely, and recognize in it no
more general philosophical import.
One of the most discriminating treatments of Schweitzer's
1
philosophy is by Professor R. H. G-rutzroacner. He recognizes
that the ethical will holds metaphysical implications for
Schweitzer, wnere he says, in review of the Kulturphi lo sophle
,
Eine einheitliche in sich geschlossene V/eitanschauung
ist nicht mflglich, folglich kann sich unsere Lebens-
anschauung auf jene nicht griUnden, sie muss auf sich
selbst gestellt sein - aber diese soil sich doch
wieder t)aus in der Welt abgelesenen Erkenntnissen bild-
en" und mit dem ,,Welterkennen auseinandersetzen" (203) •
Schweitzer fflhrt mlthin Kants Primat der praktischen
Vernunft und die Tendenzen des Pragmatismus durch, auf
der anderen Seite macnt er aber doch wieder die Lebens-
anschauung zum G-egenstande und zur Quelle theoretischen
Denkens.
This is, nowever, G-nUtzmacher very well points out "eine
prinzipiell nicht eindeutige und gekl&rte Position." He
explains,
Erle^ter G-rundbegriff ist - Nietzsche-Schopenhauerisch -
der „Wille zum Leben, " dessen Wesen zun&chst dahin
definiert wird ,»dass er sich ausleben will" (210).
Dleser Wille wird dann ethisiert und zwar durch die
„Synthese" der beiden ethischen G-rundbegriffe : Hin-
gebung und Selbst-vervollkomnung (217). Diese Ethik
wird na'her Kap. xx ausgefilihrt und zuletzt in die Form-
el gekleidet: Hingebung an Leben aus Ehrfurcht vor
dem Leben ( 236) .3
The indefimteness or this principle is twofold. First, there
is the fact that unfortunately Scnweitzer
macnt ... .mrgends emen Versuch, den Begriff des
Lebens wenigstens in der Masse zu definieren, dass
man verstent, ob Leben fiHr ihn ein rein biologisches
Prinzip ist Oder etwas Ho'heres.
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Secondly,
Schweitzer bleibt wie Kant im Prinzlp an einem Formal-
i sinus ha'ngen, der dann nur durch die Empirie mit kon-
kretem Inhalt erfilillt wird. Wenn es heisst, es sei die
Aufgaoe em „Menschenleben auf seinen hdchsten Wert zu
bringen" (240) so ist man verge Dens gespannt, zu er-
fahren worin dieser hdJchste Wert besteht und wie er
sich begrflndet.-1-
Finally, in G-rilitzmacher 1 s judgment, beyond the inspiration of
his ethical spirit, Schweitzer has little solid philosophical
contribution to make. He concludes,
Kurz auch der
t|
neue Weg" Schweitzers leidet unter alle
den Ma'ngeln, unter denen jede pmlosophische Ethik
leidet und den Schopenhauer einmal in das auch von
Scnweitzer zitierte Wort zusammenfasst : „Moral predig-
en ist leicnt, Moral begrillnden scnv/er." Schweitzer
predigt als eine sittlich starke Pers6*nlicnkeit in
diesem letzten Teil (Kulturphilosophie , Heft ^ lehens-
voile Moral, die lm einzelnen ausserst tiefe ethische
G-edanken wie z.B. u"ber die Verzemung (245) Oder lliber
die Kirche (273) aussert, aber eine „neue Moral" hat
er weder dera Inhalte noch der BegriHndung nach gebracht. 2
These criticisms of G-rilitzmacner 1 s are made with better under-
standing and surer objective ground tnan are found among the
critics in general. The criticisms of Schweitzer for indefin-
lteness in the reference of his principle of respect for life,
and for formalism, are entirely justified. It is an a-priori
general form of morality that Schweitzer offers. There re-
mains, however, the question whether the final judgment is
wnolly correct. Schweitzer does not seek to give a content of
morality whicn couid be called new, but a new foundation for
the positive ideals in our civilization. Even in this last,
of course, he does not succeed, if, thinking m tne way which
Scnweitzer rejects, one means by a rational foundation a oasis
that is purely theoretical. In the degree in which Schweitzer
succeeds in justifying the autonomy of the moral will he secures
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a foundation which, though not wholly novel to thought, would
"be a new element for the accredited and effective philosophy
of life.
We have yet to examine this foundation critically, "but the
measure of its soundness is the measure of the value of
Schweitzer ' s philosophy. That Schweitzer regards tnis problem
as the fundamental question for thought is considered oy Werner,
in his book Das Weltanschauungsproplem Del Karl Bartn und
Al bert Schweitzer , as one of the chief merits of tne latter in
contrast to Barth, who treats all thought as ultimately con-
cerned with the religious question of man's relation to a
transcendent G-od. Whereas Barth makes optimism, which is not
justified by factual observation or reflection, rest on faith
in G-od's redemption of the world in a new creation (an eschat-
ological faith), Schweitzer, the "eschatologist , " accepts it
on the direct ground tnat the will-to-live is a not less ob-
jective, and a more immediate fact of experience than tnat
which one nas or pnysical nature, and is stronger tnan tne in-
tellectual doubt. He has a place for ethics at all, oe cause
his pessimism is not absolute, but is undermined oy this
direction of the will toward the ideal.
in contrast to G-rfltzmacher' s criticism, it is Werner's view
that, through this difference from Bartn l s method of referring
ethics to a will of G-od, wnich, in the pessimistic judgment of
the world, can be Known only imperfectly, Schweitzer's ethics
is definite and absolute, and that "das denknotwendige sittliche
Prinzlp" wnich it contains is "nicht einmal nur ein oloss form-
1
ales, sondern es hat eirien sehr konkreten Inhaltl " In that
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reapect, in fact, he says,
llsst Schweitzer die ganze Masse der philosophischen
und theologischen Ethiker die seit Kant immer nur im
reinen Sollen, in dem ganz inhaltlosen forraalen
Pflichtbe griff die prima*re ethische Norm finden wollten
(sie machten aus der Not eine Tugendl ) we it hinter sichl 1
The contradiction, however, is not so irreconcilable as it
would seem upon the face of it. G-riHtzmacher is correct that
the duty „Menschenleben auf seinen hflchsten Wert zu bringen"
is one whose content is yet to be determined, and it is still
true that morality is not left without content as in Kant's
morality of respect for Tightness.
With regard to the rational necessity of the fundamental
ethical principle, it is his judgment, that its assertion
2
"h&lt . . . .offenbar doch wahrscheinlich jeder Kritik standi"
3
So much, at least, is evident, that, as Schweitzer says, every-
thing which in the customary ethical judgment of human conduct
is considered c;ood refers to the material or spiritual preser-
vation or advancement of human life and to the effort to bring
it to its highest value.
Werner also recognizes a metaphysical reference of the
will-to-live in Schweitzer 1 s thought. The philosophy of civ-
ilization is, in his view, no anti-metaphysical humanitarian-
ism. The fact that in the reflective will-to-live as it is
experienced by man, an ethical principle which opposes the
natural tendencies of that will appears as a rational necess-
ity "will nun auch in seiner ganzen Bedeutung erfasst und ge-
wrlirdigt sein. Es handelt sich hier nicht minder urn eine
nobjektive Tatsache" als bei all dem, was das pessimi stische
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Welterkennen vom Yfeltgeschehen von aussen her zu erfassen ver-
1
mag." The question i3, "Welcher Charakter 1st dem universe li-
en Willen zum Leben zuzuschreiben, wenn es dazu kommt, dass er
sich im denkend gewordenen menschlichen Willen zum Leben, der
doch nur eine der unza^iligen Erscheinungen dieses universellen
2
. Wi liens zum Leben ist, als ethischer Wille erlebt?" It is a
question which brings us face to face with the puzzle of the
morally contradictory appearance of the world's manifestations.
This is so frankly recognized that it seemed to Niebuhr, as we
saw, to be the acceptance of a naive dualism, but Werner says,
to the contrary, that in Schweitzer ' s principle of universal
respect for life, the problem "wieso das ethische G-eschehen als
aus dem Weltgeiste kommend und auf die Welt gerichtet, dennoch
3
von dem Weltgeschehen verschieden ist" is "soweit es iliber-
4
haupt l^sbar ist - gelilst." When the reflective will-to-live
confronts the above question,
dann lehnt er es als eine leichtfertige Voreiligkeit ab,
aus dem pessimist! schen Welterkennen ohne weiteres end-
gtfltige Schlussfolgerungen zu Ziehen illber das Wesen des
Weltgrundes. Er konstatiert die unleugbaren Tatsachen
des pessimistischen We It erkennens , la'sst sie als unlfls-
bare R^tsel stehen und bescheidet sich dabei, sich an
die andere objektive Tatsache zu halten, dass in ihm
selber tfberzeugungen, Ideale der Selbstverwirklichung,
der Lebensvollendung auftreten, die Mi!iber die Erkennt-
ni3se hinausgehen, die unsere Anschauung von der Welt
ausmachen" (K II, 205), und die insofern durchaus den
Charakter einer „hdheren Offenbarung des Wi liens zum Leb-
en in mir" (K II, 243) tragen.5
This treatment by Schweitzer of the ethical impulses as
"ho'here Offenbarung" in a keenly sensed dualism of evil and
good is strongly characteristic of him. It is a prominent
feature both of life and theory, and in each it gains support
from the other. His reference in the memoirs of his childhood
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to his sensibility to the suffering of life, and to his
feeling that the values of life are not to be taken for grant-
ed or as merely personal, as the two strongest impressions of
his childhood has already been noted; and it is significant
to hear him defending the idealism of youth, and its sense of
values, against the disillusionments of experience, as not
only better but truer.
How close the relation of Schweitzer's personality and
philosophy are will have to be more closely examined later,
but some critics approach his philosophy from the standpoint
of interest in his personality, and regard it as the real (and
individual) principle of the system, Oskar Pfister, Zurich
pastor, University of Zurich lecturer, and writer in the field
of psycho-analysis, finds in him an interesting subject, and
in the memoirs material indicative of repressions and feelings
of inferiority. An early childhood impression that a reflect-
ion of the church organist, which appeared during the singing
and disappeared while his father preached, was the devil, the
fear that prominences on his forehead might be horns like
those of Moses, unhappiness from the suffering of his parents
on account of poverty, the reserved nature of his mother, and
a supposedly "joyless period in Mlhausen, " he says ^'helped
to create those inner repressions which caused his unheard of
versatility, expressing itself in the keen scientific investig-
ator, the artist and the missionary."
Against an employment of the single principle of explanat-
ion of some psycho-analysts, it needs to be said that there
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are other and more significant grounds for genius than
"Minderwertigkeitsgefuhl. " The childhood incidents mentioned
may be matched out of the early fancy of any normal child of
active mind, and the sharing of family anxiety for financial
means tends in the strong to a perfection rather than imperfect
ion of character. Schweitzer's boyhood was on the whole happy,
and his family life with parents and sister was ideal. His
father, he said, was the best of comrades; and, although he
gives evidence for Pfister's mention of reserve in his mother's
character and his own in the statement that he can count the
times in which there was any expression of affection between
them, he adds briefly but expressively "doch verstehen wir
uns." His relations with other boys were active and on equal
terms. In sports he took delight in matching his strength,
and was annoyed by indifferent competition. In the affairs of
life he is practical and capable.
The above considerations need, however, scarcely be urged
against Pf ister, who in his psychological treatment shows
marked reserve; all the features which he has mentioned, he
concludes, leave the real secret of Schweitzer's personality
as a whole untouched. One wonders, nevertheless, what inter-
pretation a radical psycho-analyst might make of the inner
consciousness of Schweitzer from such features as his resolve
to enter upon a life of direct human service at the age of
thirty; his selection of a ministry of healing; his account of
the treatment of the sick, reminiscent of G-ospel narrative,
where his hand is laid on their heads and there is "kein
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1
Schmerz mehr;" his repeated inception of his work at the
Easter time, even his several months of slow travel along the
north coast of Africa and return to Lambarene at that season;
and, in the light of his interpretation of Jesus' "Leidens-
geheimnis," his expression of his chief satisfaction in the
2
terms "dass ich die Tage der Qual von ihm nehmen darf ." Such
a reflection, however, one may pass by with a reference to
Schweitzer's gentle reminder to our age (with its lack of con-
sideration of the individual) that there is a privacy of the
3
mind which is no less Inviolable than that of the body, and
with indication of Schweitzer's sociability, the balanced dev-
elopment of his character, and the abounding vigor and health-
iness of his practical activity.
Professor Oskar Kraus in his reprint in book form of an
article which appeared first in the Jahrbuch ftir Charakter-
4
ologie under the title "Albert Schweitzer, zur Charakterologie
der ethischen Pers^nlichkelt und der philosophischen Mystik,"
and which is interested primarily in the philosophy as an
expression of personality, questions whether an author "der....
der Persflnlichkeit Schweitzer's auf „psychoanalytischem" oder
„individualpsychologischem" Wege nachzuspu'ren versucht, method-
isch richtig verf&hrt." He commends Pfister that he avoids
the attempt to find the secret in the demonstration of an
inferiority complex, and says,
Der Adler'sche, gewiss fruchtbare Begriff des „Minder-
wertigkeitsgefuhls" muss jedenfalls sehr weit gefasst
werden, urn in solchen Pollen noch erklHrende Dienste
zu leisten: so weit, dass darunter jedes Bewusstsein
der eigenen Unvollkommenheit fa*llt, ein Bewusstsein,
ohne das ein sittliches Streben ilberhaupt unmo'glich ist,
und das andererseits, urn in der Weise wie bei Schweitzer
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wirksam zu sein, eine seelische Struktur voraussetzt,
fur die das Minderwertigkeitsgefunl allein nicht als
Erklltrung dienen kann, da durchaus nicht jeder, der
von solchem G-efflhl erfilUt ist, auch solche Entschl-
flsse aufweist. - Auch von einer „tiefen Verknechtung
durch konstitutionelle Angst" zu reden, scheint mir
zu weitgehend, ja verkehrt . . . .er mag unter dem G-efuhl
des G-rausens und der Angst viel gelitten und dadurch
zum Denken und zu seiner Weltanschauung den Weg ge-
funden haben; aber die Determination erfolgt in der
Richtung der mutigen Tat, Ist es daher sinngemMss,
von Verknechtung zu reden? Wenn irgendwo, ist vielmehr
das Wort Freiheit am Platze; Freiheit nicht von Determ-
ination schlechtweg, aber von Determination zu Sngst-
lichen Entschlflssen.
It is in what Schweitzer accomplishes through the impress-
ion of his personality and of his ethical will that he makes
his greatest contribution, Kraus thinks. His music, theology
and philosophy are "interessant und wertvoll," but such accomp-
lishments are less rare than the former. "Die Menschheit ist
reich an Mnnern, die G-rosses leisten in den einzelnen G-ebiet-
en und Fachgruppen menschlichen Wissens und Kflnnens," he says;
"Aber sie war und ist arm an grossen voranleuchtenden, selbst-
losen Charakteren, an ethischen Willensmenchen. Solch ein
2
Mann ist Albert Schweitzer."
The philosophy, Kraus regards as rather the expression of
a practical religious spirit than of philosophical reflection.
Schweitzer, he thinks, minimizes the difference between relig-
ious and philosophical thought, where there is genetically a
great distinction. Religion grows out of anxiety and necessity
and has no time to wait, whereas philosophy grows out of wonder
and has patience as its greatest virtue. "Schweitzer's
Lebens- und Weltanschauung ist ein Produkt seelicher BedrSng-
nis," Kraus says, "und tragt daher nicht wissenschaftlichen,
3
sondern religic'sen Charakter."
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The distinction which Kraus points out here is one that
is not to be overlooked, and yet the antithesis of the last
sentence above cannot be so sharply drawn. The attitude of
philosophy cannot be one of indifference; and a comprehensive
philosophy cannot leave value or evaluation out of account.
One of the chief handicaps of philosophical investigation has
been the fact that it has been intimidated into neglecting
this factor in its problem. We shall find it to be a chief
merit of Schweitzer that, schooled not to fear the charge of
sentimentality or tender-mindedness, he gives the etnical
evaluations and impulses a high place. In his evaluation of
Schweitzer, Kraus offsets his opinion of the philosophy with
the assertion, "Das Wissen 1st nichts; dass heisst das blosse
Wissen, der blosse Intellektualismus • . . »Der ethische Wille
1
dagegen ist die wohlt&tigste Kraft der Weltgeschichte."
Even as a philosopher, then, it cannot be a demerit of
Schweitzer that he takes serious account of what experience
has shown to be "die wohlta'tlgste Kraft der Weltgeschichte."

PART TWO
ANALYSIS OF SCHWEITZER'S PHILOSOPHY
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CHAPTER EICrHT
APFEAL FROM POSITIVISM
1. Positivistic Features.
Little agreement exists among the critics in the interpret-
ation of Schweitzer's philosophy. There is, for example, almost
equal certainty on one hand that his view is naive dualism,
and on the other that he rejects the attempt to arrive at a
metaphysical view as a hopeless and useless effort.
Basis for the positivistic interpretation is not lacking.
One of the strongest general impressions that may be derived
from a reading of the Kulturphi lo sophie is that of anti-meta-
physical bias. This Impression, moreover, is not merely a
general one for which no evidence can be found on closer exam-
ination, but the interpretation can be supported by statements
of Schweitzer's from which appeal is apparently useless.
Nothing it would seem could be clearer than the positivism
of some of Schweitzer's pronouncements. The whole course of
western philosophy has been unsuccessful in its search for a
securely based world-view, he says, and has brought us only
1
to a position of "Weltanschauungslosigkeit . " Even so the
vain search is persisted in. He, says,
Die tfberlegung, dass der Sinn des Hens chenlebens im
Sinn der Welt begreifbar sein milisse, ist dem Denken
so selbstverstandlich, dass es sich selbst durch das
fortgesetzte Fehlschlagen der dahin gehenden Unter-
nehmungen nicht beirren lSsst, Es meint nur, die Sache
nicht richtlg angegriffen zu haben....Bei Kant, in der
spekulativen Philosophie und in mancher bis fast in
unsere Zeit hineinreichenden„spiritualistischen"
Popularphilosophie bewahrt es die Hoffnung, durch
irgendeine Zusammenlegung des erkenntnistheoretischen
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mit dem ethischen Idealismus zum Ziele zu koinmen. . .
.
Aber auch dies 1st eitel....Was unser Denken als Er-
kenntnis ausgeben will, ist immer nur eine ungerecht-
fertigte Deutung der Welt. 1
In this situation, he says,
Meine Lo'sung des Problems ist die, dass wir uns ent-
schliessen m&ssen, auf die optimlsch-ethische Deutung
der Welt in jeder Weise zu verzichten, . . .In der Welt
ist f{lr uns nichts von einer sinnvollen Evolution, in
der unser Wirken eine Bedeutung bekommt zu entdecken.
Auch Ethisches tritt in keiner Weise In dem Welt-
geschehen zutage. Der einzige Fortschritt des Erkennens
ist, dass wir die Erscheinungen, die die Welt ausmachen,
und ihren Ablauf immer eingehender beschreiben kflnneni
Den Sinn des Ganzen zu verstehen - und darauf kommt
es der Weltanschauung ani - ist uns unmo'glich.
HDas neue Vernunftdenken" Schweitzer says of his proposed
system, "jagt also nicht dem Phantom nach, u*ber den Sinn der
3
Welt wissend zu werden." In contrast with it, "Alle Welt-
anschauung, die nicht von der Resignation des Erkennens aus-
4
geht, ist gektfnstelt und erdichtet." Of his position in
this he boasts only that,
Ich glaube der erste im abendlUndischen Denken zu sein,
der dieses niederschmetternde Ergebnis des Erkennens
anzuerkennen wagt und in bezug auf unser Wissen von
der Welt absolut skeptisch ist, ohne damit zugleich j-
auf Welt- und Lebensbe jahung und Ethik zu verzichten.
2, Scepticism Limited to Scientific Positivism.
The positivistlc interpretation of the Kulturphi lo sophle
is, however, even in view of the above statements,unacceptable,
in the light of the chief motives of the work, namely, the
need and duty to secure a positive world-theory with permanent
6
foundation in thought. It is wholly incompatible with
Schweitzer's declaration that,
What I desire above all things - and this is the crux
of the whole affair - is that we should all recognize
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fully that our present entire lack of any theory of
the universe is the ultimate source of all the
catastrophies and misery of our times and that we
should toil in concert for a theory of the universe
and of life, in order that thus we may arrive at a
mental disposition which shall make us really and
truly civilized men.l
What Schweitzer means by "Weltanschauung" needs to be examined
to clear up the contradiction. There are two senses of the
term in his usage. The meaning in one set of instances is
defined by Schweitzer thus,
Der Inbegriff der G-edanken, die die Gesellschaf t und
der Einzelne ttber Wesen und Zweck der Welt und uber
Stellung und Bestimmung der Menschheit und des
Menschen in ihr in sich bewegen. Was bedeuten die
Gesellschaft, in der ich lebe, und ich selber in
der Welt? Was wo lien wir in ihr? Was erhoffen wir
von ihr? Was schulden wir ihr? 2
For the sum of the answers to these questions the term "world-
view" is used in the meaning of a "theory of the universe,"
and the urgent necessity for reflection is the chief message
of Schweitzer. The answer given by the majority to these
questions, that is, their Weltanschauung, he says, decides
the spirit in which they and their age live. Nowhere does he
suggest the possibility of dispensing with such a theory of
the universe
.
As we have seen, however, there are places where Schweitzer
speaks of the Impossibility of securing a Weltanschauung, and
proposes resigning the attempt. Where this is the case, the
term is used to refer to an understanding of the world in the
sense of physical nature, and furthermore to a wholly intellect-
ual knowledge of it.
Toward the knowledge of nature, Schweitzer's position must
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be carefully defined. He does not deny the possibility,
usefulness or accuracy of a scientific description of nature.
The sciences of nature, however, do not, he believes, find
its meaning, which is after all our chief intellectual interest.
Moreover from no scrutiny of its facts, or reflection about
them, can a significance of life be found, and permanently
established.
We must not, however, understand Schweitzer to deny that
meaning belongs to nature or that it can be attributed to it.
As brute fact, and as a system of natural events, it baffles
our attempt to find meaning for life in it, but the possibility
of possession of such meaning is not excluded. Furthermore,
Schweitzer does not deny finally the possibility of knowing
it, only of knowing it by the way in which philosophy and
natural science have insistently attempted in the past to under-
stand it. It is only in a mistaken approach and method that
there is no hope of apprehending the metaphysical nature and
significance of the world. Schweitzer has, in reality, all
the confidence of the Enlightenment in the ability of reason
to discover truth if reflection is only comprehensive and
thorough.
3. The Need of a Philosophical Theory.
The vital connection between our theory of the universe
and civilization is, after his Mmoral conception of civiliz-
ation," the second fact which Schweitzer wishes to bring to
general consciousness, according to his statement in the pre-
1
face of The Decay and Restoration of Civilization. He
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criticizes the period in which we are living for its lack of
regard of this relation, and for its common supposition that
humanity will progress satisfactorily without any theory of
the universe at all. He declares that "all human progress
depends on progress in its theory of the universe, decadence
is conditioned "by a similar decaaence in this theory. Our
loss of real civilization is due to our lack of a theory of
1
the universe. " He proclaims himself, furthermore, as champ-
ion of "the paradoxical truth" that "only as we succeed in
finding a strong and worthy theory of the universe, and find in
it strong and worthy convictions, shall we again become cap-
able of producing a new civilization."
The need of finding meaning in the universe is stated by
Schweitzer no less emphatically than by his Idealistic critic
Hogg, where he says,
Only when we are able to attribute a real meaning to
the world and to life shall we be able also to give
ourselves to such action as will produce results of
real value. As long as we look on our existence in
the world as meaningless, there is no point whatever
in desiring to effect anything in the world. V/e
become workers for that universal spiritual and material
progress which we call civilization only in so far as
we affirm that the world and life possess some sort of
meaning, or, which is the same thing, only in so far
as we think optimistically. 2
He, in fact, expects that in his 'insistence that it is the
prevalent theory of the universe which determines the character
of an age, and that an affirmative and ethical philosophy is
a condition of civilization, he will be charged with placing
3
too high a value on a philosophical theory.
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4. The Possibility of a Philosophical Theory.
That Schweitzer believes a theory of the universe justified
by reflection is possible, is indicated by the facts that he
regards its attainment as the first and essential condition
1
for saving civilization from ruin and disintegration, and
that, in spite of the serious difficulties in the way, he
believes such an achievement is possible. An actual part of
the life of the ethical spirit, he declares, is belief in the
possibility of the renewal of civilization. He is conscious
of the enticing voices which say tnat living for the day is
the one thing which can make life tolerable and that we must
find rest in resignation, but dismisses them with all the
force of his vigorous character. He holds that the spirit,
as a deciding court of appeal, is able to secure a suitable
theory of the universe, and to provide a substantial basis in
the midst of events for making civilization a reality.
The notion that one can get along without any metaphysics,
Schweitzer dismisses as fallacious. Though the individual
may not know the source of his ideas, yet "genen alle G-edank-
en, die der Einzelnen sowohl wie die der G-ese lis char t , zuletzt
2
i rgendw i e auf fe 11ans chauung zuru*ck . M The re are mus i ci ans
,
he says, who have produced all'of the tones which pervade the
age in which we live, and the individual who is without a
thought-out theory of his own is one who is in tune more or
less with all these tones. It has been one of the weaknesses
of our day, he declares, that we persuaded ourselves it was
possible to get through without any theory of the universe,
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and "nahmen. . . .fftr unser und der G-esellschaft Leben die
1
Zufallsideen des Wirklichkeitssinns entgegen." However we
have long had experience "zur G-erallge, dass die Weltanschauung
der Weltanschauungslosigkeit von alien die wertloseste ist
und nicht nur Ruin des geistigen Lebens, sondern Ruin flber-
2
haupt bedeutet." The production of a reflective theory of
the universe is, he says, die grosse Aufgabe des G-eistes.
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CHAPTER NINE
SCHWEITZER'S HEW RATIONALISM
1. Rejection of Empiricism.
(1) Empiricism Cannot Support Active Optimism. A theory
of the universe which supports civilization is not secured
from experience in the general sense of that term, Schweitzer
holds. If, in the first place, empirical observation of the
world about us were our only, or primary source of knowledge
,
we would be brought almost unavoidably to a pessimistic view
1
of the essential nature of life and world. World- and life-
affirmation and optimism are our original attitudes, and it
is experience which in so many cases robs us of these, or, at
least, in any reflective man, brings them in question. When
we begin to reflect on experience of the world the optimism
which was naively ours begins to disappear, and it is for this
reason that culture is so apt to be accompanied by anathy and
loss of vital enthusiasm for the promotion of life.
Only pessimism, apparently, is justified on the basis of
scientific observation; or, at least, the world as known in
objective experience gives no sound basis or effective incent-
ive for active devotion to the 'advancement of life. The world
too strongly suggests that life is futile and inmermanent, and
that our service of it is uncertain and of transient meaning,
to itself evoke supreme devotion and self-sacrifice in its
behalf. Thus whatever value scientific observation may have
for material progress when it is the instrument of an energetic
soirlt of affirmation of life, it cannot give birth to that
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spirit or keep it alive.
(2) Tt Does not Discover Meaning. Objective experience
may not Drove that life is meaningless, but it does not find
clear signs to indicate what the purpose of the world is, or
even that it has any unitary purpose. It enables us with ever
greater accuracy to describe and to anticipate the processes
of nature, but it never finds the meaning of the whole.
Accordingly, in SDite of all that it makes possible in the way
of mechanical achievements, it is philosophically fruitless.
(3) It is a Lack of Organization of Thought. Our r»ride in
the scientific method is in its ultimate character the glori-
fication of a degeneracy of the power of reason, and of the
lack of organization of thought. What we boast of as our sense
of reality is a shortsightedness in reference to facts, and a
determination of our belief and conduct by every fresh and
unassimilated impression. We merely "aus einer Tatsache die
1
n&chstliegend andere hervorgehen las sen, und so fort und fort. M
By this method life ceases to be guided by any principle at all,
or to have any unity or coherence. We vaunt ourselves that
life has been brought into harmony with reality, but the sit-
uation is that, "Wir kamen dazu, statt im Denken Vernunftideale
mit Beziehung auf die Wirklichkeit zu schaffen, die Tdeale der
2
Wirklichkeit zu entnehmen."
(4) Vacates the Field for Lowered Tdeals. Since, Schweitzer
saysV'Allein den aus Erfahrung abgeleiteten Ideen trauten wir
die Anwendbarkeit auf die Wirklichkeit zu,"^ we actually let
lowered ideals dominate our spiritual life and the whole world.
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Schweitzer is consistently an idealist and rationalist. Mind,
he asserts, exercises an activity upon data, and it is its
ideas, ideals, and general character v/hich are expressed in
action. As he says,
Immer gehen die Einflilisse der Ereignisse, um sich in
uns zu neuen Ereignissen umzusetzen, durch das Medium
unserer Mentalita*t hindurch und werden in diesern ver-
arbeitet. Diese Mentalita't hat eine gegebene Bestimmt-
heit. In dieser schafft sie die Werte* die unser Ver-
ha'ltnis zu den Tatsachen beherrschen.
Our oractical common sense does not allow genuine and unprejud-
iced reality to have its way, as we suppose, but control by
simple, raw, disorganized experience succeeds that by reasoned
ideas, and "Die menschliche Psyche dient dann nur als ver-
3chlechternder Transformator. " The character of mentality is
normally constituted by the reasoned ideas which our reflect-
ion upon reality brings into existence, he says, but
Fallen sie aus, so entsteht keine Leere, durch die die
Ereignisse an sich auf uns wirken. In dem MentalitEts-
medium dominieren jetzt die Meinungen und die G-efMhle,
die durch die Vernunftideen bisher geregelt und nieder-
gehalten worden waren....So werden die grossen ftberzeug-
ungen, wo sie zerstflrt sind, durch kleine ersetzt, die
deren Funktionen im schlechteren flbemehmen.
Mit dem Aufgeben der ethischen Vernunftideale , wie es
in unserem Wirklichkeitssinne vorliegt, . . . .ist der
moderne Mensch nicht der idlhle Beobachter und Rechner,
als der er sich vorkommt. Er steht unter der Wirkung
der G-esinnungen und Leidenschaften, die lhm von den
Tatsachen entgegengebracht werden.... In vernunftlosester
Weise reagieren wir auf die Tatsachen. .. „Endlich festen
Boden unter den Blls sen! " rufen wlr, und versinken in
den Ereignissen.
(5) Lacks Finality. Against empiricism Schweitzer also
urges some of the same criticisms as are used by Bergson.
Empirical knowledge, however long continued is alv/ays incom-
3
olete. Its conclusions lack finality, and are indecisive.
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An optimistic world view which will not leave civilization
in constant danger of destruction of its fundamental attitude
by later experience or "by more rigorous realism, is not to be
sought for by the method of empiricism.
(6) It is an External Knowledge About Reality. Mere views
of the thing do not give us the thing itself. Intellect
always looks at a thing from outside, whereas genuine know-
ledge nasses over into experience. No mere multiplication of
observations, or ability in accurate description of phenomena,
gives knowledge comparable to that imparted in sympathetic
understanding of the meaning in a single phenomenon. "Uns
flber die Wissenschaft des &usserlichen Konstatierens und
Berechnens hinausfilihrend, " Bergson shows, Schweitzer says,
"dass das wahre Wis sen vom Sein durch eine Art Intuition zu-
1
standekommt. M Knowledge does not relate us to the world
externally by showing the scheme of phenomena, but from within
outwards (von innen heraus) in the way that we experience
2
(miterleben) the nature of all that surrounds us.
2. Faith in Reason.
(1) Rationalistic Disposition. Schweitzer is rationalistic
both in temperament and conviction. In early childhood he was
puzzled by the inconsistency of Jesus 1 economic status and the
story of the Kagi's gifts. He wondered that the Wise Men did
not later concern themselves about Jesus, or the shepherds
become His followers. Before his first year in school he
remarked the fact that in a very wet summer it had rained for
as long a time as in the case of the Biblical flood and yet
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the water was not in the houses much less over the. tops of
the mountains, and he was satisfied only when an explanation
1
was given which reconciled the disparity for thought. A
disturbing feature of his confirmation preparation was the
impossibility of satisfying his questions, because it was the
attitude of the pastor "dass vor dem G-lauben alles Nachdenken
verstummen nnHsse." Schweitzer had for this minister, he tells
us, the greatest respect, but he says,
Ich aber war flberzeugt, und lch bin es noch, dass die
Wahrheit der G-rundgedanken des Christentums sich
gerade im Nachdenken zu bewShren habe. Das Denken,
sagte ich mir, 1st uns gegeben, dass wir darin alle, 2
auch die erhabensten G-edanken der Religion begreifen.
With some regret Schweitzer looks back to a period of his
life, from about fourteen to sixteen years of age, when he
Insisted on forcing everyone into argument over any disputable
question and on uncovering all the errors of conventional
belief* While confessing that he was as unbearable as only
a partly educated youth could be, this was still no mere self-
assertiveness , he says, but "ein leidenschaftliches Bedurfnis
zu denken und mit andern Menschen nach dem Wahren und Zweck-
3
mitssigen zu suchen." The disposition, he still professes and
defends. He declares,
Eigentlich bin ich geblieben, was ich damals wurde.
Klar habe ich gefillhlt, dass wenn ich von meinem
Enthusiasmus fur das im Denken erkannte Wahre und
Zweckmlssige abliesse, ich damit mien selber aufgeben
wurde.
4
He professes that he is in reality as unbearable as ever, ex-
cept that he has subjected himself to the social necessity of
joining in conversations which are nothing more than that, and
of listening to unref lective opinion without disputing it. He
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confesses, however, that he suffers over the unused opportunit-
ies for men to know each other as striving, suffering, thinking
persons, and that he questions "wie weit man mit dieser
Wohlerzogenhelt gehen darf , ohne Schaden an der Wahrhaftigkeit
1
zu nehmen."
(2) Rationalism in Religion. Schweitzer* s theological
writings and his general attitude in religion show this
rationalistic disposition. In the treatment of the life and
consciousness of Jesus the established features for religious
feeling were disregarded in the process of intellectual re-
construction. His attitude in the field of religious thought
was well and concisely expressed in his lectures on Christian-
ity and the religions of the world when, in the introduction,
he said to his missionary hearers,
Erwarten Sie von mir nicht Apologie, das heisst Ver-
teidigung des Christentums , wie sie leider nur zu oft
ge&bt wird, und die darin besteht, dass man behauptet,
das Christentum enthalte Wahrheiten, die ttber allem
Denken 3tunden und sich daher mit dem Denken nicht
auseinander zu -setzen ha*tten. Dies kommt mir vor, als
z<Bge man sich auf eine Bergfestung zunlick, die wohl
uneinnehmbar ist, von der aus man aber auch keine
Llacht ausflben kann.
Von Jugend an habe ich die ttberzeugung gehabt, dass
alle religiose Wahrheit sich zuletzt auch als denknot-
wendige Wahrheit begreifen lassen nnHsse. Darum, meine
ich, soil das Christentum in der Auseinandersetzung mit
dem Denken und mit anderen Religionen kein Privileg fur
sich in Anspruch nehmen, sondern mitten in dem Kampfe
der Ideen stehen und einzig auf die Llacht der in ihm
enthaltenen Wahrheit vertrauen.
(3) Rationalism in Philosophy. For philosophy Schweitzer's
principles are not different. A philosophy upon which civiliz-
ation can be built, he says, must, in the first place "denkende
Weltanschauung sein. Nur was aus dem Denken geboren, sich an
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das Denken wendet, kann eine geistige Macht fflr die ganze
1
Menschheit werden." Our age, he thinks, has a kind of artist-
ic prejudice against a reflective theory of the universe, and
stands in closer kinship to the Romantic movement than it
realizes. It is inclined to regard the Romantic criticism of
the Aufkllrung as valid for all ages against any theory that
vrould found itself solely on thought; but nevertheless,
Schweitzer declares, Rationalism, with its generally prevalent
belief in thought and its reverence for truth, was "bei alien
Unvollkommenheiten die grflsste und wertvollste Allgemeinersch-
2
einung im G-eistesleben der Menschheit." He admits the incom-
plete and unsatisfactory character of the period's intellectual
productions, but claims, on the other hand, that "das damals
aufgestellte Prinzip, Weltanschauung auf Denken und nur auf
3
Denken zu grunden, ist das wahre."
Tn the light of the reputation which Rationalism bears in
present-day philosophy it is the mark of courage, or even
rashness, to praise -it. Schweitzer does not hesitate to take
the additional step of designating his thought as rationalistic.
He goes farther. Rationalism he declares, is the constant
element of all positive philosophical activity. It is, he says,
mehr als eine zu Ausgang des achtzehnten und zu Beginn
des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts erledigte Denkbewegung
•
Er ist eine notwendige Erscheinung jegllches normalen
Geisteslebens
. Aller wirkliche Fortschritt in der Welt
ist im letzten G-runde durch Rationalismus gewirkt.
Effective philosophy must, in fact, return to it. He asserts,
die Einsicht wird schon kommen, dass wir wleder da ein-
setzen milssen, wo das achtzehnte Jahrhundert stehen
blieb. Was zwischen damals und jetzt liegt, ist ein
Intermezzo des Denkens, ein Intermezzo mit auszerordent-
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lich interessanten und reichen Mornenten, aber doch nur
ein verha*ngni svoiles Intermezzo.!
3. Distinction from Traditional Rationalism.
TThile we read the above statements of Schweitzer's, however,
we must keep in mind that the rationalism to which it is
asserted we must return is thought of not in terms of its
intellectual productions but of its confidence in reflection.
Exceot in this respect, Schweitzer' s thought has little affin-
ity with the historical Rationalism which he praises. It is,
both in its method of procedure and its content, different
from the traditional Rationalism, and is to be distinguished
2
as "the new rationalism."
There are two features which distinctly mark off Schweit-
zer's "new rationalism" from the old. One is its broad non-
intellectualistic conception of reason; the other is its
mystical element.
(1^ Non-intellectualistic Conception of Reason. However
strongly Schvreitzer urges the necessity of a world-view which
is based on thought alone, he cannot be interpreted as any-
thing other than anti-intellectualistic . In the first place,
he insists that philosophy must not be abstract but elemental,
bringing man into vital working relation with practical life.
Then, it cannot be founded upon purely cognitive features;
knowledge, as we have before noted him saying, does not furnish
the spirit its attitude to life and world. Finally, its
attitude is not one that can be theoretically demonstrated, or
which lies wholly within the realm of the rational.
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The assertions of Schweitzer 1 s which are interpreted by
some of his critics as positivism, or as pessimism, are in
large measure statements of a doctrine of the inadequacy of
mere intellect to achieve valid or helpful knowledge of reality.
If, with this in mind, we examine the passages of Schweitzer's
works which sound the most sceptical, or the most pessimistic,
we shall find that it is intellectually that it is impossible
to know reality, and that it is intellect (or objective obser-
vation, perhaps) which finds no meaning for life in the world.
1
Thus it is said to be a "letzte Einsicht des Erkennens" that
the objective world is an enigmatic phenomenon, and it is any
world view "die nicht von der Resignation des Erkennens aus-
2
geht" which is declared to be artificial and fictitious.
There is, in Schweitzer, a real element of positivism, but
it relates to our scientific knowledge of the world and not
3
to an ultimate philosophical view. There are (although they
do not grow out of scientific knowledge of the world or out
of purely theoretical processes) convictions about the nature
of reality which may be considered valid. "Resignation in
bezug auf das Erkennen der Welt 1st filir mich nicht der
4
rettungslose Pall in einen Skeptizismus, " Schweitzer declares.
What he does mean to affirm is that our valid conceptions are
not those based solely or primarily on pure intellect, but on
reason within which intellect and will have entered into proper
relation with each other. Knowledge of ultimate reality is
not impossible, but impossible to intellect which disregards
the will in us, and to will which is unthinking.
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In Schweitzer's theory, will plays a much more important
part in the process of knowing than is commonly accorded to it.
If we were to adhere to a distinction of intellectualistic
and voluntaristic theories of knowledge, Schweitzer's would
have to be classed as voluntaristic. In the development of
his system, will occupies in more than one respect a place as
the primary condition of knowledge. Its preeminence is defin-
itely asserted by Schweitzer when he says, "Das letzte Wissen,
nach dem wir trachten, ist das Wissen vom Leben. Unser
1
Erkennen erschaut das Leben von aussen, unser Wille von lnnen."
It would be a serious mistake, however, to suppose that
Schweitzer's anti-intellectualism means any relaxation of
rigorous thought, or that his deference to will means subord-
ination of intellect to wish. The accommodation between will
and intellect which should be secured in thought, he says,
"in naiver Weise verlauft..., wenn der Wille von dem Erkennen
verlangt, dass es ihn eine Welt sehen lasse, die den Impulsen,
die er in sich tragt, entspricht, und wenn das Erkennen Ver-
2
suche macht, solches Verlangen zu befriedigen. " For such a
method Schweitzer has nothing but scorn. Much of his contempt-
uous treatment of transcendental idealism is leveled against
its tendency to such cavalier subordination of reason to will.
Even of Kant he makes the criticism that, by him,
wird dann die bisher naiv geMbte Vergewaltigung des
Erkennens method! sch betrieben. Seine Lehre von den
iiPostulaten der praktischen Vernunft" bedeutet nichts
anderes, als dass der Wille sich das entscheidende
Wort in den letzten Aussagen der Weltanschauung an-
masst. Nur weiss Kant es geschickt so einzurlchten,
dass der Wille dem Erkennen seine Suprematic nicht
aufdrSngt, sondern sie von ihm angeboten bekommt und
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sie dann in exquisit parlamentarischen Formen ausflbt.
Er tut, als wa*re er von der theoretlschen Vernunft be-
rufen worden, an sich mc'glichen Wahrheiten die Wirkllch-
keit denknotwendiger Wahrheiten zu verleihen.l
In the case of Fichte, he declares, "diktiert der Wille, ohne
weiter fttr Diplomatenklinste Sorge zu tragen, der Erkenntnis
2
seine Weltanschauung. H For any distinction of a religious
world view, alongside a scientific one, which is accepted on
other grounds than justification to thought, he has no use.
Pragmatism, in which "in halb naiver, halb zynischer Weise
gesteht sich der Wille ... .ein, dass die Erkenntnisse der
3
Weltanschauung von ihm selber hervorgebracht werden," belongs
to the same class. The only result has been a fatal influence
upon the mentality of our time of "Die Erschu'tterung des
Sinnes filr Wahrhaftigkeit, die mit der nicht mehr naiv, sondern
halb bewusst und hinterlistig getibten Interpretation der Welt
4
gegeben ist."
It is not in subordination of the intellectual apprehension
of the natural world to i.ts demands that the proper role of
will consists. Will should not arbitrarily determine the
conclusions of thought; but thought should be reflection upon
the experience of will in ourselves. Intellect looks at life
from without, it was said, will from within; and "our ultimate
knowledge is necessarily our thinking experience of life, but
this does not lie outside the sphere of reason, but within
5
reason itself." In other words, will does not dictate the
results of an Intellectual process which has left it out of
view, but is a factor which is represented in the conclusion -
a conclusion which is then that of reason in its full scope.
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When intellect arrives by purely theoretical considerations
at a theory which violates the will-to-live, spirit is divided
against itself and involved in inner contradiction. Reason
is rightly the process of attaining truth through the vital
co-operation, and satisfaction, of all the faculties of the
spirit. Will without thought is not reason, "but will that has
reflected about its relation to itself and the objective world
is reason. Schweitzer says,
Setzt das Wo lien das Erkennen einfach beiseite, so
kommt es in unklares Phantasieren. Das Erkennen aber,
das sich, wie der vergangene Rationalisms, nicht
eingestehen will, dass es, urn das Leben zu begreifen,
zuletzt in denkendes Erieben flbergehen muss, verzlchtet
auf tiefe und elementar begHindete Weltanschauung. l
Neither will nor intellect is independently valid, but reason
consists in the organic co-operation of the two. Only that
conclusion can be called the product of reason in which intel-
lect and will have thought out their relations, and in which
the unity of the spirit is represented.
The barren intellectualism of the older rationalism is,
accordingly, not involved in the "new rationalism" of Schweitzer.
With better psychological knowledge than it possessed Schweit-
zer refers our beliefs (when most validly founded) not to a
faculty of pure intellection, but- to the organic whole of the
human spirit, which is richer in content and operation than
mere cognition. The whole spiritual function is reason in its
concreteness, and reason's work is broader than what was desig-
nated by the term "rational" in the old sense.
It is within the frame of such a comprehensive conception
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of reason that Schweitzer can regard his system as based on
thought alone, and rationalistic, while at the same time he
recognizes that it is incapable of theoretical demonstration,
and that it contains irrational factors. On both these points
Schweitzer freely calls his system irrational. World- and
life-affirmation, he tninks, are not, as a matter of fact,
justified by objective observation. The value of life, and
the worth of activity and sacrifice on its behalf, are not
things which are established on purely theoretical grounds.
They come, not from an understanding of the meaning of the
world, but from an inner necessity of our own being,
(2) A Mystical Element. To know reality, intellect, as
was said, must bring itself into relation to will. It cannot
remain an external observer, but must become an element of
thinking experience. There must be reflection upon our ex-
perience, if we are to attain a world view upon which coherent,
effective life can be built; and, in fact, Schweitzer says, in
rationalistic style, "Die Erneuerung unserer Weltanschauung,
kann nur aus einem unerbittlich wahrhaftigen und riUcksichts-
1
los mutigen Denken kommen." A qualification which makes it
capable of its task however, is that "Dieses Denken erst ist
reif zu erleben, wie das Rationale, wenn es sich zu Ende
2
denkt, mit Notwendigkeit in das Irrationale flbergeht."
Our experience must not remain unref lective, but the ex-
perience which is to be thought out to the end is that of
will-to-live in me. The intellect finds the objective world
enigmatic and opaque - an ununderstandable series of phenomena.
But, if it will not crudely attempt to meet the demands of
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will, and thus do violence to understanding in the interpret-
ation of the world, but will follow the other, or correct
method, in which it offers to will only what it understands,
this will "be the one piece of knowledge, - that I am will- to-
live.
The will-to- live is not something which is created in me by
reflection, or which is based on theoretical considerations.
It is thus an irrational element in knowledge, but it is also
the roost immediate and certain factor in my consciousness. It
is the form in which life experiences itself.
Life- and world-negation are never thorough-going; and
systems which incorporate them involve an inner contradiction.
Such philosophies are among the most realistic and critical of
all philosophies, but they are inherently inconsistent.
The attitude of world- and life-affirmation is necessary to
thought when consciousness becomes reflective of itself, and
when intellect and will are brought into proper relation. I
am myself wlll-to-live, and when reflection is thorough it
arrives at this fact. This is the material upon which ref-
lection must work; it is the experience which must be thought
out to the end, and which, when so' thought out, leads to the
affirmative and optimistic world- and life-view. The life-
and world-affirmative view is intellect's consistency with
inner and immediate experience.
We described above, Schweitzer 1 s comprcnehsive conception
of reason, but in the mere form that knowledge is the product
of all the faculties of the spirit working together in co-
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operation, the view is common ooin today. There is in
Schweitzer, however, something decidedly unique in the way in
which ethical will takes its place in the concourse of facul-
ties. To admit it, is not a novelty, of course, since the
appearance of Kant's conception of practical reason and doct-
rine of its primacy, but in Kant the role of moral will was
secondary and supplementary to purely theoretical knowledge,
and involved such a dictation of will to intellect as Schweit-
zer condemns. Schweitzer's thought is that I find in myself
will which affirms itself and the world. It is an ethical will,
which, not on theoretical grounds, but out of its own nature
affirms the phenomena of life about it. What it sanctions as
good is what preserves or promotes life, what it condemns is
what destroys or restricts life.
The principle of nature is something Yrtiich I cannot theoret-
ically understand, but which I can experience in myself.
Reality shows itself in me as will to the realization and en-
richment of life, the logical implication of which is valuation
of life (or reverence for life). It gives me in will a way of
knowing - or in fact of experiencing - the nature of all reality.
Just as, according to Schweitzer, Jesus is not known at all
through an acquaintance with the facts of his life, but is
known perfectly through sharing His ethical will, so, in his
view, the world about us becomes clear and meaningful through
the experience in ourselves of its active will for the realiz-
ation of life despite how much, or how little, we know or under-
stand of its factual forms. Scientific knowledge, of course,
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can tell us with exactness much about the manifestations in
which life issues, can extend our recognition of life's
presence and working, and can enable us to make use of its
activity, but the unlearned man who Is moved to reflective
apprehension of this universal reality is wiser than the man
who has studied a thousand phenomena of the will-to-live, and
who can describe any of them in detail, but does not apprehend
1
their meaning.
4. The Ethical Conditions of Knowledge.
The sole condition of knowledge is the will toward the
realization of life, which as reflective and rational recog-
nizes and respects other will-to-live. This will is not acq-
uired on the basis of experience or theory, but represents the
nature of reality. All that philosophy can do is to bring out
more clearly and strongly for men, something which is an
immediate and common experience of all, which when recognized
2
exercises a growing conviction and control over life.
It is the fact of ethical will for the advancement of life
in me which makes it possible to know sympathetically other
reality as such will. By my ethical nature, furthermore, I
am required to recognize and respect all other reality as active
will toward life. A difficulty, however, is that in the world
I cannot recognize the manifold will which is at work there
as I do in myself, namely, as life-affirmative will. The will-
to-live, as it is seen in the world, appears to be in conflict
with itself, and destructive. I may, however, regard the
knowledge which I have by experience, from within, as more
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valid knowledge of will than that which I have by observation
from without. Moreover, where we cannot reconcile the imp-
ressions which we have of reality we must choose, and moral
determination enters in. Our will is optimistic and ethical,
and the volition given in our will-to- live is superior to our
1
knowledge of the world and is to be preferred to it.
It is plain that the method is not demonstrative. It invol-
ves an autocracy of ethics . Ethically-characterized experience
is datum, and ethical evaluation establishes it as favored, or
superior datum. Not less than Kant, Schweitzer attributes
primacy to ethically-interested reason, but in a way that is
his own and that makes the ethical element far more central.
As far as logic is concerned there are several leaps in
the argument, and Schweitzer accepts the legitimacy of a leap
to the shore, as the only way of getting there. First, how-
ever, it should be clear that this does not mean willingness
to make rationally unwarranted assumptions in order to arrive
at a satisfying view. The beginning of all spiritual life,
Schweitzer says, is faith in truth, and it would be better to
launch into reflection which gave only an imperfect view than
to maintain one without conviction because of its supposed
intrinsic value. In thought's enterprise the result is not
to be prejudiced. The method which involves ethical evaluat-
ion, however, is that which must be followed if we are to have
any knowledge at all. Knowledge is dependent upon faith in
the validity of our ethical impulses and evaluations and in
their conformity to reality.
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The attitude of world- and life-negation is one in which
intellect is at variance with some of the most fundamental exp-
eriences of life. The attitude of life- and world-affirmation,
on the other hand; is one which is necessary for thought when
it is true to experience. It is not logically necessary, in the
sense that each step has rational grounds, for there is a leap
of faith in the positive evaluation of life; hut it is necess-
ary for thought, in the sense that it is the only conclusion in
which the spirit has inner consistency, - that is, vitally
necessary for the integrity of reason. The clearest and most
consistent ideas of reality are those given in the will-to-live;
truth would be found in letting them be valid as our highest
knowledge. Agreement with the will-to-live is the test of truth;
the highest truth is the worth of sentient life given in the exp-
erience of life; "Ethisch werden heisst wahrhaft denkend werden."
5. Schweitzer's Methodology.
(1) Reversal of Philosophical Approach. Schweitzer's
method involves, first of all, a reversal of the course which
philosophy has commonly attempted to pursue. What it has
continually essayed has been to discover theoretically a mean-
ing in the natural world which would make life supremely and
permanently significant. Indian philosophy acknowledged the
impossibility of doing this, and in consequence adopted a
pessimistic worid-attitude and an ethics of apathy and resig-
nation. Western philosophy has persisted courageously , and
with great ingenuity, in the quest, but with only temporary
semblances of success. All that it has succeeded in doing has
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been either to find Its ethical ideals in the world at the
expense of its intellectual vigor and sincerity, or to weaken
its ethics down to the place where the natural dominated the
ideal, instead of the ideal governing the natural. Schweitzer
proposes that, like Indian philosophy, we give up the faith in
finding significance for life through an understanding of the
objective world, but without following it into its passivism.
The mistake in method of all philosophical thought, Schweit-
zer holds, has been to suppose that the way to a world-view
must necessarily be through metaphysics. It has followed the
method of making world-view the parent of life-view. The new
approach must be to find in life-view - that is, the will which
actively and ethically affirms life - the way to world-view.
An actively optimistic attitude to life and world does not
rest on a metaphysical interpretation of the world, Schweitzer
thinks; but an interpretation of the world - that is, a meta-
physics - is only possible in reference to the will to affirm
life.
(2) A Beginning with Immediate Consciousness. The starting
point for philosophical activity, according to Schweitzer, is
not sensory experience. It is not impression from without,
but self-experience. Reflection must concern itself with the
most immediate consciousness, he asserts, which is one's own
experience of being will-to-live. "Mein Wissen von der Welt
1st ein Wissen von aussen, " Schweitzer says, "und bleibt immer
unvollsta'ndig. Das Wissen aus meinem Willen zura Leben 1st
aber unmittelbar und geht auf die geheimnisvollen Regungen
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1
des Lebens, wie es an sich 1st, zurttck." He declares,
Wahre Philosophle muss von der unmittelbarsten und
umfas sendsten Tatsache des Bewusstseins ausgehen.
Diese lautet: itlch bin Leben, das leben will,
inmitten von Leben, das leben will." Dies ist nicht
ein ausgeklugelter Satz. Tag fur Tag, Stunde fttr
Stunde wandle ich in ihm. 2
As with Cartesian thought, the beginning is from conscious-
ness, or immediate experience. This is something which cannot
be demonstrated, but is directly experienced. It contains a
knowledge which is not the result of reflection but its beginn-
ing point. In neither system is the primary knowledge the
content of a particular experience or number of experiences;
it is a universal character of all consciousness or of all
experience
.
The similarity to the method of Descartes, however, is not
extended. Apart from the important point of beginning with
experience of our own life rather than of the world, the
similarity is slight. In the case of Descartes the "I exist"
was of value as an established axiom; it was the proposition
that counted for the further extension of knowledge. With
Schweitzer, that "I am wlll-to-live" is not of primary interest
as a proposition, but as an experience that carries in it
life- and world-affirmation and sympathetic understanding of
all other reality.
The world attitude which supports active service of life
does not derive from seeing what such and such phenomena sig-
nify in the totality of the world, but from the will-to-live
itself. The will-to-live when it becomes conscious of itself,
knows that it is not dependent on anything external to itself.
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The aspiration to raise oneself and all existence to the high-
est material and spiritual degree of value is innate in it.
The self-experience with which Schweitzer begins is not intel-
lectual or abstract. It has about it the concreteness and
vital reality of life as a whole.
In Schweitzer's philosophy the content of the world-view is
not, so much as is the case in Cartesian philosophy, something
demonstrated, but something experienced. We have found reason
to classify Schweitzer's method as rationalistic, but it is
mystical rationalism - or, possibly, rational mysticism.
Schweitzer says, "Von meiner Jugend an war es mir gewiss, dass
1
alles Denken, wenn es sich zu Ende denkt, in Mystik ende."
All reflection which is thorough and sincere, he holds, leads
beyond rational reflection to a profound subjective experience.
He declares,
Alle wertvolle tJberzeugung ist irrational und hat
enthusiastischen Charakter, weil sie nicht aus dem Er-
kennen der Welt kommen kann, sondern aus dem denkenden
Erieben des Willens zum Leben aufsteigt, in dem wir
iliber alles Welterkennen hinausschreiten.
2
What reflection finds as the clearest and most significant
datum is the experience of an impulse in me which is the source
of my most valuable and certain ideas, and thus rational thought
ends in mysticism. Knowledge passes over into experience. My
conception of the essential nature of phenomena is by analogy
with the will-to-live which exists in me. And so, Schweitzer
says
,
wird mir das Wissen von der Welt zum Erieben der Welt.
Das zum Erleben werdende Erkennen la*sst mien der Welt
gegeniUber nicht als rein erkennendes Subjekt verharren,
sondern dra'ngt mir ein innerliches Verhalten zu ihr
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auf....Indem es mich denkend und ataunend macht, fiHhrt
es mich immer hdher hinan auf die H#hen der Ehrfurcht
vor dem Leben. Kier la'sst es ineine Hand los....Nun
muss mein Wllle zum Leben seinen Weg in der V/elt all-
ein suchen.
Nicht dadurch, dass es mir kundtut, was diese und
jene Erscheinungen von Leben in dem Weltganzen bedeuten,
bringt mich das Erkennen in ein VerhSltnis zur Welt, In
inneren, nicht in ausseren Kreisen wandelt es mit mir.
Von innen heraus setzt es mich zur Welt in Beziehung,
indera es meinen Willen zum Lieben alles, was ihn um-
gibt, als Willen zum Leben miterleben la'sst.^-
(3^ Nature of the Jv^ystical Element. If we analyze Schweit-
zer's outlook for its mystical features we find them in the
following points. First, he takes as primary fact not the
world of objects, but the experience of life itself, and
allows this to be the key to the meaning of reality. All mere-
ly intellectual knowledge of the world is transcended in two
ways - we acquire knowledge, where pure intellect would remain
in ignorance; and we do not merely recognize what the character
of reality is, but we directly experience it. Further, my
apprehension that all else is will-to- live does not remain a
theory, but can be designated as experience. The nature of my
consciousness is will-to-live, by which I sympathetically know
from within, or intuite, the nature of other forms of reality.
It is, then, in this inner comprehension of the principle of
their being that I know them, not by progressive observation
of manifestations, and inference from these. I comprehend
them because of a common nature, which I experience in myself;
but not by knower and known losing their distinctness. Finally,
in the will-to- live there is revealed to me a universal Will-
to-live, but toward it the relation in knowledge is essentially
similar: the universal Will is object for knowledge and is
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understood, but with no loss of individuality or otherness.
The only way in which the individual existent may be one
with the universal Will is in an ethical unity. Through under-
standing the universal Will, the individual can bring its will
into ethical harmony with other will-to- live. Further, it can
make the purpose of other will-to-llve its own. By cooperation
with other striving it comes to know experimentally the will-
to-live in others which is like its own. Thus, from another
angle, it becomes evident that to be ethical is to think truly.
This last idea suggests that part of what passes as mystic-
ism in Schweitzer is the sound, experimental side of pragmat-
ism. Knowledge itself is not complete until it is tried in
action. Knowledge is not the function of pure intellect, but
of the unitary spirit of man. Will in the form of action
carries out a cognitive function, and theory does not become
knowledge until it has become so through it. Action on the
principle of affirmation of life brings confirmation of the
optimistic world-view, and thus knowledge becomes experience.
If one obeys life's inherent Impulse, he learns what the nat-
ure of life really is - namely, that it is will to realize
the fullest perfection of life. It is, Schweitzer said in the
G-eschlchte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, those who follow Jesus
who learn who He is. Similarly, it is his view, the will-to-
live makes demands on us while we do not yet know what life is,
but some persons - not the "Little-faiths, true followers of
Peter," who "cry out and sink in the sea of ideas," but "the
1
followers of Paul, who believe in the Spirit" - follow it in
the ethical venture of faith, and then as an ineffable secret
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they experience what life is.
(4) Rejection of the Method of Mysticism. For the usual
method of mysticism, or of Romanticism, Schweitzer has no use.
It is his conviction, as we have seen, that "das . . . .Prinzip,
Weltanschauung auf Denken und nur auf Denken zu grunden, 1st
1
das wahre." True thought is not barren and lifeless, but
elemental and enthusiastic. "Sie 1st nicht durrer Verstand,
der die vielgestaltigen Regungen unseres Seelenlebens nicht
aufkommen lSszt," Schweitzer says, "sondern der Inbegriff
aller Funktionen unseres G-eistes in ihrem lebendigen Zusammen-
2
wirken." On the other hand, "Die Begeisterung, die aus dem
Denken kommt, verhUlt sich zu der, die aus wirren G-efillhlen
entsteht, vie der Wind der ragenden Hflhen zu dem, der zwischen
Hugeln went"... .it is a "grosse und tiefe Leidenschaft der
3
grossen und tiefen Ideale." The life-affirmative will is
not a peculiar revelation, and Schweitzer contemptuously dis-
misses "Perso'nlichkeiten, die ftber besondere psychische
Erlebnisse zu verfillgen glauben und behaupten, damit hinter das
4
Wesen der Erscheinungen zu schauen." Mystical and romantic
systems Schweitzer calls "anspruchsvolle phantastische Meta-
5
physik."
(5) Philosophy the Product of Rational Reflection. Though
Schweitzer reverses the relations of metaphysical theory and
attitude to life, making the latter the parent of the former,
and finds that our attitude to life is given in our immediate
experience, he does not represent that the meaning of life is
secured without reflection. It is in our will-to-live, when
it has become reflective about itself, that the world-view of

186
reverence for life is given.
The question might be raised, why if world- and life-
affirmation is inherent in our nature, it should be necessary,
as Schweitzer insists, to have a thought-out theory of the
universe. The answer is, that naive life- and world-aff irm-
ation becomes confused by the multiplicity and diversity of
phenomena, so that the spiritual impulse is weakened and needs
the support of a rational world-view based on itself. There is
need to exchange the first crude world- and life-affirmation
1
for a thought-out form of the same, which is conscious of
its right to existence over against the doubts suggested by
objective observation and by merely intellectual reflection.
Further, simple life- and world-affirmation is not fully
spiritual or ethical until it is reflective. It is apt to
seek merely to live itself out in conflict with other will-to-
live. It is reflection which suggests that it is only one
form of will-to-live in the midst of other will-to-live, and
which derives as the first implication of the will-to-live the
valuation of life, or respect for life. Moreover, the innate
impulse to reach the perfection which is implicit in our nature,
which is another way of saying the affirmative attitude to
life, involves this understanding of the world, in which will
and intellect are reconciled. "Alles, was Mensch ist," Sch-
weitzer says, "ist bestimmt, in eigener, denkender Welt-
2
anschauung wahrhaftige Persflnlichkeit zu werden."
Our theory of the universe, according to Schweitzer, must
be both rational and mystical. It is "Unser grosser Irrtum,"
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he says, "dass wir meinen, ohne Mystik zu einer ethischen,
das Denken "befriedigenden Welt- und Lebensanschauung ge-
1
langen zu k$nnen. H This must, however, be a reflective
theory, which thinks itself through to the basic experience
of life. Schweitzer says,
Aber warum annehmen, dass der Weg des Denkens vor der
Mystik ende? Wohl hat das bisherige Vernunft-Denken
imraer Halt geraacht, wenn es in die IT&ie der Mystik kam.
Es wollte nur so weit gehen, als es alles in glatter
Logik ausbreiten konnte. Die Mystik ihrerseits setzte,
wo sle es nur konnte, das Vernunft-Denken herab, urn ja
die Idee nicht aufkonunen zu lassen, als nrllsse sie ihm
irgendwo Rechenschaft leisten. Und dennoch gehflren die 2
beiden, die nichts voneinander wissen wollen, zusammen.
6, The Method 1 s Competence,
The result of the employment of the method of mystical rat-
ionalism - that is, the method which goes beyond the knowledge
possible in a purely theoretical study of the natural world
through the subject's reflection on its own nature and accept-
ance of the validity of its inherent dispositions - is the
possibility of knowledge of the world. Schweitzer asserts,
Die unbefangene Welt- und Lebensbe jahung, die in mir ist,
well lch ja Wille zum Leben bin, braucht also nicht mit
sich selbst in Konf likt zu treten, wenn mein Wille zum
Leben denkend wird und den Sinn der Welt nicht versteht.
Trotz des negativen Resultats des Erkennens habe ich
Welt- und Lebensbe jahung festzuhalten und zu vertiefen
. . . .Daraufhin gebe ich meinem Leben und allem Willem
zum Leben, der mich umgibt, einen Wert, halte mich zum
Wirken an und schaffe VTerte.'
Schweitzer regards the method both as successful, and as
justified and made necessary by consistent thought. He affirms
that ethical world- and life-affirmation, although they are
subjective and non-rational, are nevertheless the end at which
rational reflection, carried out to its conclusion, arrives by

188
logical necessity. By the method, then, a world view which
fulfills the condition of being a product of thought is
achieved. In the conclusion of the preface of the Kultur
und Ethik, Schweitzer asserts,
So habe ich in diesem Ruche die Trago'dle des bisherigen
Suchens nach Weltanschauung geschrieben und selber
einen neuen Weg zur Weltanschauung beschritten. Wo das
abendlandische Denken zu keinem Ziele gelangte, weil
es slch nicht resolut in die Wflste des Skeptlzismus
des Erkennens der Welt hineinwagte, durchwandere ich
diese Wtfste ruhigen Mutes. Sie 1st ja nur ein schmaler
Streifen, der der ewig grflnenden Oase elementarer, aus
dem Denken u*ber den Willen zum Leben kommender Welt-
anschauung vorgelagert ist.

189
CHAPTER TEN
THE ETHIC OF ETHICAL PERSONALITY
1. The Place of Ethics.
Various thinkers have entered the field of philosophical
speculation under the urge of different problems: - to satisfy
religious thought, to secure and justify universal laws in
science, or to found morality. Schweitzer belongs to the last
group. The essential problem of thought for him is the nature
and basis of the moral principle; and it is the pressure of
this question which is the motive power of his philosophical
activity.
There are also notable differences between philosophers in
respect to the field within which their systems develop. In
Kant, epistemo logical problems take the foremost place, and
their solution determines his whole philosophy. In Hegel,
philosophy is developed from an analysis of logical process.
In Bilichner, Haeckel, and Spencer, natural science provides the
concepts and principles; and in Comte, sociology furnishes the
content. In Schweitzer, it is ethical experience, or the
sphere of purpose and behavior, whose consideration forms the
chief business of philosophical thought and whose analysis
secures the content of philosophical knowledge.
It would be easy, in fact, to take Schweitzer ' s philosophic-
al writings, on the face of them, as contributions to a limited
department of philosophy, that of ethics, alone. The large
second part of 3chv;eitzer 1 s Kultur
p
h i lo sophi e carries the title
Kultur und Ethik
, and in the historical survey which forms a
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considerable portion of it, Schweitzer treats the historical
systems so decidedly from the standpoint of their bearing upon
our active ethical relation to the world that it would be
possible to consider it as primarily a history of ethical
theory. In Schweitzer's own positive contribution, similarly,
so closely does it maintain its community with ethics in the
whole cycle of its development, that one can speak with equal
appropriateness of Schweitzer's Philosophy of Civilization or
Ethics of Civilization, of his Philosophy of Respect for Life
or of his Ethics of Respect for Life. So, although to regard
Schweitzer's philosophical speculation in the sense suggested
above, as a mere isolated ethical discussion, would be essent-
ially as unsound as to place Hegel's Logic among the manuals
which teach the student methods of correct thinking, it is
evident that one cannot proceed far in the discussion of
Schweitzer's philosophy without an exposition of his ethical
theories
.
2. Attack on Materialism.
Reaction against materialistic and utilitarian attitudes
and principles is one of the strongest features of Schweitzer's
thought. Particularly in the Verfall und Wlederaufbau der
Kultur
, he flays the current satisfaction with material
achievements and the assumption that they form an absolutely
positive advance in civilization. M0b etwas mehr oder weniger
von materiellen Srrungenschaf ten zu verzeichnen 1st, ist fillr
1
die Kultur nicht entscheidend, " is his summarization. Schweit-
zer has no principles of an ascetic sort. He recognizes

191
material progress as an element in civilization, and regards
the establishment of as favorable conditions of living as
possible as being desirable both for its own sake and for its
contribution to the spiritual and moral perfecting of indiv-
1
iduals. He does not, however, consider these as of the
essence of civilization. Often, in fact, through their dom-
inance over the spirit of man, he declares, they even make
real civilization difficult, if not virtually impossible.
Material power may have either positive or negative signif-
icance in relation to civilization, Schweitzer asserts; and
he characterizes the assumption that civilization is directly
advanced in scientific and technical achievements, with little
or no relation to ethics, as an external and superficial
conception. He offers his own position as artist, scholar
and physician as evidence of his ability to appreciate the
esthetic, historical and scientific elements in our civiliz-
ation, but declares,
Entering on the question as to what is the real essent-
ial nature of civilization I come to the pronouncement
that this is ultimately ethical.... I have come to the
conviction that the aesthetic and the historical
elements, and the magnificent extension of our mater-
ial knowledge and power do not themselves form the
essence of civilization, but that this depends on the
mental disposition of the individuals and nations who
exist in the world. All other things are merely
accompanying circumstances of civilization which have
nothing to do with its real essence. 2
The danger for our civilization, Schweitzer thinks, lies
in its unbalanced development of material and spiritual
values, and in its unsound sense of their relative signific-
ance. "Tfir ftberscha'tzen deren materielle Errungenschaften, M
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he declares, "und haben die Bedeutung des G-eistigen nicht
1
mehr in erforderlicher Y/eise gegenw£rtig. " But stern matters
of fact teach "dass die Kultur, die sich nur nach der mater-
iellen und nicht auch in entsnrechendem Jfesse nach der
2
geistigen Seite hin entwickelt • . . .der Katastrophe zutreibt."
3. Idealism,
The highest values, in Schweitzer's estimation, and, in
truth, the only unequivocal and ultimate values which he
recognizes, are spiritual ones, L&terial achievements and
progress are valuable only in reference to their effects
upon the human spirit. The real content of civilization is
in a mental attitude of men - namely, a predisposition to act
affirmatively toward the world and life, and to be ethical.
The nature of it consists, Schweitzer says, "darin, dass die
Einzelnen die Ideale der Vervollkommnung des Menschen und der
Besserung der sozialen und politischen Zust&nde der Vtflker
und der Menschheit denken und in ihrer Gesinnung durch solche
3
Ideale in lebendiger und stetiger Weise bestimmt sind."
Civilization has a two-fold nature, according to Schweitzer;
it is the supremacy of reason over nature, and of reason over
the dispositions of men. Both of these factors are spiritual,
but progress in civilization is realized more truly in the
achievement of the latter. This supremacy of reason over
human dispositions means, "dass die Einzelnen und die Kollekt-
ivit&ten ihr Wo lien durch das materielle und geistige Wohl
des Ganzen und der Vielen bestimmt sein lassen, das heisst
ethisch sind. Der ethische Fortschritt ist also das Wesent-
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1
liche und das Eindeutige . . . .in der Kulturentwicklung."
Civilization is measured in terms not of its artistic, scient-
ific, or material treasures but of the amount and vigor of
its ethical will. The moral spirit is the only true value.,
and the condition of all others.
4. The Nature of Morality.
The nature of the ethical spirit, and of ethical activity,
is that it is dominated "by the attitude of affirmation of
life, and that it devotes itself to preserve and to advance
life. Schweitzer repeatedly defines the good, duty, and ethics
in these terms. His most fundamental principle of morality,
he says, is "dass das G-ute in dem Erhalten, Fflrdern, und
Stelgern von Leben besteht und dass Vernichten, Scha'digen und
2
Hemmen von Leben bc^se ist." Ethics, accordingly, "ist nichts
3
anderes als Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben." Again, ethics "besteht
darin, dass ich die Nc'tigung erlebe, allem Willen zum Leben
die gleiche Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben entgegenzubringen wie dem
eigenen. Damit ist das denknotwendige Grundprinzip des
Sittlichen gegeben. G-ut ist, Leben erhalten und Leben f^rdern;
4
bflse ist, Leben vernichten und Leben hemmen."
Such a principle, Schweitzer thinks, actually operates in
all our ethics. He says,
Tatsllchlich l&sst sich alles, was in der gew6*hnlichen
ethlschen Bewertung des Verhaltens der Menschen zuein-
ander als gut gi It , . zurflckfMhren auf materielle und
geistige Erhaltung oder Fc^rderung von Menschenleben
und auf das Bestreben, es auf seinen h^chsten Wert zu
bringen. Umgekehrt ist alles, was in dem Verhalten der
Menschen zueinander als bdse gilt, seinem letzten Wesen
nach materielles oder geistiges Vernichten oder Hemmen

194
von Mens chenleben und Versaumnis in dem Eestreben,
es auf seinen ho'chsten TCert zu bringen. Weit aus-
einanderliegende, untereinander scheinbar gar nicht
zusammenhangende Einzelbestimmungen von Gut und
BiBse fugen sich wie zusammengeho'rige Stroke ineinander,
sobald sie in dieser allgemeinsten Bestimmung von Gut
und Bc^se erfasst und. vertieft werden. 1
Since it flows from the fundamental nature of vital will, or
life, its presence is, in large measure, unavoidable. The
defect is, that is is not consciously recognized as the gen-
eral and absolute principle of morality, and that its operation
is limited and thwarted by considerations which are in their
nature not ethical,
5. The Extent of Ethical Relations.
The extent of reference of the ethical principle of respect
for life is for Schweitzer unlimited. He not only means to
deepen current views of good and evil, he says, but to expand
and extend them. The limitation of ethical principle to the
relations of man to man, he criticises as one of the chief
weaknesses of our western Christian ethics. Its lack of
feeling of fellowship and of community with sub-human life
(fostered by our religious interest in the soul, our intell-
ectualistic conceptions and Descartes' mechanistic interpret-
ation of animals) strikes him as' something inhuman and unnatural.
In place of the artificial recognition which humanity to
animals receives in some modern systems, where it figures as
a training of the human disposition, or as an element of one's
own personal worth, Schweitzer proposes to instate a direct
and immediate sense of oneness with all life, and of sympathy
with its fate. The really ethical man, he says, £;oes out of

195
his way to avoid injuring anything living; he
hat acht, dass er kein Insekt zertritt. Wenn er im
Sommer nachts bei der Lampe arbeitet, hit It er lieber
das Fenster geschlossen unci atmet dumpfe Luft, als
dass er Insekt urn Insekt mit versengten Plogeln auf
seinen Tisch fallen sieht.
G-eht er nach dem Regen auf der Strasse und erblickt
den Regenwurm, der sich darauf verirrt hat . . . .bef 6'rd-
ert (er) ihn von dem todbringenden Steinigen hinunter
ins G-ras. Kommt er an einem Insekt vorbei, das in
einen Ttfmpel gefalien ist, so nimmt er sich die Zeit,
ihm ein Blatt Oder einen Halm zur Rettung hinzuhalten.
1
Not even at the border of animal life, Schweitzer thinks,
does man's responsibility toward life end. The ethical man
does not ask how far any form of life is capable of feeling,
but to him life as such is sacred; "Er reisst kein Blatt vom
2
Baume ab, bricht keine Blume . " Even the inorganic world
receives from him a similar respect, and "he shatters no ice-
3
crystal that sparkles in the sun." It is, in fact, the view
of Schweitzer that every reality is a phenomenon of will-to-
live. This is not an attitude theoretically founded through
external observation, but one in which we apprehend all that
exists through our own experience. To be consistent with the
principle of evaluation-of -life which is implied in our will-
to-live, and to think through to the end the knowledge which
we derive from self-experience
,
demands, then, that we do not
wantonly destroy anything.
Schweitzer recognizes that it is impossible in the natural
world to live out life without destroying countless other
lives. This is an inescapable necessity of existence, and
constitutes that which makes the meaninglea aneaa for life of
the universe, when objectively considered. The principle
which appears in my ethical will cannot be seen in it externally

196
- or in me in that way. I am, however, and am to remain,
ethical will, and am to snow myself as such so far as possible.
Reverence for life is to appear in conduct wherever it can,
unchecked by the fear of being laughed at as sentimental.
Though one cannot escape from the necessities of the natural
world, one must not destroy any life heedlessly or unnecessar-
ily. Schweitzer says,
Der Landmann, der auf seiner Wiese tausend Blumen zur
Nahrung fiHr seine Ku*he hingenia'ht hat, soil sich hillten,
auf dem Heimweg in geistlosem Zeitvertreib eine Blume
am Rande der Landstrasse zu ktfpfen, denn darnit vergeht
er sich an Leben, ohne unter der G-ewalt der Ifotwendig-
keit zu stehen.^
Even T/here the violation of life is recognized as an act
of practical necessity, Schweitzer declares, in what is a
significant and more1 novel feature of his ethical thought,
man must not seek freedom from responsibility for such an act.
Respect for life is an absolute ethical principle, and it can-
not be infringed without guilt. To make such a course of act-
ion the ethical one by any rational doctrine is to dull our
ethical sense. We cannot avoid offense, but in such circum-
2
stances "Das gute G-ewissen ist eine Erfindung des Teufels."
A guilt which cannot be avoided is part of the fact of evil,
but must not be escaped by betraying the ethical will.
6. Universal Perfectionism.
For the attitude of the ethical will toward all other will-
to- live the term sympathy has been used above. The notion
which it represents is, however, for Schweitzer, "zu eng, urn
3
als Inbegriff des Ethischen zu gelten." Its connotation is
too passive. He states,
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Es bezeich.net ja nur die Teilnahrae mlt dem leidenden
Willen zum Leben. Zur Ethik gehflrt aber das Miterleben
aller Zusta'nde und aller Aspirationen des Willens zum
Leben, auch seiner Lust, auch seiner Sehnsucht, sich
auszuleben, auch seines Dranges nach Vervollkommnung . 1
Schweitzer attempts a characterization of it by the phrase
"Hingebung an Leben.. die durch Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben motiv-
2
iert ist.'" What ought to be clear is that it involves active
effort for the furtherance and promotion of life. It does not
mean merely refraining from destroying life, nor taking care
to maintain its existence, but enhancing it in every respect.
To be ethical is to give oneself to all life in the effort to
realize the fullest worth of which it is capable, it is to de-
velop in all reality the degree of perfection which is implicit
in it.
7. Irrationality of the Ethical Will.
(1) Obligation of Irrational Self-Sacrifice . It is, of
course, evident that such a principle of respect for life and
of active devotion to its furtherance cannot be followed with-
out personal sacrifice. "Die Lebensbe jahung strengt sich an,
Lebensverneinung in sich auf zunehmen, " Schweitzer says, "um
anderenLebewesen in Hingebung zu dienen und sie, eventuell
durch Selbs taufopferung, vor Sehfldigung Oder Vernichtung zu
3
bewahren." This is the work of reflective thought. In becom-
ing reflective the will-to-live becomes ethical. The principle
of respect for life is the first result of thought directed
upon the will-to-live . Thought sees that to fully realize
what is implicit in the will-to-live , and to make it perfect,
simple life-affirmation must include in itself an element of
life-negation.
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Some life-negation is, in Schweitzer's view, a necessary
feature of all ethical life. It is not ethical in itself, but
is the form of world-affirmation where thought has stirred up
the will-to.- live to recognize and enter into community with the
life-affirmation which exists in the manifold life about it and
which stands In analogy to the life-affirmation within itself.
This world-affirmation and its corollary of voluntary life-
negation does not have logical limits. "Wohl kommt sie aus dem
Denken, " Schweitzer says; "Aber sie lfisst sich nicht logisch
1
durchfiHhren. " The repeated attempts to explain the essential
nature of self-sacrifice in such a way as to bring it within
the scope of rational canons, he asserts, always "geht...auf
2
Kosten der Natflrlichkeit und Lebendigkeit der Ethik." Self-
sacrifice is not a rational element, but the expression of the
subjective enthusiasm for life. How far it shall go cannot be
established by rules, but is determined by the strength of its
inner impulse of respect for life. V/here life-affirmation and
negation come into conflict and demand objective rules, it is
a sign of the waning of the ethical will.
Whoever adopts fully the principle of respect for life -
that is, launches out toward a true ethic - Schweitzer says,
"muss darauf gefasst sein, in den Strudeln des Irrationalen
3
herumgewirbelt zu werden." The principle of reverence for
life does not allow him to reflect about the life for which he
gives himself, to what extent it can feel, or to what extent
it deserves sympathy. It does not permit him to rest in the
thought that the more capable advances at the expense of the
less capaole, but it presents life as such as sacred. It leads
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one to do what seems foolishness, or is actually foolishness
in so far as the renunciation for the sake of others has real-
ly no useful effect, but still this is right. MNur in dem
Masse, als wir alle im Sinne des gewflhnliehen Rechnen3 wenig-
er vermlinftig werden, " Schweitzer says, "wirkt sich ethische
G-esinnung unter uns aus und la*sst Prooleme Iflsbar werden, die
1
bisher unlflsbar waren
(2) Disregard of Utility. The anti-utilitarian nature of
Schweitzer's ethics stands out clearly in the above features.
Ethical conduct is irrational, and is not measured by the an-
ticipation of the usefulness of its effects. The utilitarian
principle is not the principle of ethics, but a substitute for
it. Where calculation of utility takes place, it is a victory
of the theoretical world-view over the attitude derived from
the inner experience of life and means the silencing of the
ethical spirit.
To be ethical is to surrender oneself wholly to the behest
of the subjective wi 11-to-live, unweakened by considerations
derived from theoretical knowledge* The etmc of reverence
for life does not contain a relative principle, but what re-
spect for life commands has its awn meaning, even when foolish.
It is, in fact, its non- conformity with practical ends which
reveals in it tne operation of the spiritual principle, and its
"Torheit" which shows that "wir hdhere Verantwortungen in uns
2
bewegen.
"
(3) Source in Intuition. Schweitzer, in fact, regards
ethics as irrational throughout, and not merely on the side of
the necessary element of self-sacrifice which it contains.
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Ethical conduct, in his view, is not tiiat action which is
seen to "be necessary for certain practical ends, and it is
not decided by anticipation of its consequences or by its
hopes of success.
Morality does not arise as prudent accomodation to the
1
world, according to Schweitzer, but out of inner constraint.
It is not the product of Knowledge about the world, but grows
out of the reflective experience of the will-to- live . "Ethik
entsteht dadurch," he says, "dass ich die We Itbe jahung, die
mit der Lebensbe jahung in meinem Willen zum Leben natil.trlich
2
gegeben ist, zu Ende denke und zu verwirklichen versuche."
Thus, for Schweitzer, the fundamental principle of morality
is innate in subjective will, and not learned by experience.
"Ohne den Sinn der Welt zu verstehen, " he expresses it, "wirke
ich Werte s chaffend und Ethik Abend in der Welt und auf die
3
Welt ein." To live ethically is not to derive the principle
of one's action from the world, but to live out the principle
that is inherent in one's native and underived will-to-live.
8. Individualism.
(1) The Autonomy and Individuality of Moral Acts. Moral
acts are regarded by Schweitzer as wholly autonomous and indiv-
idual. Tneir form is not determined by any authority, but
grows out of the individual's inner will. "Die Ethik der
ethischen Pers^nlichkeit , " Schweitzer says, "ist persSnlieh,
4
unreglementierbar und absolut." In neither its reference nor
its intensity is action in accordance witn the disposition
5
controlled by any objective canons, out only (as in art) by
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the enthusiasm and force of the subjective spirit. "Wir K^nnen
dieses Wirken auch nicht objektiv reglementieren, " Schweitzer
declares, "sondern mu*ssen die u-estaltung und Ausdehnung des-
1
selben ganz dem Smzelnen anneimgestellt sein lassen." Etmc-
al decisions must be personal matters, Schv.eitzer says;
Nur subjective Entscheide kann der llensch in den
ethischen Konf likten trel'l'en. Niemand kann ru*r inn
bestimmen, wo jedesmal die aHisserste Grenze der I.Io'g-
liclikeit des Verharrens in aer Ernaltung und F^rder-
ung von Leoen liegt. Er allein nat es zu beurteilen,
mdem er sich dabei von der aufs hi3chste gesteigerten
Verantwortung gegen das andere Leoen leiten la*sst.
Moreover, the conrlict must oe faced again and again, in the
personal decisions tnere are no general principles about the
extent of regard for life or of sacriiice, but the disposition
of respect tor life calls on us to make an individual adjust-
3
ment v/ith it in each individual case.
(2) Theory of Property. Schweitzer's ethics is, as we have
seen above, individualistic in spirit. He explains its attit-
ude toward property in conformity with that viev/point, although
he combines it strangely with a socialistic interpretation of
the nature of property. The ethics of reverence for life, he
says, "Besitz beurteilt . .als von dem Einzelnen souvera*n ver-
4
waltetes G-ut der C-esellschaf t . " - The same idea appears in
other words in the statement that "Erworbenes oder Ererbtes
nicht durch irgendwelche Massnahmen der G-esellschaf t, sondern
nur durch absolut freie Entschliessung des Einzelnen in den
5
Dienst der Allgemeinheit gestellt werden soli."
(3) The Subjective Source of Morality. The individualistic
view regarding property, even though it has intimate relation
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to Schweitzer's practical plans for support of his mission, is
not an isolated position, as has been shown above. Neither
is the individualism an accidental factor. Rather, it is an
inherent feature in Schweitzer's philosophical outlook.
Schweitzer does not regard society, but the individual, as
the source of morality. Ethic arises in the individual's re-
spect for life, and this is the highest authority for conduct
and belief. It is not to be dictated to by objective knowledge
or by social attitudes. It must be true to itself, and action
should follow its decision alone, since active enthusiasm for
life and ethics are derived solely from it. Each person must
decide on his own duty according to his inner, reflective,
life-affirming disposition. "Nach der Verantwortung, die ich
in mir erlebe," Schweitzer says, "muss ich entscheiden, was
ich von meinem Leben, meinem Besitze, meinem Rechte, meinem
G-Llick, meiner Zeit, meiner Rune hingeben muss und was ich
1
davon behalten darf .
"
The individual's sense of responsibility is the only author-
ity, and there can be no autocratic rule. The promotion of
ethical progress depends solely upon enhancing the individual's
sense of responsibility, and upon freeing the inherent prin-
ciple of respect for life from the domination of an ethics
derived by intellect from the world.
(4) Relation of Individual and Social Ethics. In view of
the prevalent theories of the social basis of ethics, Schweitzer's
conception of the relation of personal and communal morality
2
seems strikingly novel. It is his view that the collapse of
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civilization which is occurring, has as a cause the fact that
we have left the determination of morality to society, and
have subjected our inherent ethical wills to its judgments.
We have lost our personal moral judgment in that of the mass,
have suppressed our scruples in order to judge goodness and
badness eye to eye with it, and in our theory of the general
good have become capable of excusing everything that is mean-
ingless, cruel and unjust. Schweitzer asserts,
Wenn unter den modernen Menschen so wenige mit Intakt-
em menschlichem und sittlichem Empf inden anzutreffen sind,
so ist es nicht zum wenigsten, weil sie fortwanrend ihre
pers^nliche Sittlichkeit auf dem Altar des Vaterlandes
opferten, statt in Spannung mit der Kollektivita't zu
bleiben und Kraft zu sein, die die Kollektivita't zur
Vollendung antreibt. 1
The fault found with social morality is, that in it men
tend to act in accordance with objective principles rather
than with the spirit of humaneness. This is done in obedience
to a feeling of supra-personal responsibility, and is justif-
ied by an ethical theory which sanctions non-egoistic motives.
Schweitzer replies to this that to sacrifice or injure life is
unethical whether it is done egoistically or unegoistically
.
Ke insists that any other purposiveness than that for the main-
tenance and enhancement of life,- out of reverence for life, is
not ethical, and seeks to check the attempts to combine in a
relative ethic the really ethical purposiveness with purposive-
ness of any other sort. "Ethik, " he declares, "geht nur so
weit, als die Humanita't, das heisst die Rilicksicht auf die
2
Existenz und auf das G-luck des einzelnen Menschenwesens geht."
To reckon as ethical any violations of this principle, because
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they are based on unegoistic considerations, he says, is a
"bridge over which the ethical passes into the unethical, and
is a menace to the mental atmosphere which is desirable for
the community. Schweitzer declares,
Zu sehr handeln wir....als Menschen, die es ohne An-
strengung fertig bringen, gegebenen Palles nicht mehr
Menschen, sondern nur noch Vollstrecker allgemeiner
Interessen zu sein. Darum 1st unter uns kein Vertrauen
mehr zu einer durch Kenschlichkeit erleuchteten G-e-
rechtigkeit
. . . .Alle ftfhlen wir uns einer kalten, sich
in Prinzipien versteifenden, unpersflnlichen und ge-
v;6'hnlich noch unintelligenten Opportunlta'tsmentalita't
ausgeliefert , die urn kleinste Interessen zu verwirk-
lichen, grflsster Inhumanlta't und gr^sster Torhelt
fMhig ist. Alle Probleme werden in unzwe demits sigem
Machtkampfe ausgetragen, weil keine Gesinnung vorhand-
en ist, die sie l6*sbar macht.
If the moral judgment of the individual, growing out of
reverence for all other will-to- live , v/hich is the product in
reflection of his own will-to-live, is subordinated to this
utilitarian and social ethics, there is reversal of the proper
relations. Schweitzer says,
Wo die Kollektivita'ten st&rker auf den Einzelnen ein-
wirken, als er auf sie zurflckwirkt , entsteht Nieder-
gang, weil damit die Gro'sse, auf die alles ankommt,
die geistige und sittliche Wertigkeit des Einzelnen,
notwendigerweise beelntrSchtigt wird. Es tritt dann
eine Entgeistlgung und Entslttlichung der G-esellschaf
t
ein, durch die sie unfa'hig v/ird, die sich ihr stell-
enden Probleme zu verstehen und zu lflsen. Frilher oder
sp&ter verf&llt sie also der Catastrophe. 2
(5) An Ethic of Ethical Persons. Schweitzer's moral theory
is well characterized in his words, "die Ethik der ethischen
Persflnlichkeit." It places persons over against abstract and
material interests as the objects of ethical action, in the
first place, - with indefinite extension of the range of what
is spiritually interpreted. Then, it is the ethics of think-
ing and free men, not acting under the dictation of objective
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canons, but out of their inherent ethical disposition. The
ethics of respect for life is not that of lav;, or of society,
hut of the natural and vital impulse of the individual.
What one most immediately experiences as his own nature,
according to Schweitzer, is will-to-live - that is, an irrat-
ional enthusiasm for life and devotion to its service. The
principles of this innate will are in striking contrast to
those commonly attributed to will-to- live. Its impulses are
not toward ruthless employment of power and cruel supremacy,
but toward respect for life. It is not merely self preservat-
ion, but giving of life for the preservation of other life.
The fundamental nature of life, in Schweitzer's view, is no-
thing less than spiritual and ethically purposive will.
9. Relation to Metaphysics.
We have long searched to find evidence of the ethical
nature of the world, driven by a conviction of the dependence
of our ethical impulse upon the knowledge of its meaning for
life, and have often done injury to our intellectual sincerity
in order to establish our ethical interpretation. The make-
shifts have very largely fallen away, however, and what is
revealed in all our maneuvers is' the fact that our affirmative
attitude toward life has not grown out of a theoretical inter-
pretation of the world. "Die Lebensanschauung souf f lierte ,
"
Schweitzer says, "und die Weltanschauung rezitierte. Dass die
Lebensanschauung aus der Weltanschauung komme, war also nur
eine Fife-felon."
The life-view was independent all the time, and grew out of
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a primarily ethical will. By the conscious recognition of
this, however, ethics is not merely liberated from correlation
with principles derived from the actual world, and allowed to
show its own inner principles derived from itself, but it
becomes metaphysical. The problem of thought is to think out
the meaning of the will-to-live in relation to itself and to
the world, and "alle in der Ethik v/altende Hingebung als
Erscheinung eines innerlichen, geistigen VerhUltnisses zur
1
Welt zu begreifen." Our relation to the world, we discover,
where it is not brought into confusion by a poverty-stricken
sense of actuality, is determined by the principle of reverence
for life. The acceptance of this relation is not only ethics,
but to be ethical is to think truly. In the ethical will in
me, and in the attitude which it takes to phenomena, I may
find the truth about the nature of reality.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
SCHWEITZER'S SPIRITUALISM
1. Idealistic Disposition.
That Schweitzer is Idealistic in his social and ethical
theory has "been noted before, and this practical idealism
is over and over again made evident. He repeatedly designates
the spiritual and moral perfection of the individual and of
society as the purpose of ethics and as the goal of all prog-
1
ress. Further, he asserts that "Der Trieb, Forts chritte auf
alien G-ebieten und in jeder Hinsicht zu erstreben, kommt dem
Mens chen aus optimistischer Weltanschauung, die die Welt und
2
das Leben als etwas an sich Wertvolles bejaht."
Such a metaphysical outlook Is not, of course, a theoret-
ical conclusion from the facts of the natural world, and it
goes beyond the knowledge which they either give or affirm.
It is derived from the will in its effort to fulfill life and
in its disposition to respect other life. The attempt in which
western thought has persisted up to the present time, to find
a meaning in the world which would make it possible to regard
the goal of man and of humanity as real and significant, was
foredoomed to failure, Schweitzer thinks. The reversal of
method which he suggests, derives world-view from life-view.
It regards the worth of life and of activity for its fulfill-
ment, which are given in the will-to-live, as true and valid
for reality. They belong to the most immediate and undeniable
experience of life. Intellect, moreover, cannot reject them
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without bringing spirit into an inner contradiction from
which it cannot escape. The task of reflective thought, then,
is to think out the meaning of this will-to-live in relation
to itself and to the world. In this way only, he thinks, may
1
the shattered sword of idealism "neu geschmiedet werden."
2. Theory of the Natural World.
(1) Subordination of Philosophy of Nature. In view of
Schweitzer's method it is natural that he does not have much
to say about the features of the natural world. This is, in
fact, almost inevitable in his system. He says, "Das Ent-
scheldende filir unsere Lebensanschauung ist nicht unsere Er-
kenntnis der Welt, sondern die Bestimmtheit des Wo liens, das
2
in unserem Willem zum Leben gegeben ist." Accordingly, his
new rationalism leaves the questions of the objective world
undecided and gives its attention to the effort to secure
clarity about the will-to-live in us.
Scientific activity as such is not disparaged or interfered
with, but it is made to understand that its progress realizes
only the result "dass wir die Erscheinungen, die die Welt
ausmachen, und ihren Ablauf immer eigehender beschreiben
3
kdJnnen." It does not find meani'ng for life and the world,
but its failure to do this, through its method and in abstract-
ion from the subjective experience of ethical will, is not
decisive for our world- and life-view. The empirical scient-
ific knowledge of the world is
.
philosophically fruitless. It
describes phenomena with accuracy of detail, but does not pen-
etrate into their nature. For it, the objective world, in so
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far as its purposiveness and general import are concerned,
remains an enigma.
It would be utterly inconsistent with this positivistic
interpretation of science, and with his subjective method,
for Schweitzer to deal with the data and principles of the
special sciences in the development of his metaphysics. It
is, accordingly, not to be expected that discussions of space,
time, perception, matter, etc. would enter. Moreover, in view
of Schweitzer's absorbing interest in ethics, and of his
doctrine that our convictions of the value of life do not rest
on objective observation of the world, he has no motive to
concern himself greatly with a philosophy of nature. To
devote much consideration to a philosophy of nature, further-
more, would involve great danger of obscuring his principle
that our world view consists of ideas derived from the will-
to-live, not from knowledge of the world, since it might be
made to appear that our affirmative life- and world-view
depended after all upon an idealistic interpretation of the
world.
(2) World and Spirit Are Not Distinct Metaphysical Principle
It is possible for Schweitzer, by his philosophical method, as
we have just seen, to leave the questions of the natural world
largely out of account, and he probably acts wisely in doing so
There are, however, some dangers in this, which he does not
escape. In denying that our optimistic and ethical attitude
grows out of an idealistic interpretation of the world, Schweit
zer gives occasion to be understood as denying the idealistic
interpretation. He is then understood as having no metaphysics
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or as having a dualistic one - with a spiritual ethical prin-
ciple, revealed in man's moral impulses, over against a dark
enigmatic principle of nature.
Niebuhr, as we saw before, found it possible, because of
these features of Schweitzer's thought, to attribute a naive
1
dualism to him. The interpretation v:as answered in a negative
way at the time by showing the unwarranted steps in thought
through which it was reached. More positively, it may be said
that Schweitzer, however strongly he insists that the world on
the one hand does not show ethical significance, and that the
self on the other hand is directly known as ethical will, does
not think of the world as a different metaphysical or moral
principle from that of subjective spirit.
The denial of an ultimate metaphysical dualism in Schweitzer's
philosophy might be contested. In the conclusion of a criticism
of attempts of former rationalism to understand the objective
world and ourselves as forming a harmony, he declares that
"unser Deriken bei einem Dualismus anlangt, nit dem es nie fertig
2
werden kann." Again, in a chapter which he entitles "Der Neue
Weg," he challenges the inevitable connection betv/een world-
view and life-view, questions whether when world-view can no
longer be kept afloat life-view must be, dragged down with it,
and proposes that we cut the tow rope and attempt to navigate
3
our view of life independently. He refers also to his course
as "Verzicht auf Weltanschauung im alten Sinne, das heisst auf
eiriheitliche, in sich geschlossene Weltanschauung"
If Schweitzer's professions of dualism are examined more
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closely, however, and in their setting, it will be seen that
the dualism from which no escape is possible is one of appear-
ances or of types of apprehension, and that it does not, in
his thought, belong to ultimate reality. Hitherto the attempt
has been to make our knowledge of the human spirit and of the
natural world show the same face. Schweitzer disapproves of
that attempt, because it either softens the ethical lines in
the human spirit or does injury to our intellectual sincerity
in the description of the v;orld. He admits a duality of
appearances (appearances which will not harmonize with one
another) , but where he urges that each must be allowed its
independent right, it is "daraufhin zu einer aufrichtigen
1
Auseinandersetzung zwischen beiden kommen zu lassen. M Further,
he criticizes the world-view of dualistic realisms as crude,
because of its failure to secure a connection between ethics
and a philosophy of nature. Reality, it is true, shows itself
differently in me and in the phenomena of the objective world,
he says, but "Urn sich als denknotwendige Orientierung des
Mi liens zum Leben zu begreifen und sich zur ethischen Welt-
anschauung auszudenken, muss sich Ethik mit Naturphilosophie
2
auseinandersetzen.
"
Since the subjective and objective phenomena will not harmon-
ize one must choose which of them one considers to be the valid
representation of reality. In this situation despair of
intellectual knowledge proves to be not a thing which leads to
scepticism, but "die Wahrhaftigkeits lei stung, die wir wagen
mi!issen, urn von da aus zu der wertvollen Weltanschauung, die
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1
una vorschwebt zu gelangen." The life view cannot be estab-
lished on such a closed system of inner and outer experience
as was aspired to, but must be founded on itself. It becomes,
then, further, the duty of life-view to give a world-view;
it must "aus in der Welt abgelesenen Erkenntnisen bilden." We
must accept the understanding of reality which is given in
our inner experience of our own life as our clearest and most
certain knowledge of it. We cannot observe phenomena and find
their meaning, but through our experience of reality in our-
selves we can comprehend their nature. It is in the light of
our self-experience alone that they acquire meaning. Thus, as
Schweitzer says,
Das EntsCheidende fflr unsere Lebensanschauung ist nicht
unsere Erkenntnis der Welt, sondern die Bestimmtheit
des Wollens, das in unserem Willen zum Leben gegeben ist.
In der Ilatur tritt uns der unendliche G-eist als r&tsel-
haft schdJpferische Kraft entgegen. In unserem Willen
zum Leben erlebt er slch in uns als welt- und lebenbe-
jahendes und als ethisches Wo lien.
^
(3) The World is Enigmatic in its Features, but Known in
its Ultimate Character. Schweitzer does not profess to enable
us to understand the world completely. After all our philoso-
phy, it remains enigmatic in its manifold features. On the
other hand, its ultimate metaphysical nature is known. In fact,
we do not merely know what the nature of reality is, but we
experience its character in our inner life. That the meta-
physical nature of reality is material is already excluded
from the circle of Schweitzer's thought by his discussion of
questions of civilization and ethics* He recognizes no mater-
ialistic determination of events, but thinks always in terms
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of ideas which determine reality. It is his view that no
material factors produce spiritual value, "but that spiritual
elements, on the contrary, influence the moulding of reality,
and produce facts in support of themselves. It is in the field
of social affairs that Schweitzer discusses this relation of
spiritual and actual, and not, for several readily under-
standable reasons, in that of abstract metaphysics, but there
is no boundary at which he could consistently limit his view
that "der Material! smus unserer Zeit kehrt das VerhUltnis
1
zwischen dem G-eistigen und dem Wirklichen urn." It thinks,
he says, that spiritual value can result from the working of
facts, but "in Wahrheit funktioniert das VerhSltnis nur in
2
dem umgekehrten Sirine."
The spiritual is always, however, in Schweitzer 1 s thought,
in intimate relation with personal life. He speaks of ideas
and ideals as governing ages and determining the course of
history. These are not, however, Platonic ideas, but are always
those of some person. In the first place, "es die Persflnlich-
3
keiten sind, von denen die Zeit ihre Ideen empfangen hat,"
and in the second, they become effective only in so far as they
are adopted, and work vitally in persons.
In Schweitzer 1 s view, it is, as we have seen, through self-
experience that the nature of reality becomes known. The
consciousness which is primarily experience, however, is not
conceived, in Descartes' intellectualistic fasnion, as cognit-
ive, or in such terms as "ithink." The basic reality, as I
experience it in myself , is not primarily apprehensive, but
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active (as Lei"bniz represented), and more specifically desig-
nated is will (as Schopenhauer said). It is will-to-live.
1
"ich ja Wille zum Leben bin," Schweitzer says; and in the
experience of reality as it exists in me, I experience the
nature of the world, which is also wi 11-to-live . Through my
own will-to-llve as it becomes reflective I know and respect
all phenomena as manifestations of will-to- live • The world-
view of reverence for life regards the world as "die viel-
2
gestaltigen Erscheinungen des Willens zum Leben."
This view is not an intellectual one, arising from obser-
vation of the world, but is derived from the ethical will itself.
It is an ethical mysticism, Schweitzer says, but at the same
time, as we noted him saying before, it is the non-rational
and subjective attitude at which rational reflection arrives
by a logical necessity wnen it is carried through to the end.
3. Voluntaristic Spiritualism.
(1) Will-to-Live as World-G-round. Schweitzer's view of
ultimate reality is one which definitely takes self-experience
as its principle for the interpretation of reality, and is thus
spiritualistic. Moreover, its conception of the spirit is one
which places stress upon its purposive and active, rather than
purely contemplative features, and which finds will the most
descriptive term for its essential nature. Thus its metaphysics
is to be classed as voluntaristic spiritualism.
The reality of every phenomenon is for Schweitzer that it
is will-to-live, or creative impulse toward realization of
life and fulfillment of its inherent possibilities. Will-to-
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live is not considered to be merely the form of reality in me
and other persons, but also is read out into the world. It
thus furnishes, Schweitzer says, a "Naturphilosophie, die die
1
Welt so ldgstj wie sie ist," but which enters into sympathetic
understanding of its inner character. Will-to-live is much
more than individual impulse; it is World-C-round. Schweitzer
says, H in Welt- und Lebensbejahung und in Ethik erfilille ich
den Willen des universellen Willens zum Leben, der sich in mir
2 3
offenbart" and "der im Universum in die Erscheinung tritt."
"Ehrfurcht vor dem Laben," he says again, "ist Ergrif f ensein
von dem unendlichen, unergnlind lichen, vorwaVts treibenden
4
Willen, in dem alles Sein gegrttndet ist;" and "Durch sie (Welt-
und Lebensbe jahung) geht meine Existence auf die Ziele des
5
geheimnisvollen, universellen Willens zum Leben ein." Thus, I
am one center of will-to-live among manifold other centers of
will-to- live which are due to an eternal, unoriginated,
dynamic Will- to-Live
•
(2) The Character of the Will-to-Live Is Ethical Purposive-
ness. For Schweitzer's conception of the metaphysical principle
the term will-to-llve is not a satisfactory designation. It is
borrowed from Scnopennauer, and is unescapably colored by his
usage, wiiereas only in its fundamental voluntarism and in the
verbal identity does Scnweitzer's conception have anytning in
common with Scnopennauer 1 s . " Tarticularly in English translation,
where Wille zum Leoen is rendered as will-to-live, is tne term
by which the fundamental reality is described unfitting. The
translation gave a correct representation of Wille zum Leben in
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Schopenhauer' s conception of it, which was that of the imper-
ious and ruthless will for survival and gratification. Not
the term, but only the delineation, however, enables us to
realize what the nature of this principle is in Schweitzer'
3
thought. Except in its crude unreflective stage, it is
scarcely at all v/hat is usually meant by "will-to- live J' and
it is only Wi lie -zum-Leben in the sense of "wi 11-toward- life"
or "will-for-the-furtherance-of-lif e . " It might even be better
described as the impulse to care for life. In Schweitzer's
conception of will-to-live , there is inherent in it the necess-
ity of self-denial and of complete self-sacrifice out of regard
for the sacredness of life as such. In this, the principle
is essentially . the antithesis of that of Schopenhauer, which
found its material expression in clav; and fang. It is, in fact,
not different from what we mean by ethical will, and the
heart of Schweitzer's philosophy is the doctrine that the
clearest and most philosophically fruitful experience of reality
is in its manifestation in subjective experience as ethical
will. It is on this, not on any nature philosophy or any
compromise of ethical experience with one, he insists, that
our philosophical attitude is to be founded.
Schweitzer 1 s conception of the most priiaary consciousness,
and of the most fundamental reality, is then that it is will
directed to the maintenance of life and realization of its
fullest perfection. He says, of the will-to-live,
Er tragt den Drang in sich, sich in hflchstmo'glicher
Vollkommenlieit zu verwirklichen. . . .In allem, was ist,
1st durch Ideale bestimmte, vorstellende Kraft am
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Werke. In uns freibeweglichen, eines iliberlegten, zweck-
m^ssigen Wirkens ffihigen Wesen 1st der Drang nach Voll-
endung in der Art gegeben, dass wir uns selber und all-
es von uns beeinf lussbare Sein auf den hdlchsten mater-
iellen und geistigen Wert bringen wollen.
Wie dieses Streben in uns entstanden ist und wle es
sich in uns entwickelt hat, wissen wir nicht. Aber es
ist mit unserm Dasein gegeben.
1
Thus the fundamental character of life in me is said to be
experienced as life-affirmative and ethical will. The aspir-
ations and ideals which life manifests are not borrowed, but
are the autonomous expression of its own character. Its
regard for life, and its self-sacrifice are essentially irrat-
ional but are manifestations of its inner nature and
consistency.
(3) The World-Ground as God. In his view of the World-
Ground Schweitzer draws his conception from the subjective
experience of reality in the form of ethical will. To char-
acterize it he uses the term Wille zum Leben in common with
Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer, however, formed his conception
of the character of will primarily from the lower types of
life, and from the standpoint of ethical judgment condemned it,
taking a position of life- and world-negation. Schweitzer's
concept, on the other hand, not only in its view that reality
is will, but also in its interpretation of will, is taken from
inner experience. In this fact Schweitzer carries his fund-
amental metaphysical concept to a point of more definite char-
acterization than philosophy has before done by such a method.
He accepts the view of reality which has been the current one
since Leibniz, conceiving of it as that which acts, and follows
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Schopenhauer in further defining it as not mere energy hut
will. Reality, then, through the experience of it which I
have in myself, is known not only as that which acts, hut as
will, or that which acts purposively. Schweitzer says, further,
that it is not merely experienced as an existence which is will,
hut as ethical will. Existence is not will which is undeterm-
ined, but which is innately life-affirming and ethical, and
when consistent with itself is nothing less than will to raise -
all existence affected by its influence to the highest material
and spiritual degree of value. Metaphysical reality is known
1
not as mere power, but as a "durch Ideale bestimmte Kraft. M
The universal will-to-live of which Schweitzer speaks is, thus,
not Schopenhauer's craving, aggressive, unprincipled Power,
though it bears the same name, but an aspiring, creative, and
self-negating Will.
In its thought of the World-Ground Schweitzer's system is
idealistic and religious. Werner says,
Man sieht, es handelt sich wie in der liberalen
Dogmatik urn eine idealistische Deutung des Weltgrundes
,
nur dass Schweitzer nicht dabel stehen bleibt, G-ott
als den „absoluten reinen G-eist" zu erfassen, sondern
dieses rein geistige Wesen G-ottes als des Weltgrundes
sofort n&her bestimmt als Willen, und zwar als Willen
zum Leben. In der Formel stammt dieser Begriff von
Schopenhauer, in der Sache handelt es sich urn das,
was die Christ liche G-laubenslehre von jeher mit der
Vorstellung vom SchiJpfer sagen wollte.2
The mo3t primary reality is an eternal Will which is creator
and creative, and through co-operation with which our life
takes on meaning. Through world-affirmation, Schweitzer says,
geht meine Existenz auf die Ziele des geheimnisvollen,
universellen V/illens zum Leben ein....Mit Bewusstsein
und Wollen gebe ich mich dem Sein hin. . . .Damit setze
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ich meinem Dasein einen Sinn von innen heraus.
Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben 1st Ergriffensein von dem
unendlichen, unergrflndlichen, vorwllrts treibenden
Willen, in dem alles Sein gegHlndet ist. 1
4. Pantheistic Personalism.
(1) Metaphysical Monism. In another place Schweitzer exp-
resses the same religious outlook, in even more distinctly
theological terms, but in a way that opens again, in a new
connection, the questions of dualism. He says that,
in Welt- und Lebensbe Jahung und in Ethik erfMile ich
den Willen des universellen Willens zum Leben, der
sich in mir offenbart. Ich lebe mein Leben in G-ott,
in der geheimnisvol.len ethischen G-ottesperso'nlichkeit
,
die ich so in der Welt nicht erkenne, sondern nur als
geheimnisvollen Willen in mir erlebe. 2
Our active optimism and ethics are derived from the innate
impulse of our natures alone, and not in any measure from the
objective world. That the principle of objective occurrence
is not seen as identical with that of ethical will then creates
a difficulty for our spirit. "Alle Probleme," Schweitzer says,
"gehen. . . .auf elnes zunlick: dass ich G-ott in mir anders er-
3
lebe, als ich ihn in der Welt erkenne."
Schweitzer 1 s solution of this problem is that,
Unsere Erkenntnis G-ottes aus der Natur ist immer unvoll-
kommen und inadaequat . . .In mir- aber erkenne ich die
Dinge von innen. In mir offenbart sich die schiJpferische
Kraft, die alles, was ist, hervorbringt und erhalt, in
einer Art, wie ich sie sonst nicht erkenne, als ethischer
Wille . . . .^ieses erlebte G-eheimnls ist fu*r mein Denken,
Wollen und Verstehen entscheidend.
This may, to be sure, be taken as a statement about the ethical
character of the G-od of religion only, with no bearing on the
character of the world, but that is not Schweitzer's meaning.
An ultimate dualism of metaphysical principles is a conception
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which he does not seriously entertain. He speaks of that
which "in mir offenbart sich....als ethischer Wille" as also
"die scho'pferische Kraft, die alles, was ist, hervorbringt .
"
The question is only that of two v/ays of knov/ing: one, that
of external observation, which is always inadequate and incom-
plete, the other, that of subjective and inner experience,
which is accepted as valid and decisive, Schweitzer does not
even suggest that the reason why our knowledge of God from
the world of nature is incomplete and inadequate is that any
matter or nature is intractible to Him. The full implication
of his thought is that it is wholly the expression of God.
He does not presume to judge that the world is an imperfect
expression of God, only that it is enigmatic to us. It is
our knowledge which is limited and imperfect, in as far as it
does not secure from nature an apprehension of the true char-
acter of the power behind it, which comes to us only in our
inner experience of it as it expresses itself in us. Schweitzer
is satisfied in the assurance of comprehending the nature of
Being in his inner experience of it, and willing to accept
that this is the character of it even where intellect does not
understand how it is. He says,
In der Welt tritt er (Gott) mir als ra'tseU.iaf te , wunder-
bare Scho'pferkraf t entgegen; in mir offenbart er sich als
ethischer Wille. In der Welt ist er unperso'nliche Kraft,
in mir offenbart er sich als Perso'nlichkeit . Der Gott,
der in dem Denken iliber die Welt erkannt wird, und der,
den ich als ethischen Willen erlebe, lassen sich nicht
zusammenbringen. Beide sind eins; aber wie sie es sind,
verstehe ich nicht. 1
(2) Immanence of the World-Ground. Another question, how-
ever, has been obtruding itself in the previous discussion.
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It is that of Schweitzer's conception of the relation of God,
or the World-Ground, to the natural world and to persons.
The question of his position on the relation of God to the
natural world has been partly settled in the preceding discuss-
ion. Schweitzer nowhere seems to think of G-od as the mere
•fashioner of a distinct and independent principle, or as giving
independent existence to a physical world through a creative
act. G-od is, at least, the constantly creative and sustaining
Power of all that is. The relation to natural world and to
persons cannot, however, "be made two separate problems. He
must keep in mind the fact that Schv/eitzer does not recognize
any non-spiritual being. Ke does not consider the distinct-
ion between man and the animal world, or between the organic
and inorganic realms, as one of metaphysical nature, but inter-
prets all existence as spiritual. All being is will-to-live.
The question, then, is whether each individual is conceived of
as an independently existing will or only as a manifestation
of one universal will.
Schweitzer's doctrine of the relation of God and the mani-
fold phenomena of will-to-live is one of the points of his
philosophy which is most difficult of definite interpretation.
He does not deal with it as a distinct problem, and his state-
ments concerning it, and concerning the Involved concepts of
God and individual, are hard to form into a definite view.
Toward any conception of a metaphysically transcendent God
Schweitzer is clearly unfriendly. When he says that a universal
will-to-live expresses itself in all reality, he wishes to be
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understood that it is not something distinct from the individ-
ual realities in which it is found. HEs gibt keinen Inbegriff
des Seins," he declares, "nur unendliches Sein in unendlichen
1
Erscheinungen." This might, of course, suggest that a contin-
ual multiplicity of individuals is the only reality. This
in one sense is what is meant, but not in a way which denies
the universal unoriginated Will. What it does mean is that
the eternal Will has its being immanently in the manifold phen-
omena of will-to-live which constitute the universe. It is
only on such an interpretation that reconciliation with a
multiplicity of other expressions can be secured - e. g. that
"in der Natur tritt uns der unendliche Geist als r&tselhaft
sch6*pferische Kraft entgegen. In unserem Willen zum Leben
erlebt er slch in uns als welt- und lebenbe jahendes und als
2
ethisches Wollen;" that "in Welt- und Lebensbe jahung und in
Ethik erfiHlle ich den Willen des universelien Wi liens zum
3
Leben, der sich in mir offenbart;" and that "Ehrfurcht vor
dem Leben ist Ergrif fensein von dem unendlichen, unergHind-
lichen, vorwarts treibenden Willen, in dem alles Sein gegn!ind-
4
et ist."
The combination of Schweitzer 1 s doctrine of the non-
transcendence of God and of his spiritualistic interpretation
of objective nature, makes the separateness of God and finite
wills impossible. It is directly in the individual manifest-
ations of will-to-live that the universal Will exists. Finite
wills are parts of the universal willing. Thus Schweitzer
speaks of human persons as sparks of the will-to-live, and
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of the universal will-to-live as that of which the self is
1
one among many phenomenal expressions,
(3) The Individuality of Particular Wills. The general
nature of Schweitzer's conception is manifestly pantheistic.
But on the other hand, he holds to the real individuality of
finite wills. If there is an absolute being, it is not simple
but concrete, it is not behind the phenomena but the whole of
them. Schweitzer, in fact, Y/ould avoid the concept of the
Absolute altogether as tending to abstraction from reality.
"Der Inbegriff des Seins, das Absolute, der Weltgeist, und
alle derartigen AusdHicke , " he asserts, "bezeichnen nichts
Wirkliches, sondern etwas in Abstraktionen Erdachtes, das
deswegen auch absolut unvorstellbar ist. Wirklich ist nur das
2
in Erscheinungen erscheinende Sein." He insists that the
mysticism which affiliates with respect for life must deal in
realities, throw away the abstractions which it usually employs,
and become as indifferent to the absolute as is a converted
3
negro to his fetish.
There is, then, no will-to-live apart from the will-to-live
which works in the manifold phenomena of the world. The demand
that philosophy remain elemental, 'which appears prominently in
Schweitzer's thought, means that it is to keep clear the truth
that relation to the universal Will- to- live must be through
relation to will-to-live in its particular individual forms
about one. Self-surrender to the Absolute, he considers to be
not a real objective fact, but a purely intellectual act per-
formed with abstractions and symbols, and a dead form of spirit-
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uality. The only mysticism of which his system allows is an
"ethical mysticism" or "mysticism of reality," which consists
of practical devotion of the self to particular forms of
the wi 11-to-live • That is, in his view, spirituality and
1
ethics are "ein und dasselbe." No phenomenon of the will-to-
live can enter, he thinks, into relation with the totality,
or spiritual essence, of existence. It can relate itself to
the will-to-live only in some one of its forms, and become one
with the universal will-to-live in identifying itself with
other will-to- live and ridding the universal will of the
contradictions in its members.
There is not one Being, but many beings. They are not
primary realities, but parts or forms of the universal Will-
to-Live, and not eternal. Still they have individuality; and
they both possess value in themselves as inherent parts of the
eternal Will-to-Live and meaning through their unity with it.
Each will, though it is embraced in the universal Will and
expresses it, possesses that which is the fundamental nature
of will as a whole. That is, each part is truly will, and is
therefore self-active, purposive, ethical agency.
The origin of the particular individual centers of will is
due to the operation of the eternal, unoriginated Will -
which is Will-toward-Life. The Will, in creating, acts, in a
manner of speaking, out of a necessity of its nature - which
means, as becomes free purposive creativity. This is the nature
of will, and is true also of the individual forms of will.
They are free ethical agency, and when they work for the pres-
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ervation and enhancement of life, although they act in accord-
ance with their essential nature this is not causal determin-
ation. No ethical action is1 governed by objective canons or
performed in expectation of fulfilling any purposes, but
expresses an inner constraint of the spirit. Moral conduct
is undetermined and autonomous. In obedience to the principle
of life-affirmation one acts out the innate impulse in one,
as the chemical does in its crystalization, the f lower in its
blooming and the animal in its instinct. Only in man the
impulse is not blind, but can reflectively apprehend and think
out the ideas inherent in it, and arrive at general world-
affirmation. Individual will is in this way free and yet in
accord with, or attuned to, the aims and purposes of the univ-
ersal Will-to-Live. This Will lives in a multiplicity of
differentiations which are not bound by any law of necessity,
but by spiritual relations. In respect for life in its individ-
ual relations the individual will-to-live enters into spiritual
unity with all will-to-live.

PART THREE
CRITICISM

226
CHAPTER TWELVE
INFLUENCES
1. Biographical Factors
.
1
Character, philosophical theory, and practice in Schv;eitzer
flow into each other in a remarkable way. In the philosophy
and practice of the principle of respect for life there are,
in the first place, features to which traits exhibited in
childhood, and experiences of early youth, make significant
contribution or commentary.
A strong and immediate feeling of sympathy for the exper-
iences, the joys and the sufferings of all life is central in
Schweitzer's philosophy. It has its cultural supports, but
its first source is in personal disposition. Some measure of
this apparently comes from Schweitzer's esthetic sensibility
and its feeling for the unmarred fullness of things and for
the contribution which each makes to the artistic whole. In
part the respect for crystal, flower, and insect is born from
the ability to see, and to thrill at, the perfection of line
and of proportion in them, to find them valuable, and to be
moved by their fate. In even greater measure, however, it has
its source in the closely allied, but not primarily esthetic
feeling of sympathy. In the story of his childhood he profess-
es a sense of sadness at the amount of mysery in the world
which goes back as far as his memory. The cries of pain of
a dog which he had struck with a whip, he says "kla rig mir noch
lange nach. Durch Wochen hindurch konnte lch sie nicht los
2
werden." The pleasure and pride of trotting a neighbor's
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horse, which was old and asthmatic, was wiped out when, in un-
harnessing it, he observed its working flanks and its tired
eyes. When at about the age of seven or eight he went, under
the leadership of another boy, to shoot birds with home-made
slingshots, the sound of the church-be 11 cane to him, he says,
as a voice from heaven commanding "Thou shalt not kill," so
that he scared the birds away from his friend's sling and fled
home. Fishing, although he tried it, was impossible for him
because of the treatment of the worms and the tearing of the
mouths of the fish. Childish, one may say, and a squeamish-
ness at the sight of wounds', but it is a practical surgeon who
gives the narrative, and who concludes,
Aus solchen mir das Herz bev/egenden und mich oft be-
sch&menden Erleonlssen entstand in mir langsam die un-
erschilitterliche flberzeugung, dass wir Tod und Leid
iliber e in anderes We sen nur bringen dillrfen, wenn eine
unentrinnbare Notwendlgkeit dafur vorliegt, und dass
wir alle das G-rausige empfinden msHssen, das darin
liegt, dass wir aus G-edankenlosigkeit leiden madien
und toten. Immer starker hat mich diese tUberzeugung
beherrscht. Immer menr wurde mir gewiss, dass wir im
G-runde alle so denken und es nur niclit zu bekennen und
zu bestUtigen wagen, weil wir filirchten, vor den andern
als „sentimental bela'clielt zu werden, und auch weil
wir uns abstumpfen lassen. Ich after gelobte mir, mich
niemals aostumpfen zu lassen und den Vorwurf der Sen-
timent alltit niemals zu filirchten. 1
<
The conscious setting of himself against the influence of
being laugned at for sentimentality to which Schweitzer refers
In the last sentence, is an important biographical factor. He
is intense in his feelings and enthusiasms, but at the same
time reserved. Restraint of the earnestness with which he has
tended to throw himself into all interests by the claims of
conventional manners, and a shyness about snowing his inner
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life have often made mm appear actually Indifferent. It was
only in a measure accidentally, and under a special stimulus,
that Schweitzer allowed nis feeling for music to break through
the "wooden playing" which he had presented to hi3 teacher. In
his confirmation he was the occasion of deep trouble to the
pastor because of apparent indifference, although he says, "In
Wirklichkeit . . . .war Ida in jenen Wochen von der Helligkeit der
1
Zeit so bewegt, dass ich mich fast krank fu*hlte." This reserve
in the manifestation of his real feelings led Schweitzer in
some cases, such as the bird-hunting and fishing, to try at fir
to conceal his natural' reaction. The latter, however, was in
such cases stronger, and later he came consciously to recognize
and to combat the shyness as a cause of unfaithfulness to his
true nature and convictions. The apparent callousness and in-
difference to suffering common to men, Schweitzer thinks, is
originally due to ihame-facedness about their innate impulse,
fear of being considered sentimental, and habitual hardening of
natural feeling. This experience and belief form, then, the
background of his insistence that the subjective disposition
is not to be modified by the experiences of life, or to be sub-
jected either to external canons or to the consideration of
what is rational.
The universality and democracy of Schweitzer's principle of
respect for life is one of its conspicuous characteristics. He
will not so much as enter the path of rational classification
of life as more or less valuable. Reverence for life, he says,
does not ask how far any life des-erves saving, but treats all
life as sacred. It does not permit one to appropriate one's
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happiness or advantage as a matter of course, or one's rights
as those of the more capable. In this Schweitzer carries out
in wider range a protest against class distinctions which he
had uncompromisingly registered in his boyhood. That, as the
pastor's son, he was viewed as better off than the village boys,
and had advantages beyond theirs, distressed him. Regardless
of embarrassment to his parents, he would wear no gloves ex-
cept a fingerless kind, and on week-days no other shoes than
wooden clogs. An overcoat he refused altogether, since that
was a garment which the other boys did not have. This was in
part, of course, the aversion which any boy has to being differ-
ent from his associates, but in Schweitzer's case it had the
distinct and strong factor of reaction against being considered
a member of the gentry and as "having it better" than others.
An ethical spirit cannot be considered a simple element in
character. It is rather the sum of sensitive sympathy, fellow-
feeling, and ideals. Taking it in this composite character,
however, it may be said that the prominence and strength of
moral disposition is the greatest personal factor in the deter-
mination of Schweitzer's philosophy. It requires a man in whom
<
the moral impulse is the most evident and significant experience
of life to thus build a philosophy wholly from it. To this ex-
tent Schweit zer ' s philosophy is a relative one, the expression
of his own personality. The artist, or the genius in any line,
however, is only a person with somewhat heightened sensibility
and insight. Without this riper development he would not be a
leader, but there is necessarily a common experience which he
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evokes and sharpens. Thus Schweitzer seeks to make men aware
of, and to bring to clear consciousness in them, what he con-
siders to be the common fundamental experience of all men.
1
2. Cultural Factors.
(1) Music. The effect of music must not be overlooked
among the influences which determined Schweitzer's viewpoint.
The tendency and principles of his thought are severely ration-
al, - referred by him to a rationalist grandfather. However,
without allowing mere feeling or emotion to dictate belief,
the artistic disposition, which also belonged to him by family
inheritance, has militated against any intellectualism or one-
si dedness of thought. Music has given him experience in ex-
pressing the organic wholeness of spirit, and has made it poss-
ible for him to estimate the integral function of its several
elements of intellect and feeling. It has confirmed him,
further, in the experience, which was originally ethical, that
spiritual achievement flows from subjective impulse not from
objective impression or canon. The quality of noble unity and
grand simplicity amid Gothic elaborateness of detail which
Schweitzer extols in the musi cal 'compositions of Bach has work-
ed itself out through the details of his life and thought,
which form a rich elaboration of a single theme. Mystical ex-
perience, in the usual understanding of the term, is foreign
to Schweitzer' s mentality. The operation of some such exper-
ience, however, when its function is not performed by a ration-
al process as in Hegelianism, seems to be required for making
the monistic and pantheistic features of the system intelligible.
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The place seems, then, to be taken by the artistic spirit and
its activity, and through it there is apparently developed in
considerable measure the monistic disposition of mind which
enters into Schweitzer's world-view.
(2) Religion, The influence of the Bible and of Christian-
ity in the development of Schweitzer's thought would be diffic-
ult to over-estimate. We must here allow that world-view and
theological theories exercised a reciprocal influence, but the
life and work of Jesus and the history of the early church con-
stitute without question the greatest cultural influence in
1
Schweitzer's life. One might almost say that Schweitzer 1 !
philosophy is his personal accomodation to the vital religious
spirit of Christianity. The quality of ethical earnestness
binds them inseparably together, and leads Schweitzer to re-
gard the essential heart of Christianity as man's highest
spiritual expression.
The conceptions of the world and of the course of history
which belong to Christianity Schweitzer regards as wholly in-
cidental and actually varied elements. It is in considerable
degree through this opinion (together with his subjectively
«
strong moral disposition) that Schweitzer develops his thought
that our general life- and world-affirmation have some origin
and foundation other than such theoretical views. The spirit-
ual element from practically every feature of early Christian
thought, however, is carried over into his system. He rejects
the other-worldline ss of Christianity as a theoretical outlook,
but accepts it in the form of a fundamental judgment by the
ethical spirit upon the principles of the natural world as
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given to scientific knowledge, and regards it as a self-assert-
ion of the innate ethica.1 judgment. The esoteric character of
Jesus' message, heralded by his phrase concerning those who
have ears to hear, is duplicated in Schweitzer 1 s philosophy by
the doctrine of the non-rational intuitive nature of ethical
optimism. The inner spirit, not external facts, furnishes the
active anticipation of the realization of ideal ends, as in
the case of the expectation of the coning of the Kingdom. Just
as in Jesus' thought, according to Schweitzer, there was no
organic connection between the achievement of the Kingdom,
which was to be God's act, and the ethical acts of men, which
were appropriate to its coming but not its efficient causes,
so, he says, we are to be ethical, "nicht in der Erwartung
damit irgend einen Zweck verwirklichen zu Ico'nnen, sondern aus
innerer Notwendigkeit , urn Kinder des G-eistes G-ottes zu sein
1
und in dieser Welt schon in seinen Willen einzugehen." Here
we see that two features of Schweitzer' s philosophy - the
thought of ethical unity with G-od secured through obedience
to the inner spirit, and the non-utilitarian ethics (which
Schweitzer calls non-rat ional, or irrational ethics) - have
very direct relation to Christianity. To Christ, of course,
the feature of vicarious sacrifice in Schweitzer's philosophy
also is chiefly due. Particularly when Jesus' death is view-
ed, as Schweitzer views it, not as an appointed act in a legal
atonement or as a consequence of opposition to established
institutions, but as a voluntary and great-hearted attempt
to save the mass of men from the terrors and sufferings of the
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last days, does the relation become apparent. Irrespective
of the relative and mistaken world-view in which he considers
that it was manifested, it is for Schweitzer the absolute and
faultless expression of the ethical spirit, - and of the
Universal Will. Its spirit of regard for human woe and of
uncalculating self-sacrifice for life are regarded as of absol-
ute vrorth and of universal authority. The impact of the spirit
of this sacrificial act u^on the mind of Schweitzer, and his
reflection upon its meanings and relations, are to be regarded
as among the most effective forces in the development of his
world-view.
(3) The Zeitgeist. Schweitzer is responsive to several
currents in the thought of the time, even when he is not
entirely friendly to the systems in which they are most sharp-
ly expressed. Thus, while he has a strongly philosophical dis-
position and interest, and is insistent also upon the practical
necessity of a reflective theory of the universe, the positiv-
istic temper of the time is reflected in him, though mainly in
the form of his conception of natural science and in his
anti-intellectualism. In the latter of* these particularly,
<
Schweitzer shares in the prevailing spirit of the time, despite
his criticism of it for its prejudice against rationalism.
The voluntaristic conceptions of cognition and of the self
which appear in Schweitzer 1 s system belong to the philosophy
and psychology of the last half century in a general way*
Moreover, in his very marked reference of knowledge to will
and in his v/hole conception of the role of philosophy as in
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elementary relation to ethical action and civilization,
Schweitzer strikei the note of the pragmatic philosophies.
This does not mean, however, an adoption of the pragmatic
epistemology and logic by Schweitzer. To them he is definitely
hostile. They mean not thought, cut dictation of belief "by
will, and they introduce something like a modern doctrine of
the double standard of truth. They contain an inherent cynic-
ism about truth, to which Schweitzer opposes an evangel of
belief in truth and of confidence in thought. To its ethics
his attitude is the same. Whether an action works or not, or
has rationally desirable results, is not the criterion of
riglitness for Schweitzer, but only whether it is performed out
of respect for life. The less rationally considered an action,
the more ethical it is in Schweitzer's sense. Nevertheless
the pragmatic spirit has an Influence in Schweitzer 1 s thought.
Belief is active not theoretical, and it is perfected in action.
Thus in religion Schweitzer insists that knowledge of Jesus is
not given in historical acquaintance with his life but in
action in accordance with his will, and in philosophy that
insight into the nature of reality does not come by objective
observation of it but by acting out its innate impulse.
Action produces knowledge, and again knowledge is for action.
Our interest in a world- and life-view is conceived as for the
purpose that it may produce optimistic ethical action and
civilization.
1
3. Pragmatic Factors.
The philosophical influences upon Schweitzer from the hist-
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orical systems and thinkers have been both wide and varied.
With his strong historical interest, his prodigious energy,
and the breadth of his outlook, Schweitzer knows the forms
and development of philosophical thought comprehensively and
thoroughly. His interest, however, is not primarily that of
the pure historian. He grasps the whole of the history of
philosophy not as a collection of systems and thinkers, but as
the search for a ref le-ctive view of the universe on which
civilization may rise; and he asks what it has achieved, or
contributed to this search. In this elemental thinking, which
he insists is the business of philosophy, his relations to
philosophers and systems are widely varied, often very signif-
icant but free. Schweitzer owes some insight to many differ-
ent philosophers, without being a follower of any one of them.
Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer, to mention a few of the most
prominent thinkers who have influenced him, have all had pro-
found effect upon Schweitzer's thought, but his philosophy is
not Criticism, not Absolutism, nor pessimistic Voluntarism.
No more is it an eclecticism. It is the highly individual
spiritual response of Schweitzer to his experience of life and
to the general accomplishments of 1 historical philosophy.
Probably no single thinker, unless it be Schopenhauer, has
had more effect as a whole on Schweitzer's thought than Kant.
In the positive features of Schweitzer's world-view, however,
the Kantian system is very little represented. The epistemol-
ogical type of idealism which Kant developed, and its method
of dealing with the objective world by depreciating its

236
reality, Schweitzer rejects. It is vainly, he "believes, that
ethical idealism still cherishes the hope that it has some-
thing to gain by this method, "Die Kerabsetzung der Realita*t
der Sinnenwelt , " he declares, "bringt ihr nur scheinbaren
1
G-ewinn. H In reality neither ethics nor world- and life-
affirmation can be derived from such an interpretation of the
world, he thinks, but they must be founded on themselves. So,
he mocks at the philosophy of the academic text-books, which,
in the hope of attaining a meaning of the objective world,
rages "gegen das uhbefangene Denken, welches zu Weltanschauung
gelangen will, ohne von Kant mit Feur und dem heiligen G-eiste
2
getauft zu sein." That the ideas of pure reason, when estab-
lished in accordance with the original plan of Critical Idealism,
are ethically indifferent, and that thus there is no real
relation of epistemo logical idealism to moral experience, is
a conclusion which Schweitzer regards as established by his
study in the Religionsphilosophle Kant's .
Epistemo logical idealism fails then, as Schweitzer sees it,
to arrive at any meaning of the objective world by the consist-
ent use of its method. Moreover,, its depreciation of the real-
ity of the objective world is, he thinks, an "unberechtigte
3
Vergewaltigung der Weltwirklichkeit . " It is against the
phenomenalism of Kant, as much as against abstract Absolutism,
that Schweitzer directs his declarations that the only exist-
ence is in the phenomena; and the form of his pantheism is
largely determined as reaction against a thing-in-itself
.
Reality must be the universal existence in a multiplicity
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of forms which are real members of it, and have no being
outside its phenomena. For the philosophy of ethics it is
enough, he thinks, to know that the whole world of sense is
a phenomenon of forces, or is composed of enigmatically
manifold wi 11-to-live . In that it is spiritualistic. It is
also materialistic, however, in the sense of rejecting critical
idealism, for it regards individual existents as in a common
relationship with reality. That is, they are not passing,
ineffectual pictures or shadows of reality, but real and act-
1
ing existents. This is true not merely of man, but of each
individual existent, whose nature is that it is will.
Kant's idea of the practical reason and doctrine of its
primacy might be said to be taken over by Schweitzer. Thus
2
G-Hltzmacher , as we noticed, considered the philosophy of
civilization to be essentially a development of this idea from
Kant's moral philosophy. This feature of Kant's philosophy is
regarded by Schweitzer, however, as a bit of simple practical
naivete combined with keenly critical and subtle epistemology
.
Diplomatically, but none the less actually, will demands of
intellect that it furnish the interpretation of the world
desired. This is an escape from the necessity of thinking
out a world-view which is intolerable to Schweitzer 1 s rational-
istic principles and intellectual sincerity. In his own view,
will and intellect must cooperate in thought, but the relation
between them which Kant suggests is a false one. Reason
means will thinking out its own meaning and reflectively deriv-
ing the ideas Inherent in it by rigidly logical thought. In
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this, nevertheless, Schweitzer owes more to Kant than he seems
to realize. While the idea which appears in Schweitzer is not
taken directly from Kant, the development of it in 3cnv/eitzer 1 s
mind has evidently come in large measure tnrough his working
out in the Religionspmlosophie Kant's the conclusions that
the identity of trie ideas of reason in pure and practical
employment is only apparent, and that the moral postulates are
not secured in any other way than from the moral will. Llore
positively than at any other point, Schweitzer is influenced
by Kant in this theory of the innate a,nd autonomous moral law.
1
The "disappearance of reality" is a feature which Schweitzer
criticizes in all the idealism of Kant and his followers. In
defense of the reality in the phenomena he tilts several times
against the Hegelian Absolute. In this and in his conception
of the relation of the Absolute Will and individual existents,
he is, of course, indebted to Hegel himself, through the
latter 1 s insistence upon the concreteness of the Universal.
Schweitzer credits this where he says, "Dass er der geistige
Vater unseres Wirklichkeitssinnes ist, l&sst sich nicht be-
streiten. Sr ist der erste Denker, der dem Bestehenden gerecht
2
zu werden suchte . " Schweitzer parts ways immediately with
Absolute Idealism, however, where it identifies thought and
reality. The Absolute as pure being exists for Schweitzer only
as an abstraction of thought, not as a stage in reality at all.
So much does Schweitzer put the actual reality of the individ-
ual existent into the foreground, that while he also retains
the embracing Whole,his system is in its general bearing quite
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antithetical to Hegelianism as it is generally current. Such
Hegelianism, in Schweitzer 1 s judgment, does violence to reality
1
and is a magnificent creation of imagination; its Absolute is
a figment of the intellect which does not exist,
Schweitzer ' s thought of the Universal Reality, however close
it may come to the Hegelian conception of the Absolute when the
concreteness of the latter is insisted upon, differs again
sharply in its anti-intellectualism. Reality is not Idea, but
Will, It is not Thought, but Creative Energy. In reversal of
the Hegelian doctrine, Schweitzer 1 s theory is that what is real
is something irrational - namely, ethical will.
The speculative method of Hegelianism furnishes a foil for
that of Schweitzer. While he is at one with Hegel in his
reaction from romanticism toward thought as the method of
philosophy, Schweitzer does not consider that thought can begin
with ideas, but insists that it leads ultimately and inevitably
to the non-rational. The logical method of Hegel seems to
find meaning in the world, but it assumes that the world is a
thought
-pro cess and rational, and that it can develop a logic-
al discussion of pure being into a view of the universe.
Schweitzer insists that thought begins with our knowledge of
the world as a manifold of will-to-live . This doe3 not permit,
then, of any apriori interpretation of the world about us
according to a unitary purposiveness
.
The dialectic movement of reality is also rejected. There
is no power by which well-thought-out progress inevitably
issues from the conflict of wills. No necessity exists by
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which the individual will passes into wider and wider syntheses
until it merges into the unity of the Absolute. Will-to-live
is in conflict with itself in individual wills. In respect
for life the individuals do bring themselves into harmony with
all will-to- live, but this demands reflection and development
in thought of the ideas implicit in the will-to- live . This is
not, then, made inevitable by any logical necessity, but is a
free moral achievement. It is not to the operation of facts
upon each other, but to the spirit, as Hegel knew much better
than his followers, that progress is due.
The Hegelian conception of history plays a larger part in
Schweitzer's thought than any other feature of the system.
History is regarded not as a succession of facts, but as a
spiritual process with a unity of inner principle. Without
mechanical employment of the concepts of Hegelian thought,
Schweitzer's historical interpretations show the dramatic form
of thesis, antithesis and solution. History develops in suc-
cessive oppositions - for example, in the course of the Leben-
Jesu-Forschung, between the miraculous and natural Jesus, then
between the liberal life and the eschato logical. Progress,
according to Schweitzer, is always achieved by the radicals,
the ones who bring out the oppositions in their sharpest
contrast and fullest development of consequences. There, how-
ever, Schweitzer and Hegel reverse their respective positions
as champions of rationality. Hegel accepts that reason is in
this irrational, for it defies the law of contradiction and
accepts opposites. Schweitzer believes that truth excludes
contradiction. Progress toward it depends upon the consistent
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development of opposite positions until the falsity of one is
demonstrated and one of the alternatives is chosen. As he
says in the Von Re imams zu Vfrede , "Der Fortschritt besteht
1
jedesmal in der Einseitigkeit , im Nichtmehrvereink^nnen.
"
The direct influence of Leibniz on Schweitzer seems to have
been less than that of either Kant or Hep-el, but his views
have a closer affinity with the former's monadology than with
the system of either of the latter. To his thought there be-
long the Leibnizian conception of reality as that which acts,
and the idea of the universally spiritual character of the
natural world. Schweitzer's views of the individuality and
freedom of particulars have also in some degree the background
of the monadology, and the similarity to Leibniz' thought
continues in Schweit zer ' s theory that the individuals derive
their knowledge, and act (at least when they act freely) out
of their own nature alone. Schweitzer ' s individuals are not,
on the other hand, necessarily free and self-contained. Inter-
action occurs between individuals, and they affect one another.
Knowledge of other individuals, so far as their real nature is
concerned, is, as in Leibniz, due to community of nature, but
other knowledge is empirical and of a descriptive kind; no
pre-arranged harmony is posited. The eternal and unoriginated
existent, further, is related to the individuals not merely as
creating them but as embracing them.
With Schopenhauer, Schweitzer characterizes dynamic reality
more definitely as will. The conception of will which he has,
however, as has already been pointed out, is very different
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from that of Schopenhauer. He interprets it from the stand-
point of self-experience which is of a strongly ethical type,
whereas Schopenhauer, according to Schweitzer's statement,
carries through consistently the development of Critical Ideal-
ism to its eventual conclusion, without the moral earnestness
which made Kant replace its ideas by postulates which had
genuine moral content that was derived from the will. Even
though Schopenhauer's conception of reality comes primarily
from subjective experience, he finds the disposition of will
through objective experience of the natural world. On this
point Schweitzer sharply divides from him, as one of the main
principles of his new rationalism.
Intuition is the heart of Schweitzer's insight into the
nature of the world. In this he derives something from Bergson
also. He refers to the incompleteness of empirical knowledge
and to its inherent inability to know reality. He thinks of
it in the Bergsonian way as always know ledge about the thing,
or a view of it, which never apprehends what it is, or adds up
to be what the thing is in itself. Bergson, Schweitzer says,
"Uns iliber die Wissenschaft des ausserlichen Konstatierens und
Berechnens hinausfilthrend, zeigt. .'.dass das wahre Wissen vom
Sein durch eine Art Intuition zustandekommt , " that "Philosoph-
ieren heisst unser Bewusstsein als eine Emanation des in der
1
Welt waltenden schflpf erischen Triebes erleben." He regards
Bergson' s thought as incomplete, hov/ever, in that it remains
primarily an epistemology ; and he criticizes him that "er hat
nicht..das Bedilirfnis, eine Welt- und Lebensanschauung aus ihr
2
hervorgehen zu lassen." What Schweitzer misses is a recognition
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of the definitely ethical character of our consciousness, of
the elan vital in our experience as not merely creative power
"but ethical impulse. Moreover, Schweitzer does not propose
that thought remain in an immediate unreflective experience of
reality, but that it think out the meaning of its immediate
intuition. He disparages intellect, as an adequate means of
knowledge, but does not adopt Bergson's doctrine that it is
merely an Instrument of oractical adjustment and gives us only
1
a conventional and untrue picture of reality. Moreover, multi-
plicity and distinction are for him include'd in the positive
nature of reality.
There is much that is common in Schweitzer and Nietzsche;
and Schweitzer regards the latter as belonging "in der ersten
Reihe der Ethiker der Liens chiie it . " The most fundamental and
comprehensive agreement is in an elemental and life-affirming
ethics. Schopenhauer had an ethics only in the rejection of
life and world; but Schweitzer and Nietzsche, in common, regard
the highest ethical law as obedience to the innate impulse of
life to live itself out and to realize its implicit possibil-
ities. Together they also attack hedonistic and utilitarian
considerations, whether personal or universal. In Schweitzer,
however, the perfection of the individual is considered less
biologically and more spiritually than in Nietzsche, and the
recognized virtues are supported. No things, in fact, could
be more antithetical to each other than Nietzsche's Yfill-to-
Power and Schweitzer's Will-to-Live . Schweitzer recognizes
the struggle for existence as an expression of will-to-live,
it is true, but one in which it is in contradiction with itself.
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When the will-to- live is thought out, lie holds, it involves
belief in the value of life and reverence for it. Thus the
service of life, and self-sacrifice out of respect for it, are
the only logical consequences of the will-to-live.
With the philosophy of William Stern Schweitzer's philosophy
has probably more in common than with any other system. This
is true both in regard to ethics and metaphysics, though
Schweitzer seems to recognize the fact only on the side of the
ethics, and though the viewpoint is on both sides developed in-
dependently on the basis of other suggestions and experiences.
That the fundamental principle of ethics is respect for life,
in all of its forms without limit, is a suggestion which Schweit-
1
zer finds made by Stern in 1897. His conception of the essence
of morality as the impulse to maintain life by warding off all
harmful interference with it, is adopted by Schweitzer, with
more emphasis upon the positive perfection of life and its
spiritual elements. Already in the ethical discussion the sug-
gestions of mystical experience and pantheism enter in, and
Schweitzer has probably been affected by them in the development
of his thought. Stern had suggested that in the service of
other life a feeling of community with all spiritual being arose.
Schweitzer praises this as containing a deeper insight than
Darwinism, which discovers only herd feeling and exalts conflict,
and as providing solidarity with all being. Ethics which is
thus universal, he says, can alone come into agreement with
nature philosophy in a comprehensible way. The ethical spirit-
ualism in which he has himself sought this agreement, is a pan-
theistic personalism of the same general class as that of Stern.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
CONTRIBUTIONS
1. Ethical and Social Values.
Among the merits of Schweitzer's philosophy there are to he
noted first its practical and social values. One of the most
distinctive features of Schweitzer's thought, as also of his
character and personal history, is the central place of ethic-
al experience. This has its distinctly theoretical aspects,
but it means also that there is a close relation between his
philosophy and the realization of personal and social values.
It is the business of philosophy, in Schweitzer's view, to
present a world-view which is not only able to meet the critic-
isms of pure thought but also to furnish and support a healthy
popular philosophy. It must give the support of reflection to
the ethical and spiritual elements of civilization.
(1) Moral Conception of Civilization. One of the most
prominent of the particular ethical values in Schweitzer's
work is his vigorous representation of the spiritual nature
1
and ethical conditions of civilization. There is no reaction-
ary attitude to natural and material achievements, but their
dependence upon spiritual factors, and the relative nature of
tiieir. value in reference to ethical spirit, is made clear. In
the clarity and conviction of his proclamation that progress
lies in the spiritual development which is achieved in the
mass of persons, and that the essence of the civilized spirit
is moral, Schweitzer ma lie a a contribution to the life of
society, and one of which there is need in a period of rather
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general economic absorption,
(2) Doctrine of Respect for Life. Probably nothing is more
socially significant or more vitally necessary in thought,
particularly in the face of the moral and spiritual tendencies
of the last few decades, than Schweitzer's preaching of rever-
ence for life as the fundamental and absolute law of morality.
It must be remembered that this is not merely regard for the
existence of life, but even in that meaning alone it is a
needed and significant emphasis. Life itself has been made a
secondary consideration to material advantages and general
objectives to such a degree that consideration of persons, and
mutual confidence in such consideration, on which the integrity
of society rests, are very largely lost. What is most vital
for all of human life is a restoration of direct regard for
Individuals, not simply in an impersonal and calculated way
but in a sympathetic and human relationship. Only such a
spirit, which is in Schweitzer ' s sense non-rational, or deter-
mined by ethical volition simply, can manifest enthusiasm for
life, and arouse it in all classes generally for the perform-
ance of the necessary tasks of life. This spirit, moreover,
as was said, is not limited to the preservation of pnysical
life, but involves respect for the spiritual life of the in-
dividual and its richest fulfillment. As such it constitutes
a disposition of respect for personality which is essential to
social confidence, and of active social effort which is the
condition of all types of achievement and culture.
(3) Defense of Individual Freedom. Another important way
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in which the principle of respect for personality operates is
in defense of the individuality and freedom of the person as
it is threatened by the forces of social cohesion and standard-
1
ization. It is a real service which Schweitzer performs in
pointing to the individual as the source of ethical law and
spiritual achievement, and In attacking the "pathological"
susceptibility of the individual to the views of society and
of its organs of expression. Schweitzer's attack upon the sub-
jection of the individual reason and sensibility to communal
disposition or interest, and particularly upon the erection of
the latter to a principle of morality, is a justified one. An
individualist theory, which is in the fullest sense social in
its operations and interests, but which frees the individual
from the narrow and opportunist social theory of the time, and
gives him ground on which to stand over against the community
in his personal moral judgment, is a contribution to a very
real practical need.
(4) Attack on Ethical Relativism. In opposition to the
moral scepticism and relativism of our time, Schweitzer asserts
2
the possibility and fact of an absolute ethic. It is his view
that in the individual there is a reason which is valid and
objective when it is properly employed. Like Socrates and
like Kant, he faces anarchy in moral judgment with a theory of
3
an innate and universal function of the human spirit. The
law of morality is not external but self-imposed, but it is
none the less common and universal; it is both social and cosmic
in its meaning.
As is evident, Schweitzer's individualism and moral serious-
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ness are related to a faith in the validity of the operations
of reason and in its ability to realize objectively significant
1
principles. The energetic championship of this faith in
reason is itself a value. Not alone for the confidence which
may be secured for a body of knowledge or a set of principles,
but for the establishment of the reflective frame of mind and
method in all phases of life, a belief in thought, and trust in
its use for the solution of problems, is to be desired.
2
(5) Rejection of a Non-Spiritual Faith in Progress. It
is, Schweitzer further asserts, through thought, as it gives
itself to the solution of men's problems, as it fashions ideals,
and as it provides spiritual content to the age, that civiliz-
ation may alone be preserved. That is, not only is spiritual
achievement the form of civilization, but it is the sole means
to its attainment. He attempts to withdraw easy optimism,
whether based on a faith in inevitable natural evolution or
in a transcendent God, and to challenge men to the task of
realizing civilization through spiritual efforts. There is a
transcendent hope, it is true, not merely a humanitarian but
a religious one, which is to be realized in the mysterious
purpose of the universal Will-to-live , but it is in the active
will of individuals that the universal Will exists and strives
toward its purpose. Only through the vigorous efforts of indiv-
iduals can man master life and wrest from it a progressive
realization of value. Moreover, in this effort it is the cont-
ribution of the moral spirit alone which counts. Through no
external machinery, institutions or social arrangements are the
ends possible of realization, but only through the inner regard
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for life and enthusiasm for its purposes,
(6) Ethical Activism. The philosophical outlook of Schweit-
zer is one which is idealistic, but which nevertheless does
not lift the responsibility for the realization of his pur-
poses from man. The achievement of value is made to depend
upon his spiritual earnestness and activity. There are, of
course, certain comforts and assurances which are thereby
sacrificed, but these are more than compensated for by the
reality and significance which are given to the ethical sit-
uation and to moral effort. There is here an idealism which
would satisfy Professor James in hi3 demand for hazard and
moral adventure. There is no whole of reality which is and
always has been perfect, as in Absolutism, with its unreality
of moral distinctions and futility of moral straggle, or even
an omnipotent transcendent Being on whom one depends for the
abiding power, and final fact, of victory by fiat, as in trad-
itional theism. This does not mean, as James suggested, a
finite G-od in company with whom one struggles against alien
principles, but an infinite God who strives in one toward the
realization of further value. It is a conception which sacrifi-
ces some of the traditional religious values, but v/hich gives
new meaning and new religious spirit to ethical activity.
(7) Emphasis Upon Obligation. Schweitzer makes the exper-
ience of ethical obligation, and loyalty to it, the foundation
for personal life and for civilization. Faith in this exper-
ience of obligation is one element of Schweitzer's trust in
reason in general. In contrast to the disregard of obligation
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in current thought, the emphasis which is placed upon it by
Schweitzer is regarded as an element of value in his thought.
It may well be that Schweitzer does not give the consider-
ation of values, as the ends of action, the place which it is
necessary for it to have in an adequate ethics. On the other
hand, there is a merit in his opposition to the utilitarian
consideration in ethics. There is in reality something
wholly incompatible between the principle of ethics and of
utility. The decisive factor in ethics cannot be the desire
to realize some purpose, or the expectation of achieving some
end, but the sense of inward necessity to be true to the
1
ethical spirit. An ethic which is directed to the realization
of specific values is relative, and does not provide a categor-
ical and absolute element such as is characteristic of the
ethical ought ,
(8) Liberation of floral Obligation from Dependence upon
Metaphysical Theory. It is a further merit in Schweitzer's
ethical thought that he definitely and clearly liberates moral
obligation from its too common dependence upon metaphysical
theory. Moral experience is direct and obligatory, and it is
not from the work of critical intellect that it arises. There
is not as much practice of pessimism and resignation as there is
profession of its principle, but outstanding piety in it is
possible. Men renounce theism, belief in immortality and other
such ideas, but continue for the most part, illogically, to act
as believers do. Schweitzer does not regard it as unimportant
2
what men think, but he emphasizes, nevertheless, the fact of
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the immediacy of moral experience and obligation, and their
independence from knowledge of facts*
(9) Extension of the Field of Ethical Relations. The
extension of the scope of ethical relations which Schweitzer
1
proposes, is a movement in the right direction for ethics.
The ethical treatment of the lower forms of life is one feat-
ure of morality which does not arise from theoretical consider-
ations, but which nevertheless enters into our sense of moral
obligation. To find place for it in a wholly homo-centric
ethics as an element of personal worth, if there are no values
Implicit in the objects, is only an artificial systematization.
The extension of the relations of direct sympathy, and of ethic-
al obligation of a primary sort, to all forms of life is a
positive contribution to current ethical theory.
2. Critical Contributions.
In the philosophical material of Schweitzer's which we
have considered, some contributions of a critical nature must
be taken account of. In the study of Kant's philosophy of
religion, Schweitzer made acute and significant criticisms.
He brings to light the failure of Kant's projected plan for a
philosophy of religion in connection with Critical Idealism,
the alteration which it has undergone in the Kritlk der prakt-
i schen Vernunft, and the ultimate failure of the plan in
either form. He reveals with convincing clarity the practical
indifference of the ideas of pure reason, and the lack of rel-
ation between them and the postulates of the moral will. That
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"being the case, so far as Critical Idealism is concerned, we
are left in entire ignorance about the theoretical ideas.
The ideas for which the system of Critical Idealism would make
place are, in fact, not those in which there is practical
interest. The practical questions are distinct from the theor-
etical, they have their source in moral will, take a different
form and have a different solution. It is possible to con-
clude that the assumption, made by Kant and commonly accepted,
that the ideas of pure reason have finally been given practical
grounds for belief is incorrect. The postulates of the
Kritlk der praktischen Vernunft are established by moral will,
but when brought into conjunction with the critical epistemol-
ogy they lose their connection with morality. Since the
sensible world is the appearance of the intelligible world,
natural causation is made identical with free "moral" causation,
and moral judgment is destroyed; the end of ethical develop-
ment is placed in the beyond; and, since God appears only as
guarantor of a conjunction of virtue and happiness in that
beyond, He is in only apparent connection with moral activity
in the sensible world. The moral and religious elements in
Kant develop only in independence of the critical.
One of the common criticisms which is directed against the
ethics of Kant has reference to its complete individualism.
It is then an interesting feature of systematic criticism
that Schweitzer refers this to the epistemological standpoint
of Kant, and represents it as inevitable within the framework
of Critical Idealism. Where, however, in the Religion inner-
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halb der G-renzen der blossen Vernunft the plan of Critical
Idealism is set aside, and the ethical and religious ideas
are treated as they develop from the moral will, the individ-
ual is brought by Kant into intimate and vital relation to
society in his religious and ethical life.
All that Schweitzer finds of value in Kant comes from what
is extraneous to Critical Idealism and is concerned with the
innate moral will. Because of the lack of relation of episte-
mological idealism to moral experience, and what he regards as
the unjustified violence to reality in its theory of the
Ideality of phenomena, Schweitzer rates the whole movement
from Rationalism to the present time as an intermezzo of phil-
osophical thought. This is, of course, a sweeping and unjudic-
ial judgment to pass upon one of the periods of most acute
and lively philosophical speculation in all history, but in
the light of Schweitzer's criticism, which strips from Critical
Idealism all the philosophically positive features associated
with it, and attributes them to practical (or moral) reason,
there is justification for the attitude, to the extent of the
dominance of critical features in Kant's system and in the
general constructive activity of philosophy since his time.
There is not wanting, furthermore, a strong support in present
philosophical thought for Schweitzer's claim that in Criticism
philosophy was travelling a blind alley from which it must
retrace its way.
The disparagement of Rationalism which has been popular
in the last century and a half has been due in some measure to
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the way in which German Idealism has "been supposed to have
transcended it, though its superficiality has also been appar-
ent. It has, however, as Schweitzer insists, a right to
respect for its faith in rational thought. In the failure
to accord recognition to this feature of Rationalism, much
succeeding philosophy has shown itself inferior; and in giving
credit for the permanent value of its rational principle,
Schweitzer makes a Just correction in historical criticism,
3. Contributions to Philosophical Theory,
(1) Recognition of Moral Experience as Non-Rational and
Immediate, Some of the factors which have been mentioned as
practical values are to be considered also as contributions
to the development of philosophical thought. This is true in
the case of Schweitzer* s doctrine of the independence of moral
1
disposition from metaphysical views. It is not that this is
a unique suggestion, but morality is so customarily treated
as the product of theories about life and the world, and left
out of account among the data for a philosophical view, that
the definiteness and emphasis with which Schweitzer insists
upon the primary and immediate nature of moral experience
means the introduction of a truth generally unrecognized in
philosophical thought,
(2) Moral Experience Treated as Central in the Interpret-
ation of Reality. With the principle of the primacy of moral
experience and of its non-theoretical character there is com-
bined, as a further distinctive feature in Schweitzer's system,
the procedure of taking ethical phenomena as significant
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and central for indicating the nature of reality. Together
with his declaration that morality does not rest upon meta-
physics, Schweitzer insists that metaphysics depends upon the
experience of morality. His world-view is one that definitely
has its outlook in ethics. This idea is, of course, not new
with Schweitzer. Flchte had said that the kind of view of
the world a man held depended upon the character of the man,
and had thought that an apprehension of its free and moral
spirituality depended upon the exercise of these qualities in
the individual; out, after all, it was eplstemology rather than
ethics which was essential to his system, and the idealism
was subordinate to the creativity of mind in its relation to
the world. Kant derived his metaphysical beliefs from the
ethical will, but this was a feature Incidental to a theoret-
ical system, and the beliefs had to do with transcendent real-
ities not with the world of experience. The closest kinship
in thought on this point is to Lotze. The latter had taken
account of the non-theoretical factors in knowledge and conduct
in his declaration that life is more than logic, and had fur-
thermore said that metaphysics begins in ethics. However, he
had not carried out the idea in any fundamental way in the
actual construction of his metaphysics. Ethics remained in
the place of a not unimportant, but nevertheless supplementary
part of philosophical theory. In recent theological writings,
such as Sorley's Moral Values and the Idea of God , the exper-
iences of value and obligation begin to take a new place and
to be recognized as having metaphysical significance, but this
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la rather narrowly conceived, in relation to the one question
of the existence of God. It is a novel and significant prop-
osal in Schweitzer, to take the data of the science of ethics
not merely for the construction of a philosophical theory of
conduct, but, in a definite and thorough-going way, in place
of the data of the physical sciences, a3 the material of exp-
erience for the construction of philosophical theory in gen-
eral. It is recognized in the consideration of the weaknesses
1
of Schweitzer's system that this is too restricted a basis
for the comprehensive interpretation of reality, unless the
data of all other experience is really related to the ethical
experience, but even so it is more Justified than the many
philosophical efforts from the viewpoints of chemistry, physics,
biology or some other such field of experience, since it is
not a case of taking merely one field of experience among
others, but of putting in the forefront a body and. type of
experience which is regarded as primary, universal and system-
atically significant. To bring moral experience as definitely
into the foreground a3 Schweitzer does, and to relate it in
his manner to the determination of the world-view is an
Important philosophical contribution.
Idealists who have used the human spirit as a principle for
the interpretation of reality, and this is largely true even
of Lotze despite his pronouncement about the relation of ethics
and metaphysics, have accorded more fundamental significance
to the qualities of consciousness, unity and the like than to
the moral nature. There is reason for this, in that these are
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the qualities which are significant for meeting certain theor-
etical questions, and that they lend themselves to a more
demonstrative method. It is taken for granted that in estab-
lishing the mind- likeness of nature the ethical nature is
provided for. It is a merit of Schweitzer that he takes account,
not merely of the intellectual, but also of the active and
ethical quality which is inherent in spirituality and is more
fundamental than critical thought, and that he insists upon
this quality of personality having its part in the determinat-
ion of our thought about reality.
(3) Recall of Philosophy to its Function as a Rational
Theory of Life. The demand which Schweitzer makes upon phil-
osophy, that it give itself more definitely to the development
of a philosophy of life, is a much needed one at present. Not
only is it well for philosophy to be reminded that its useful-
ness lies in giving currency in general thought to its results,
but it must recognize the more-than-theoretical interests for
which it must provide. It is its business to furnish, in a
full, dynamic, rich form, a body of thought which gives coher-
ence and nobility to life. Philosophy has been busy at its
technical questions, which is proper enough, but in its pre-
occupation it has, as Schweitzer charges, neglected this necess-
ary function. Though not alone in this expression, Schweitzer
is to be credited for a share in recalling philosophy to its
duty at this point.
(4) An Empirical Rather than A-Priori Idealism. That
Schweitzer derives his philosophy from reflection upon the will-
to- live gives to his idealism an empirical foundation. Even
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though in his system the appearance of reality in objective
experience is not taken as having philosophical significance,
the conception of reality which it contains is not an a-priori
constraction from thought, as it is in Kantianism and in the
general world-view of Hegelianism despite Hegel 1 s recognition
of reality and provision for it in his system.
(5) Adjustment to natural Science. Through the above fact,
there is possible a much more friendly relation of natural
science with Schweitzer's idealism than with the forms mention-
ed. It claims no means of anticipating subjectively what forms
the life impulse will take in nature, or in our experience.
The features or phenomena in which Force or Life shows itself,
it says, are mysterious and enigmatic to thought. There are
no general principles by which we comprehend its practical
working, but that must be known in experience. On account of
this attitude, and of the derivation of the philosophy of life
from will-to-live, no claims are made upon the descriptive
sciences and no pressure is brought to bear upon them in their
findings, but they are left free to describe phenomena as they
are, to classify them and to anticipate on the basis of their
classification.
1
Schweitzer, as we have seen, rejects the epistemo logical
type of idealism. His approach to idealism is, in its general
form, that type which ha3 been mo3t prominent since the middle
of the last century. Though the idealistic systems of that
period have all owed a debt to Kant, in their philosophical
method they have subordinated the epistemo logical consider-
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ations, and have developed a spiritualistic interpretation
of nature in the general fashion of Leibniz. Schweitzer even
more definitely repudiates the idealistic treatment of the
objective world. It is not possible here to go into the
whole problem of perception, and Schweitzer does not elaborate
his views on the subject. His position, however, is in gen-
eral a realistic one. There are, of course, serious difficult-
ies which realism must face in the facts of error, but Schweit-
zer has, on the other hand, the advantages of a type of ideal-
ism which does not depend upon "the ego-centric predicament"
and which thus stands closer than episterao logical idealism to
the direct form of experience and to general thought.
(6) Method. Schweitzer's work may be considered to be a
contribution on the side of right method in philosophical
thought. There is no element of the method which is entirely
new, but there is a distinctive and uncommon character to the
whole, and to the adjustment within it of elements which
stand dissevered In many traditional systems. Schweitzer gives
due, and not inconsistent recognition both to the non-rational
elements in life and to the necessity for thorough and unrelent-
ing thought. In the inclusion and adjustment of these two
factors he has the only valid, and only possible, method for
knowledge. Allowance must be made for a material which is
that of experience and non-rational, but our knowledge depends
upon thinking out the meaning and relations of this experience.
In view of pragmatism alone, not to mention other systems,
it can scarcely be asserted that Schweitzer's doctrine of the
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necessity of a factor of active faith in the establishment
of knowledge is unique. However, the presence of such a
feature of moral venture is an essential element in valid
philosophical method, and Schweitzer's combination of it with
an intuitional and non-utilitarian view is novel. In common
with pragmatism he asserts that belief must be determined by
an element of volition in absence of conclusive rational
demonstration, and that knowledge comes only through such a
venture of faith. In distinction from pragmatism, however,
the certification of truth which comes in action is not in
any cash value, but in the inner experience of the nature of
the acting self.
1
It is pointed out elsewhere that Schweitzer does not give
rational ground for his belief that ethical will such as one
experiences in oneself is the nature of all reality with which
one comes in contact, and of the general reality of which one
is a form. Apart from what has been said about factors which
dispose Schweitzer to this outlook, the belief is the manifest-
ation of Just such an act of faith as has been spoken of. It
arises out of reflective treatment of experience, and represents
a view which is most meaningful", but the conclusion can never
be rationally arrived at; there must be the act of will to
accept, - the leap of faith. This belief in the nature of all
reality as ethical will toward life, may then be further streng-
thened in action in which it is accepted, where reality is
experienced as so acting and unity with reality about one is
realized.
(7) Doctrine of the Ethical Conditions of Knowledge. In
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Schweitzer* s sy3tem, as in no other, there is "brought to the
forefront the idea of the ethical conditions of knowledge.
Socrates had said "Knowledge is virtue," but it is strange
to hear that virtue is knowledge. We have heard that "Beauty
is truth; truth, beauty; this is all ye know and all ye need
to know," but it is new to hear that virtue is truth, truth
is virtue, and that is all one knows or needs to know, "Eth-
1
isch werden," Schweitzer says, "heisst wahrhaft denkend werden."
That is, truth belongs to the ideas regarding reality which
are Implicit in the inherent disposition of respect for life
and which may be derived from it by reflection. In this con-
ception, that to be ethical is to think truly about life and
the world, Schweitzer presents a more valid view of the relation
of ethics and thought than is embodied in the Socratic doctrine
that to think correctly is to act properly.
(8) The Cosmic Nature of Morality. Schv/eitzer relates
ethics to metaphysical reality more fundamentally than has been
done before. Oftentimes they have been brought into a kind
of relation through views of natural right, or of morality
as conformity to the Universal Mind in nature. Where this
has been carried out rigorously, however, it has tended to lose
its connection with a genuine ethical spirit and activity, as
it did in Stoicism. In Spinoza the disposition became even
more manifest, and the perfect (rational) activity is distinct
from morality. This is the logical fate of morality in
Absolutism also, though that system seeks to prevent its lack
of relation to moral Judgment from becoming evident or coming
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into effect. Spinoza regarded the body of moral law as rep-
resenting interests of the individual or of society which
were relative and grew out of imaginative forms of thought.
In this fashion the ethical factors of life have frequently
been treated as accidental features in our world (mere express-
ions of the individual will or desire; devices in the interest
of the ruling and wealthy class, or of the weak and poor; or
rules of social interest against individual tendencies) out of
relation, in any of these cases, to metaphysical fact, unexp-
lainable by it, and without cosmic significance. Even in the
traditional thelstic thought, the ethical rules entered in a
somewhat artificial way. They were more or less arbitrarily
established by the will of the Creator and Ruler, even though
they had then a metaphysical basis to this extent, that moral
action meant accordance with the rules of the power which was
World G-round. In Schweitzer's system, however, morality has
a much more primary and immediate metaphysical relation. Our
actual morality, in its fundamental and genuine principles,
does not refer to utility, either individual or social, or to
the results of action in human experience, but expresses the
essential nature and tendency of Reality. USThereas in theism,
furthermore, the realization of the end of tne metaphysical
process was the work of G-od, it is here thought of as the
product of this very life-affirming activity. Our morality is
thus metaphysically grounded and cosmically significant.
(9) Fundamentally Ethical Nature of the Metaphysical
Principle. That Schweitzer, through making moral impulse, as
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an immediate element in life, the central fact for philosoph-
ical reflection, presents an ethically-characterized Force as
the fundamental metaphysical concept, is one of his most dis-
tinctive theoretical contributions. Matter, Mind, Spirit,
Force, Will, and some modifications of these, have been offered
as the concepts of ultimate reality; and, where Reality has
been conceived of as Mind or as Spirit, ethical attributes
have been assigned. This has been in an incidental way, how-
ever, for reality was interpreted primarily in accordance with
the attributes of mind such as unity or consciousness, which
do not necessarily involve morality, and this was then argued
from evidences of design and beneficence. In his notion of a
primarily ethical purposiveness Schweitzer contributes what
is, in any definite way, a somewhat new manner of conceiving
of the metaphysical principle, which places it in a new light,
and which lends itself to a different outlook on life and the
world as a whole.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
DEFECTS AND WEAKNESSES
1. Lack of Completeness.
From the standpoint of many theoretical interests it would
"be easy to find fault with Schweitzer 1 s system for what it
does not treat at all, or in detail - in the cases of the nat-
ural world, psychology, perception, or logic. This would not,
however, be entirely fair. There roust be allowed to Schweitzer
the right to assign to these matters their place and importance
in accordance with his philosophical viewpoint and not with
that of a different one; and we must note that for him phil-
osophy is not the science of the sciences, or an attempt to
interpret and unify their results. We must rather ask, whether
the elemental problems of life which are taken up by thought
are reflectively explained in reference to their ultimate
reality, consistently, and in a way that is justified to thought.
On the other hand, it cannot be claimed that what Schweitzer
offers may be taken, without further development, as a full
1
and complete system. Since Schweitzer proclaims the failure
of all preceding philosophy, and the incapacity of any future
philosophy which begins with objective observation of the nat-
ural world, to secure an intellectual apprehension of life and
of its relation to the world, and proposes a new beginning and
method for philosophical thought, it might be expected, if we
are to be satisfied in the new province and are not to take
excursions in the old, that the intellectual problems which
puzzle us would be settled.
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Wlille it may be sufficient for ethics, to know that the
whole world of sense i3 a phenomenon of forces, or is composed
of enigmatically manifold will-to-live , our intellect insists
at least upon knowing how we may consistently conceive this.
It may be true that one is no longer driven, by the necessity
of securing meaning for one 1 3 life or guidance for one's
conduct, beyond the general conceptions and principles which
have been given. That being so, however, one is ready, in
quietness of spirit, and with no ulterior purposes or emotions
to hinder one's achievement of truth, to develon a world-view
which is both detailed and coherent.
Schweitzer seems to feel, in some measure, that one does
not need to think out one's relation to other will-to-live or
to the universal Will-to-Live beyond the point of realizing
the practical and ethical relation, and that there is danger
in the attempt to do so, that one will regard the optimistic
and ethical attitude as dependent upon the theory, and that
in this way the validity and strength of the ethical impulse
will be affected by confirmations and contradictions out of
objective knowledge. Accordingly, Schweitzer's metaphysical
doctrines are not well-developed, and must in the main be de-
duced as the implications of various incidental and sometimes
equivocal statements. One may, however, accent that self-exper-
ience gives adequate and conclusive evidence for practical
and reflective life- and world-affirmation, but still want to
know in what fashion one can coherently think of one's self as
a real individual will-to-live and also a part of a universal
Will-to-Live. We must not, of course, hold the volumes which
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sketch the general ideas of a new system, and announce that
they are to be supplemented by other writings, accountable for
a detailed development of the outlook, but we must recognize
that the view is incomplete as a philosophical system, and that
on many logical, epistemo logical, and methodological points, as
well as metaphysical ones, its position is not fully expounded
or adequately Justified.
2. Conception of the Nature and Function of Philosophy.
Schv/eitzer' s conception of philosophy and of its function
is on the whole too practical. One may have a great deal of
sympathy with his protest against philosophy becoming only
chamber music, and agree that the test of its worth is its
ability to take the problems of life, and, after more thorough
reflection upon them than exists in popular thought, to return
them to general circulation; but this does not mean that eth-
ical action, and loyal support of life and civilization, are
its only end. Schweitzer neglects the theoretical interests,
and the place of knowledge as an intrinsic value. Even though
his emphasis upon the wider-than-theoretical function of phil-
osophy is needed, the demands of thought for consistent and
comprehensive ways of thinking about experience of every sort
are not to be neglected.
1
3. Undeveloped Theism.
(1) Vagueness of Conception. Schweitzer speaks of an etern-
al and unoriginated, universal Will-to-Live. He also uses for
it the term God, and says that God reveals himself differently
in the world and in my inner experience. Again he refers to it
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as"the ethical divine personality ... .which I experience in
1
myself as a mysterious impulse," If the concept of G-od is to
have a place in Schweitzer's philosophy, however, it should
be more clearly developed. Furthermore, there needs to "be a
more rationally satisfying exposition of the relation of the
universal Will to individual wills, which must be conceived
metaphysically as well as ethically.
(2) Lack of Proofs. Perhaps a more definite statement of
the concept of God would help in the problem of its establish-
ment, but there is not sufficient justification apparent for
the use of the concept. Schweitzer does not, in fact, give
ground at all for his belief in the unity of reality. Phil-
osophies are accustomed to argue this on the basis of inter-
action and system, or the internal character of relations, or
to find it as the unshakable conviction resulting from myst-
ical experience. Schweitzer does none of these. Except that
It is evidently the only way of attributing any meaning to
the objective world under the conditions of his other views
(and Schweitzer does not state this), there is no rational
argument for the continuity and community of nature in all
existents which he assumes. The remaining ground (of which
there is some suggestion) is that it is the innate disposition
of our ethical will to treat all reality with which we come in
contact as expression of a personal will, and that the ethical
impulse is to be accepted as valid for our thinking. Reflect-
ion upon impulse may, as in Schweitzer's system, find meaning
and significance In it, but impulse as such does not give us
belief.
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(3) Religious Value of the Conception. The assumption of
continuity and community of spiritual nature in all reality, is
a vital feature in the philosophy of Schweitzer, It is through
It that self-negation and ethics are involved in will-to-live.
The religious values which belong to the conception might, how-
ever, be questioned. Religion is, in Schweitzer's view, the
active preservation and enhancement of life. Spirituality
1
and ethics, he says, are one. Ifhile we are accustomed in the
Christian religion to think of service to God as taking the form
of service to man, this would seem to mean simply discarding
the values which are the distinctive ones of religion. This
is apparently not true in the case of Schweitzer, but still
some of the religious values are lost, at least in their trad-
itional form. No relation of the individual to a Universal
Being is recognized, but only the relation to other individuals.
In the theistic way of thinking this would mean that there is
never any relation to God, but only to persons and things.
For Schweitzer, hov/ever, the individual comes into relation
with God in his spiritual community with particular existents,
and the religious values seem to be actually united with, and
realized in, daily activity. The relation to a transcendent
Spirit, which is lost, Schweitzer regards as an unreal and dead
spirituality.
4. Precarious Provision for Metaphysical Unity.
The question of unity has other significance for philosophy
than its religious Interest. Schweitzer has been chiefly con-
cerned to show the possibility of spiritual unity with the
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universal Will-to-Live, realized in the fact that the individ-
ual becomes conscious of the nature of himself and of all real-
ity, and that he removes conflict between the will-to-live in
himself and in other phenomena. This, however, does not
provide the unity which constitutes a natural universe and
which provides order and law in it. The type of conscious
ethical unity which is aimed at must have behind it some type
of metaphysical unity.
The difficulty of providing for unity is greater for Schweit-
zer's philosophy, in proportion as the Individuality and freedom
of particular wills is stressed, together with the doctrine of
the non-transcendence of the universal Will. The universal
Will is not regarded as a will in addition to those in individ-
uals, but as having its existence in the wills of the individ-
uals. There is, however, in these single wills no common pur-
posiveness, except as an abstraction. This universal Will-t©-
Live would include in itself a multitude of particular purpos-
ive tendencies, often in conflict with each other, but no gen-
eral purposes or universal laws. There might be said to be a
common self-fulfilling power working in all the particulars,
without agreement in them, but vthe unity assigned to it in
that case seems meaningless. There would be a multitude of
diverse, clashing, individual purposes, able to take account
of each other and sympathetically forward one another, but no
purposiveness . There is no place in the will of any of these
individuals, or of a will which is simply the whole of them
(a really unthinkable and contradictory will), for any system,
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any universal purpose, or any universal law. The universal
Will must, for possession of such factors, as well as for its
existence as an individual and unitary being, transcend the
particular wills in some sense, at least as a unity which is
more than any of its parts or the sum of them. The primary
1
metaphysical unity is recognized in Sch7reitzer' s statements,
but it has a precarious position.
5. Conception of the Natural World.
Schweitzer's conception of the natural world has, from the
angle of the above consideration, an appearance of inadequacy.
His anti-intellectuallsm and realism, combined with his inter-
pretation of metaphysical reality through self-experience , does
not allow for any distinction in the manner of existence of
natural phenomena and of persons. The natural objects or
events are individual forms of will-to-live, which strive to
live out their possibilities in accordance with their natures.
The pan-spiritualistic - one might say animatistic - view of
the natural world which is involved, while it is not an imposs-
ible one, is not a wholly clear conception, particularly as
regards its provision for the unity and system of the world
in which universal natural law rests.
6. Relation to Natural Science.
The relation of Schweitzer's philosophy to natural science
has two faces. In one aspect the relation, as we saw, is very
2
friendly. His world-view leaves the natural world be what it
is, as he says; and does not seex in its representation to
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distort in any way, ita actual features. It finds the signif-
icance of life in another manner, and does not modify the nat-
ural phenomena in order to derive it from empirical observation.
Thus the objectivity and freedom of descriptive science is
assured.
The importance of objective experience, on the other hand,
is discounted by Schweitzer's view. It has a practical use-
fulness and gives a relative kind of knowledge, but it does
not lead to insight into the nature of reality. Moreover,
intuition, outflanking it, has provided an interpretation of
reality, and one which, as indicated above, leaves the ground
of natural law in uncertainty. In the mysterious and contra-
dictory manifold forms of will-to-live which are allowed in
nature there is not secured a unity and concentration of con-
trol which gives any expectation of certainty to scientific
prediction.
7» Dualism in Experience.
The above criticism is intimately related to another: that
of the dualism in experience which is so prominent a feature
1
in Schweitzer's system. This, as has been made clear, is
never presented as indicating a duality of principles, but only
as a dualism of appearances. There are, even so, two ways in
which the dualism may be regarded. One of these is as a dual-
ism of two ways of knowing, an inner and an outer. The other
is as that of two parts of reality with which knowledge is con-
cerned, self and the natural world. We will leave aside for the
moment the first sense. For knowledge then, there appear to be
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the two manifestations of reality to which thought can be
directed, and to either one of which priority could be given
in determining our judgment of the character of reality. It
might then be allowed as true that, if we should abstract
from one part - namely, personal life -, experience would not
lead us to a world- and life-affirmative view, and that at
the very least the world would not give any certain and
decisive evidence of a single life-regarding purpose. When,
however, such an interpretation has arisen, by virtue of sub-
jective experience, the aspects of the natural world are not
incompatible with that interpretation, if pleasure is not re-
garded as the highest value, and if due allowance is made for
limitations of our outlook. Then, too, personal life is not
so different from nature, for it also shows evil as well as
good. Taking personal life and nature as two materials of
experience, they present much the same phenomena of unethical
and destructive processes. All personal life, one's own as
well as that of other persons, when it is known objectively,
falls in with the natural world, and appears only as active force.
Its disposition toward ends and its element of moral obligation
are known only in intuition. The dualism of appearances is
thus not one that can be maintained as existing between the
natural world and personal life, but only between intuition
and objective observation; so far as it is represented in the
former way, it is a case of confusion.
Ultimately, then, a sharp and irreconcilable dualism in
experience, such as Schweitzer asserts, cannot exist, and is
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not retained in his thought. There is not finally a situation
in which different parts of reality are of different seeming,
but only different understandings of the same realities through
immediate intuition and objective experience. The latter never
exhibits any determination by moral obligation; that is known
only in subjective experience. This difference of intuition
and observation is an ineradicable one, but the apprehension
of moral disposition in self-experience is introduced as an
element in total experience. We do not allow the two impress-
ions to stand over against each other, creating two different
and unrelated attitudes. 1he types of experience come into an
organic whole, and the intuition determines how experience of
an objective sort is interpreted.
It must be recognized that Schweit zer does not sufficiently
justify this use of self-experience as a principle of inter-
pretation for all reality. The reasons for it which are more
or less clearly Implicit in his system are significant, but
they need to be supplemented before they can be regarded as
1
adequate or as able to carry general conviction. Neverthe-
less, the inner and outer experience which enters into life
cannot be kept distinct, but must be reconciled. Experience
has to be taken as one, and every element must be brought into
a coherent whole. This may give to some parts of experience
a different importance and meaning than that which they have
when isolated, but this does not mean that the conclusion
does not take them into account.
Stress upon certain often-neglected elements of experience -
such as moral experience - may be very desirable, but any
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conclusion which is based upon them must be able reflectively
to reconcile other experiences with them. In such a theory as
Schweitzer's for example, one is able to reject the primary
impression of objective experience only because one has a way
of regarding it which is thought to do justice to it in the
light of other experience. Philosophy may reinterpret some of
its experience in view of other experience, but it does not
base its view on some part of it rather than another; its con-
clusion is justified only if it can include all experience in
its view and still be warranted. It can say, as Schweitzer
does, that life-view is the decisive datum for its world-view,
not the product; but it must seek to bring the experience of
the natural world also into relation to its world-view.
From the above propositions, however, Schweitzer would prob-
ably dissent. They would in all likelihood seem to him to be
a compromise with the old attempt to derive the vital world-
view from a theoretical view of the universe which did not take
it into account as a primary and direct manifestation of real-
ity, and to threaten both the free spontaneous exercise of the
ethical will and the attainment of a correct world-view. There
is good ground for the fear, but what is essential in Schweit-
zer's view is the recognition of the primacy of life-affirmat-
ive will and of the dependence of world-view upon the exper-
ience of this fact, not a division of experience either into
two bodies of experience or two methods of experience, one of
which is rejected.
An illustration might help. To our sensory observation the
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sun apparently rises above the eastern horizon, passes over-
head and moves down the western sky. Our reason assures us,
however, as we take other data into account that the appearance
is due to a revolving motion of a round earth ,through which its
various faces are successively turned toward the sun. We do
not, then, speak of an irreconcilable dualism between observat-
ion and reason, because of the diversity of view, but incorpor-
ate and transcend the sensory impression in a larger process
of knowing in which the objective observation does not remain
what it was. There are not said to be two kinds of knowledge,
which contradict each other, but reason in the larger sense is
taken to involve the apprehension of the appearances and their
correction.
It might be replied that in the case of the illustration a
set of hypotheses are secured which make the appearances under-
standable, whereas in the case of the disteleological features
of the world, the hypotheses which have been advanced have
neither been faithful to the essential nature of the experiences
nor made the phenomena understandable. There is no set of prin-
ciples by means of which, without destroying the integrity of
moral judgment, I may understand in the particular features of
the world about me the operations of a reality in which life
and its activities have significance. Still, one does not have
two kinds of know ledge, which contradict each other, between
which one must choose, but one knowledge which is the result
of all varied experiences and of whatever adjustment one can
make between them by all the faculties of mind, and in which
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the individual features of experience do not remain what they
were in isolation. Knowledge may not be perfect, and some
features of experience may not be satisfactorily incorporated,
but the most comprehensive system of experience must be regard-
ed as true, Schweitzer 1 s proposal that world-view be based
upon the experience of ethical will in the self alone, separat-
ed from objective knowledge of the world and in complete inde-
pendence of it, is, then, in that form, philosophically unsound,
and impossible in the very nature of human thought. The sug-
gestion is at variance with the distinctive function of philos-
ophy to think experience together and as a whole. It is, of
course, understandable as a reaction against "philosophies"
which are based exclusively upon the data of descriptive sciences
of nature, and is even a preferable philosophy. Further, we
may allow to Schweitzer that our active optimism and ethical
will do not wait for an intellectual understanding of the natur-
al world, that they are not derived from it, but are primary
facts of which it must take account, and that when this is
recognized the free descriptive work of science may be contem-
plated without alarm. We cannot, however, secure any intellec-
tual peace or satisfaction through dividing experience into
non- communicating compartments, or keeping our experience of
ethical will and of the natural world apart.
8. Treatment of Value.
The treatment of value by Schweitzer is peculiar. One might
say that value experience is the foundation upon which he con-
structs his philosophy; and this is true in so far as it is
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the experiences of moral will, and of the disposition of regard
for life and for its objectives, which for him furnish the
basis for a conception of reality; but, on the other hand, it
is quite clear that Schweitzer does not regard effort for life
as justified by experience of value in it or in its spiritual
incidents. The value of life is an implication of the dispos-
ition to strive for it in one's self and to respect it and
promote it in others. In the case of service of other life,
for example, one does not have any rational theory of its value,
or any value experience of it, only a disposition of active
regard. The metaphysically real value of the forms of life is
in their character as phenomena of the universal V/i 11-to-Live
.
It might be granted that without a relation to an external
purpose any very abiding or significant value would not be con-
ceivable to thought, but without some experience of intrinsic
values in life, our notions of value, and our aspirations for
its more perfect fulfillment, would be meaningless, and active
effort for life could not be evoked. Schweitzer, however,
depends only upon the intuition that I am will-to-live. Ethics,
and metaphysics building from it, proceed from the inner impulse,
which is unrelated to value experience.
9. Irrationality in Ethics.
All conduct, in Schweitzer's view, so far as it is ethical,
flows from the nature of the individual. The ethical principle
is not purely formal as in t :e case of Kant, for there is appar-
ently a body of potentialities which the individual realizes,
but there is neither experience of value from which it proceeds,
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nor anticipation of definite values to which it is directed.
There are, however, serious objections to this. It officially
places the uncritical conscience above the rational conscience.
On the other hand, then, it has to admit obligations which
sometimes and in some measure set aside the impulse of humane-
ness. In this, however, it destroys the meaning, of ethicality,
if It can be distinguished from that which it is right for one
to do in any case.
In referring the rightness of acts solely to impulse, and
refusing to accord place to consideration of the rational con-
sequences, Schweitzer is illogical. Respect for life may be a
good designation for the general form of morality, if life is
not conceived too narrowly, but apart from experience it is
empty. What one does out of respect for life is indisputably
based on experience of its needs, of its experiences of value,
and of its methods of realizing them. This would have to take
consequences into consideration, and would not be genuinely
respect for life unless it had them in view so far as possible.
The question is only one of narrower or wider extension of
vision in the determination of the content of the disposition.
Unless Schweitzer would assert/ as he evidently does not, the
inclusion of all the features of life-respecting action in
intuition, a more or less extensive reference to value is nec-
essary. Without a fairly definite body of experience to guide
it, respect for life becomes mere regard for biological exist-
ence - self-preservation and preservation of life in others,
though this is not at all what Schweitzer has in mind.
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10. Account of Evil.
Another difficulty in Schweitzer 1 s system appears at this
point. If every existent is in its nature will-to-live, how
can it act in any other way than affirmatively of life? Row
does conflict enter in between the different phenomena of the
universal Will-to-Live?
Schweitzer* s answer to this question is only suggested.
He speaks of the Will-to-IAve as being in contradiction in
the Individual to its manifestation in other phenomena; but
how it enters upon this self-contradiction, or why it is div-
ided manifoldly against itself, he does not attempt to explain.
There is an implication that evil is negative - a weakening of
the will! Active vital regard for life is the good, and is
the nature of being; evil is the diminution, or want, of good
and of being. How evil enters in, or the will to live is
divided against itself, however, is not satisfactorily expounded.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN
THE FACTOR OF IMMEDIATE INTUITION
The heart of Schweitzer's philosophy is its non-rational
1
factor. He urges, it is true, the necessity of reflection
upon the fundamental questions of man's relation to life, to
world, and to fellowman, and of a world-view which is the pro-
2
duct of thought and capable of carrying conviction. In fact,
insistence upon thought about fundamental philosophical posit-
ions, and faith in rational reflection as the only means of
arriving at truth, are among the merits which are to be attrib-
uted to him. Bevond presentation of his own philosophical
outlook, Schweitzer seeks, if we may accept his assertion, to
contribute to the awakening of rational reflection upon the
fundamental problems of life. The only creditable and service-
able outlook on life, he urges with vigor, is one which the
individual has secured by reflection, and which can be Justif-
ied to thought. Schweitzer's system is in this, and we must
keep the point steadily in mind, distinct from the familiar
types of intuitionism. It is by no means his idea that feel-
ing and will should arrogate to themselves any freedom from
the criticism of thought. Nevertheless, it is still the case,
that the essential and vitalizing factor in Schweitzer's phil-
osophy is Its non-rational element, which depends upon immed-
iate intuition and is incapable of empirical confirmation or
rational justification.
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1, Analysis of the Intuitional Elements.
(1) Ethical Intuitionism. Ethical intuit ionism and intel-
lectual intuitionism are "both present in Schweitzer's philos-
ophy. On the ethical side, the principle of moral action is
freed from social connections which are commonly assigned to
it. It is not, either genetically or normatively, a represent-
ation of social codes, or of social tradition and development.
Neither is it directed to social objectives. In fact, it
might be said to have no objective or objectives at all. This
is, in one sense, incorrect, for it lias the objective of life
and its fulfillment, but even in this it acts on its own inner
impulse, and not on a rational judgment of the value of life
or an accounting of the outcome of its efforts.
Any hedonistic or utilitarian calculus for conduct is reject-
ed by Schweitzer. We have only to recall his assertions that
the less rational conduct is, in the ordinary sense of the term,
the more ethical it is, that the extent of self-sacrifice for
life cannot be rationally determined but must be decided by the
strength of the enthusiasm for iife, and that where intellectual
calculation of results and prospects of success enter in, it is
1
an indication of the decay of the moral sense. Thus, in the
personal and subjective determination of ethical conduct rep-
resented by S chwe it zer, there is freedom not only from social
dictation or objective canons, but also from the influence of
objective observation. The moral decision is autonomous and
categorical. To violate the subjective principle of morality
#
the principle which is given in the spirit, through any consider-
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ation of ends or results, whether personal or social, is to
incur guilt.
Although the ethical determination of conduct must be left
wholly to the individual, and to his subjective and unspoiled
impulses, however, the general form of morality can be specif-
ied - it is action in accordance with the principle of rever-
1
ence for life and for its aspirations and potentialities. For
no individual, in any situation, can the right course of con-
duct be determined by objective laws, but it must be inspired
by this spirit of respect for life. It cannot be reflectively
determined what this spirit requires, but conformity to its
impulse is regarded as the sole Tightness of conduct.
It would be difficult to classify this ethical intuitionism
of Scnweitzer 1 s . It includes some positive features of each
of the types, even of the mythical with its definition of con-
science as the voice of God; but it is not identical with any
of them. There is no inner power of judgment ?/hich discerns
and legislates with instant and infallible insight about good
and bad, right and wrong, in every case, but there is an inher-
ent and constitutive disposition which cannot be violated ex-
cept as a division and an abnormality of the will. There are
no innate ideas of right or wrong, there is no faculty of immed-
iate apprehension of a difference of better and worse, there is
no esthetic sensibility to fittness, but there is a striving,
on-going, creative disposition which is one's being and in which
one has a place in the universal creative Will. What its end
is, one does not know, but whatever meaning and value life has,
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lies in participation in it, and in unity with it through the
elimination of conflict between one's particular will and the
universal Will in its multiplicity of manifestations.
The impossibility of any genuinely rational canons of the
service of life and of self-sacrifice, arises from the wholly
non-rational character of our valuation of life and of its
furtherance at all. We do value life, and make efforts for
its preservation and furtherance, but we would be at loss to
show that such an attitude and behavior is rational. It would
be only for a few individuals, and for some part of their lives,
that the intrinsic pleasure could be considered to show any
positive balance; and there, it would seem to justify no great
sacrifice or endurance for its sake. Its tenure is so transient
and insecure; the cosmic place of any life among the myriads
of life and in the perspective of cosmic history is so insig-
nificant; its objective accomplishments, even in the case of
the most gifted and favored, are such meager and unimportant
things, in any unprovinclal prospect, and are so liable, even
ultimately certain, to be brought to nothing by the merest
chances and changes of history or of social conditions, or by
the simplest sports or processes of nature! The attempt to
show that the value which is attached to any life, either
one's own or that of another, is rationally justified, would
be a miserable failure.
Nevertheless, we do value life, and we strive with severe
labors, and sacrifice, to maintain and to further it. We can,
through such reflection as the above, introduce division into
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the will, and cause checking or thwarting of free effective
expression, but these are all features of repression of will
and of duality in it. They are definitely pathological cond-
itions of the spirit, and apathy toward life or attempts to
destroy life are rightly regarded as aberrations and abnormal-
ities which do not represent the coherent whole of will or the
real will of the individual. They are impulses, obsessions or
assertions of a partial mind, but will is always will-to-live.
We are will-to-live, and cannot, except in a pathological and
partial way, be any other will. The fundamental attitude, that
of respect for life, is something irrational, but yet thought
shows it as ultimate and authoritative. Our actual judgments
of worth go back to the worth of life as their presupposition.
Reflection, also, reveals one's nature as will-to-live, and
refers it to unity with the universal Will-to-IAve for its
meaning. It is this will which is the source and criterion
of moral conduct*
(2) Intellectual Intuitionism. Ethical intuitionism and
intellectual, or metaphysical, intuitionism are inseparably
connected in Schweitzer 1 s system. Not only is the rule of
conduct given in an inner disposition which is not based upon
consideration of objectives of action or upon prospects of
success, but the nature of reality is thought to be known
directly rather than inferred from its manifestations.
The knowledge Y/hich we have of reality, according to Schweit-
zer, is from within outwards. Reflection, to be sure, must
join with intuition in order to make it a genuine knowledge,
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for the naive attitude of life- and world-affirmation which
arises from the will-to-llve is not adequate, or able to main-
tain itself, but must be related to thought and replaced by
a thought-out form; and one*s philosophy is the result of two
factors: of consciousness of reality in one f s self as will-to-
live, and of reflection upon the Implications of this fact for
life and the world. Philosophy begins, hov/ever, with an Immed-
iately certain truth, instead of finding it as the conclusion
of a process of thought. It is, moreover, a truth which is
superior to the criticism of all objective experience. This
certain truth is no self-evident idea or axiom, but is immed-
iate self-experience . It is, thus, not a rational basis, but
in a sense an empirical one. The experience, however, is not
regarded as a phenomenon among others, to serve as the basis
of a generalization, but as an immediate apprehension of truth
by means of which all subsequent knowledge is possible; and is
thus rationalistic. Philosophical knowledge is not thought to
proceed by the extension of observation and collection of facts,
but by interpretation which has grasped the inner essence of
reality in Immediate intuition. On the other hand, the fact
must not be lost sight of, that the intuition is not a single
flash of experience. It is not proposed to take a lone, unrel-
ated experience as final, and as certified in its one moment of
occurrence. The experience of self, and that in the form of
active will for the maintenance and enhancement of life, is
a common element in all awareness; it is the vital, repeated,
1
constant form of experience.
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In what sense the experience is to "be considered as intuit-
ive and immediate, as contrasted with any experience whatsoever,
should be definitely examined. In the first place, that I am
will-to-live is asserted to be direct experience, and not an
inference from it. If so, it has this immediacy in common
with all experience. The will-to-live, further, is something
which cannot be known reflectively, but must be experienced.
The experience of myself as will-to-live , more distinctively,
is not by any of the channels of sense. It is not objective
experience at all. To affirm in reflection that I am will-to-
llve, the reality is nominally divided into subject and object,
but metaphysically, what has been treated in the two aspects
is identical. Schweitzer does not deal with the epistemolog-
ical questions, but no set of beliefs can escape being involved
1
with them. He does, as we have seen, reject idealistic eplste-
mology, or the notion of creative activity of mind in knowing.
He maintains the reality and objectivity of the known, and
treats the knowing relation as an external one. One knows
other phenomena of the will-to-live, not strictly empirically,
it is true, by observation of their behavior, but interpretat-
ively by analogy with one's self, still not by becoming ident-
ical with them. I may never be said to be one with any other
phenomenon of will-to-live , or with the universal Y/ill-to-LAve
in any other way than by agreement of will. I am never even
in the knowing-relation to the whole of reality, or the
essence of reality, but only to particular manifestations of
the will-to-live. Thus intuitionism of the traditional
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mystical sort is excluded. Knowledge Involves duality of
knower and known, but in the case of self-knowledge the dual-
ity is merely formal. The object of know ledge is not really
an other, only logically so. The form of reflective thought,
or intellectual apprehension, requires their distinction,
but knowledge arises in a unity deeper than the Intellectual
division. In the case of self-knowledge there is an immediacy
of apprehension which is unique, and which makes the knowledge
of reality in the self more direct than one's knowledge of it
in any other manifestation.
In the consideration of intuition in Schweitzer's philosophy,
however, there is involved not only the formal question of
method, but the questions of material or content. There belongs
to Schweitzer's system, as knowledge which is supposed to be
directly intuited, or at least is not referred to objective
observation, the voluntaristic spiritualism in the conception
of the self and of every existent, and in the notion of an
1
unoriginated universal Will.
In what way the latter bit of content is secured is a quest-
2
ion. That phenomena are not a^ collection of independent
realities, but are all manifestations of a single reality,
whose nature alone is in question, has the appearance of a
presupposition of Schweitzer' 3 philosophical cogitation. It
is certainly not the result of observation of the world.
Schweitzer does not regard the world as showing a purpo3iveness,
merely undecipherable as to its intent, but considers it to
be diverse and contradictory in its appearances, with no
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evidence of any unitary system or purposiveness • The belief
must in a certain sense, then, be intuitive. Schweitzer's
notion of the universal Will is, of course, not that of a
transcendent Deity, and its existence is not therefore a thing
to be inferred. The existence of the sum of the things which
exist is logically demonstrable. But that there is a common
spirit which exists in all of them, if it is not evidenced
by the manifestations can be known only in intuition. This,
of course, is not given in my daily-repeated experience of
myself as will-to-live. Of the nature of others there is no
direct intuition; I must know it by analogy. This method pre-
supposes, however, the knowledge of a similar nature at least,
or as Schweitzer thinks of it, a common nature in all. But
there is, we may repeat, no direct experience of the essence
of reality. Schweitzer has from some source, however, an
unwavering conviction of the community of the will in me with
the reality in all being. The conviction may be an Irrational
1
one which, as we suggested, rests in large measure on esthetic
feeling. It would apparently, however, in some degree also
depend upon the consideration that in this way alone meaning
is given to reality. This is, in other words, faith in the
relation or conformity of the human faculties to the environ-
ment, without which no thought is possible.
Intuitionism and apriorism merge in Schweitzer's system.
Thus, in the sphere of ethics, the value of life is not direct-
ly experienced any more than it is rationally demonstrated.
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Rather, it is the logical implication, the rational a-priorl,
of our will-to-live and of all our value judgments. It is on
that ground that respect for life, wherever it is found, grows
out of the naive will-to-live. Then, again, in Schweitzer's
metaphysical thought, the idea of the community of spirit in
all reality, except as it gains unrecognized support from
mystically colored esthetic experience, is, as was suggested
above, founded on its position as the .implication of any and
every truth.
That I am will-to-live, however, does not take a place as
inference or implication, but is regarded as immediate intuit-
ion. Furthermore, even though the worth of any life is not
directly experienced, but is only a rational implication which
is recognized by will when it becomes reflective, the will is
innately and by its nature, prior to intellect, life-affirmat-
ive or ethical. In the reflective realization of the nature
of itself and of all reality, release may be secured from some
of the contradiction which commonly exists between the will-
to-live in me and in other phenomena. However, since there
is not a material measure of the rightness or wrongness of
conduct, but only the criterion of expression of the inner
conformity to the disposition to preserve and enhance life,
the will-to- live is innately ethical will. The eternal, on-
going power in me and in the universe is not unqualified force,
but is creative will, directed to the production, maintenance
and perfection of life. It is not unequivocally manifest as
t
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such, or able to be known in that character from objective
observation of nature, but is experienced in that form in me.
So, in the knowledge which belongs to the content of intuition
there is included, not only the acquaintance with one f s self
as will, but as life-affirmative or ethical will.
2. Problems of the Doctrine of Intuition.
There are, then, several problems about the immediate int-
uition alleged by Schweitzer. These problems are: whether
his will-to- live is an actual experience; whether, if so, the
will is innate and primary, or is derived; what the extent
of the original nature and content of the experience is, if it
exists; what the relation of the disposition to ethical will
is; what degree of validity it has as an experience; what
implication its existence as experience has for what ought to
be; and what implication it has for what exists in a metaphys-
ical sense.
(1) Is the Experience which is asserted a Psychological
Pact? The questions interpenetrate; and the consideration of
one cannot be carried through entirely in distinction from
the others. We are interested first, however, in the quest-
ion whether self is actually experienced in the way which
Schweitzer asserts. That even below the level of conscious
purpose the native impulses and behaviors are directed to the
preservation of the life of the individual or of the species,
and that in the most highly conscious beings, a large back-
ground of intellect is made up of imperious dispositions which
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have the service of life as their end, are descriptive facts
which are among the best established material of the science
of psychology. But this cannot be the experience that Schweit-
zer means, for although he suggests it as instance of the non-
intellectual but fundamental nature of will-to-live within
reality, this is a body of external observations. It does
not enable us to know the nature of reality, particularly its
ethical character.
The experiences of will-to-live for which we are looking
are of an inner, intuitive sort. Whether there are such
experiences is a difficult question, and one which cannot be
answered decisively and finally by any individual. There are,
of course, experiences of distress at the suffering of others,
of empathetic sensibility in general, and of beneficent imp-
ulses. These appear, from Schweitzer's narratives, to be prin-
cipally what he has in mind; and he seems to be right in re-
garding them as on the whole the expressions of an innate
unreflective disposition rather than of experience or reason,
and as being in many cases checked by sensitiveness about
irrational tenderness or by considerations of inutility. It
may be said, however, that the sympathetic feelings and bene-
ficent impulses are not alone in human nature, but are accomp-
anied by contrary feelings and Impulses, so that personal dis-
positions are as indeterminate and equivocal with regard to
moral principle as the natural world appears to be. Schweitzer
would recognize that this is true of them as they present
themselves to external observation, and that will-to-live
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enters into conflicts with itself in different phenomena,
or even undergoes perversion in some circumstances; but he
holds that from within will is revealed, normally and univers-
ally, as will toward the preservation and enhancement of life,
and that there is no normal will against life, Schweitzer's
views are born out by personal experience; its testimony is
that there cannot be destruction of any life, or thwarting
of its efforts, however unimportant or worthless these may
seem to be from a rational point of view, without a sense of
guilt. Furthermore, with Schweitzer, it is believed that this
is, despite appearances to the contrary, a universal experience,
even where it is not admitted, and where it is dismissed as
irrational. We like, not simply for the sake of the feeling
of safety which it gives, but for the sense of secret kinship,
to read of irrational acts of sympathy in others whom we admire.
It is true that action has a great range of stimuli and patterns,
and that the objectives are varied, so that to say all action
has the preservation of life, or its enhancement, as its immed-
iate object is psychologically false. It is getting this
special object, or doing this particular thing, toward which
the individual strives, and with the accomplishment of which
he identifies himself. The particular ends are the things
sought, and activity may disregard the principle of respect
for life. This is responsible in large measure both for the
appearance of ruthlessness which belongs to much of conduct, and
also for the disregard of personal interests which constitutes
self-sacrifice. Still, whenever the consciousness of life
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and of purposive striving enters, the experience of regard for
it arises; it may be dismissed on one ground or another, but
it has been there.
There are probably persons in whom the experience is less
strong than in others. There are individual differences in
all psychological functions, but the disposition and experience
may be regarded as common and normal. Objective appearances
do not clearly manifest it, and there are individuals in whom
it does not seem to exist, or in whom its presence seems to be
contradicted. Where, however, this is not, as in the majority
of cases, due to suppression of natural feelings through one
type or another of self-regard or through considerations of
rationality, it gives the appearance of pathological pervers-
ion of a natural feeling. The power of vicious acts to catch
and fixate the attention of the mentally unstable, until their
impulse becomes overmastering, or, In other cases, the sense
of power and self-enhancement which they give, are due to the
strong impression of unnaturalness and abnormality which they
make.
While, then, it is noz denied that there are many and varied
tendencies which do not involve experience of reverence for
life, and which in their execution come into conflict with,
or override wi 11-to-live , it is accepted that such a disposit-
ion is a strong and definite element of Immediate experience.
Reflection cannot be considered to be its source or to support
it. Whether, however, it is to be regarded as an innate dls-
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position, is still a problem which cannot be considered sett-
led. It is clear that it is not established on theoretical
grounds, but it may, nevertheless, be constructed in the
course of early and simple experience. How this may occur,
can be seen through conditioned arousal in us, of sensations
and feeling tones which were originally due to action upon
our own organism. The common elements in the situations which
act as stimuli, hov/ever, do not appear to be sufficient, and
the character and content of the experience do not seem to be
adequately accounted for in this way. The experience is des-
erving of further psychological investigation, but it gives
the appearance of having an innate content or character.
There is, however, some indef initeness in Schweitzer 1 s
writings, about the experience in which respect for life is
given, whether it is in such experiences as are discussed above,
or is in an experience of personal will-to-live. There are
places where he undoubtedly suggests the former class of exp-
eriences, where he refers to them as the most vivid and sig-
nificant impressions of his life, and where he insists upon the
necessity of keeping them unweakened by consideration of ab-
1.
stract ends or of rationality. In other places, and in a
more definitely systematic connection, on the other hand, he
speaks of reverence for life as the immediate implication of
one's individual v/ill-to-live . Schweitzer quite clearly be-
lieves in the real and absolute value of life. This belief
he does not, however, refer to a direct experience of
value, and to it he does not assign the status of an intuition.
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The worth we attach to life is, nevertheless, non-rational,
since it is given in the non-rational dispositions of life.
The value of life is determined, however, Schweitzer seems
to assert, whenever he deals directly with the point, not as
the implication of my sympathetic and "beneficent dispositions,
"but of my will-to- live, though it would seem to "be as validly
the implication of the one as of the other, unless the latter
might possibly be more fundamental, and be the source of the
former.
Is there, however, an experience of will-to-live? If, as
we found reason to assert, there is experience of regard for
any life independent of, and even contrary to, rational judg-
ment of its value, and if this is a sympathetic projection
of dispositions which refer to the self, then there must be
such a subjective disposition. Again, we may note, perhaps
in other life better than in our own, that the individual exerts
itself constantly, and with intensity commensurate to necessity,
by the employment of unconscious function and Intellect alike,
to keep itself alive. This tells us something about Reality,
or about realities, but does not provide knowledge of any
general meaning or significance of life or the world, and it
is the knowledge from which Schweitzer distinguishes, and to
which he opposes, his intuition.
An immediate experience of will-to-live which can be con-
sidered significant, on the other hand, is somewhat elusive.
There is (in some respects comparable to the experiences we
have in relation to other life) the experience of panic at
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any suddenly presented prospect of imminent death, and of the
concentration of energy in a supreme effort to preserve one's
self. There belongs to the reaction itself, it is apparent,
more than is accounted for by previous experiences and their
elements of disagreeableness . We call it instinct, but the
instinct is simply the common behavior-pattern in which the
life-force expresses itself. It is highly probable that there
is more in the experience, over and above the presentative
elements, than the sum of the particular bodily sensations of
digestive, respiratory, circulatory, and muscular changes.
The positive assertion of an experience of some inherent force
in operation for the preservation of life, which cannot be
analyzed into such sensations, is not justified, however, and
is apparently not meant by Schweitzer,
If it is a question of conscious will-to-live , we must say
here again, that the usual experience of will is of the dis-
position to go to some definite place, to have dinner,, to read
a book, to make the goal in a game, or to achieve some one
of a number of definite objects. Certainly, if the matter
comes in question, however, I shall will to live. One may,
of course, as in the case of Jesus, choose to die, but that
is after all in affirmation of the actual worth of life, and is
an expression of will-to-llve in its fullest strength. In
any other form than this, we regard absence of the choice to
live as a symptom of ill-health, either physical or mental.
In the normal person, the suggestion may be entertained under
strain of excessive demands or of severe disappointments, but
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it Is not willed* But why do we so certainly will to live?
It is not that the experiences of value or the pleasantness
of life give this determination to conduct, but that this is
the nature or the disposition of the force which is in us.
But, by the experience of the will-to- live , Schweitzer means
more than this general and repeated choice to live. Even
where varied experiences, apparently not life itself, are
being sought, the will-to-live is manifested. Life as a spirit-
ual reality is the process of consciousness or of experiencing,
and in the effort of consciousness to maintain or sustain it-
self, and to find content, there is experience of the will-to_
live.
It is undoubtedly the experience of will-to-live in the self
which is fundamental. It is this experience which enables the
self to enter sympathetically into the understanding of other
beings and to adopt an attitude toward them of helping their
purposes. The native will-to-live which is experienced in
one's self, however, is not so narrow as the impulse to realize
and to preserve one's own life. The disposition which is immed-
iately experienced, and is inner and underived, is a disposition
of regard for life as such. So much as that, Schweitzer's view
would require. The mere will-to- live, in its common meaning,
cannot give the ethical conception of the nature of reality as
experienced in the self which Schweitzer holds, and insight
into reality through it would be no different than that through
objective phenomena. The will-to-live which is experienced, is
my inner will, but it is not a will directed solely to my exist-
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ence. It includes, together with my devotion to the further-
ance and perfection of life, regard for other will-to-live
,
and active sympathy with its efforts. This attitude, and the
valuation of life which it implies, have no inferential basis,
but are the ones which are inherent in the nature of reality,
(2) Is the Disposition Innate and Underived? The disposit-
ion of respect for life has been accepted as a fundamental and
characteristic experience, but the possibility that it is not
innate is not excluded. However, as has been pointed out, it
is not produced by observation and reflection, but is weakened
by them. It is not, moreover, the product of social education,
but on the contrary the individual shields his impulse from
notice as something which society would consider a weakness.
Schweitzer asserts that humaneness belongs to personal ethics,
whereas social ethics sacrifices it to material considerations
and abstract principles. The disposition seems also to go
beyond anything that is built up in affective experience and
its projection, and to be richer in its content than it.
This disposition, apparently innate, has been credited with
being wider than the tendency to self-preservation, - that is,
no less than a regard for life. But although an innate tend-
ency is recognized, this is not to be taken to mean either in-
nate ideas or an innate axiom. It is not primarily an intellec-
tual factor. It is a principle, but a formal one, and, at that,
of action, in so far as it is determined by the inner nature
which is unaffected in its disposition by objective observation
or by conclusions from it. Just as in the case of Kant's cat-
egorical imperative, however, the content of each act must be
t
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decided in the individual case; this is done autonomously and
on the motive of respect for life, but, nevertheless, the con-
tent of the act represents what has been acquired through ex-
perience. For instance, the consciousness of the existence of
life in Africa and of its needs, and the knowledge of the meth-
ods of medicine and surgery, are due to impression and to the
course of experience. That which is subjective and innate is
only the spirit of reverence for life in which the acts of
healing are done. The principle is not so empty or indetermin-
ate as Kant's mere rule of consistency, but it is a spirit
rather than a content, and it leaves the latter to be progress-
ively determined In experience. It is not an innate knowledge
of any facts or ideas, but it can exist non- conceptually, and
it 'becomes a maxim only when it is reflective about itself.
(3) The Relation of the Disposition to Ethical Will. How
the disposition to live is related to distinctly ethical action
has already been touched upon. If it were merely disposition
to live, this relation would present greater difficulties. The
activity which flowed from the impulse to* preserve life might
be considered to be perfectly natural, but there would be no
added meaning in designating it as ethical. The innate dispos-
ition, however, is not simply one of living itself out, but of
affirming life and its potentialities. Moreover it is free,
and may be either consistent with its own nature or untrue to
it; it may be in conflict with will-to-live in its otner mani-
festations, or in agreement with them. The disposition of
ethical life-regarding will is natural, but not necessary.
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Necessity does not attach to It, "but obligation. Schweitzer
holds a doctrine of an original perfection, fall, and salvation
in which what is by nature life-regarding will contradicts it-
self and then overcomes conflict in fellowship. In this, his
views are more suggestive of Neo-Platonic mysticism than at
1
any other point.
Schweitzer's ethics is both empirical and metaphysical. If
we take the actual facts of ethical judgment, he thinks, and
introduce consistency and unity of principle into tnem, the
common element of morality will be found to be respect for life
in its broad sense. The sense of obligation is a genuine elem-
ent of experience, and it originally attaches to responsibility
for life, Schweitzer believes, even though it is often confused
by various observations, social purposes and artificial ethical
systems. Regard for life is an inherent disposition, and has
implicit in it the factor of responsibility. The experience of
ought is derived from it, even though it has often become separ-
ated from It or turned against it. The healthy and unartific-
ial sense of obligation agrees with, or is, as a matter of fact,
identical with the disposition^of humaneness; and this disposit-
ion asserts itself in a sense of guilt, even when the individ-
ual tries to Justify unhumane acts by the rule of some rationally
determined Tightness.
(4) Implications of the Experience for Obligation. Schweit-
zer regards the sense of responsibility toward life as no
simply descriptive fact, but as constituting actual obligat-
ion, and as referring to real value. The disposition of regard
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for life is considered to be valid and authoritative. Schweit-
zer speaks of native and inherent rights of the individual
being, which are sacred and may be violated but never voided,
as the basis of our social conduct. Respect correlates to
genuine rights and actual value. Even granting, however, that
the feeling of respect for life and of responsibility in rel-
ation to it is real, the question whether the fact of valuation
establishes the real value of its object must be faced. The
fact that we can ask such a question indicates a distinction
between thought and reality, and brings to mind the occurrence
of contradiction and error in our experience. This dualism
in epistemology , and these contradictory experiences, make it
impossible to take experience as such as giving reality, or to
regard any experience taken by itself as final truth. No exp-
erience, however clear or significant in meaning, can escape
criticism or the need to validate itself. This is the weakness
of any of the traditional theories of intuition - mystical,
esthetic, or perceptual, and of realistic epistemologies.
Schweitzer's system meets the difficulty and faces the
problem with the following weapons. The actual value of life
does not have the status of a single impression, but is the
implication of all active dispositions and of every value exp-
erience. That this, then, agrees with objective reality dep-
ends upon faith in the conformity of our faculties to object-
ive reality. This cannot be proved, but it is a presupposit-
ion of all understanding. Unless we are to surrender meaning,
which is impossible to mind, we must find it through inner
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experience, and through faith that reality at large accords
with the fundamental and general characteristics of our being.
This must be true no less of the affective and volitional prin-
ciples of our nature, than of the intellectual. These are all
equally elements of reason, which, if we are to know reality at
all, must be taken as akin to reality in general and as rep-
resentative, in its processes, of it. This faith is that with
which, and with which alone, Schweitzer's philosophy is equipp-
ed to meet the problem of the meaning of subjective experience
for objective fact,
(5) The Metaphysical Import of the Experience. The quest-
ion of the implications of the innate experience of respect for
life, has been discussed above from the viewpoint of the bearing
of such a subjective experience upon any absolute obligation,
but it has involved the whole problem of the metaphysical imp-
ort of the intuitive experience. The consciousness of being an
active self directed to the perpetuation and rich elaboration
of life is not a conclusion of general objective observation
and inference from it, but is the general form of experience,
and the fundamental apprehension through which there exists a
principle for its interpretation. It is the beginning of phil-
osophical knowledge, and the factor through which it becomes
possible. The immediate intuition is self-experience , and the
nature of spiritual life in that experience is taken to be
representative of reality as a whole. The justification for
this is in the necessity, for knowledge, of an ultimate act of
decision among appearances, and in the fact that it is the
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nature of reality, as it exists in the will, which determines
the decision. The decision of will is not relative or
capricious, but it represents a universal determination of
reality. Knowledge of any sort depends upon such a faith in
the objective grounds and validity of the spiritual processes.
Thus the content of metaphysical apprehension is given in
immediate intuition, but the formulation of it, and the defense
of the viewpoint, is carried out in rational thought.

CONCLUSIONS
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN
PROPOSITIONS
The chief conclusions which result from the foregoing study
may be formulated in the following propositions:
1. The philosophical view to which Albert Schweitzer has
given expression in his Kulturphilosophie is not a complete
and systematic philosophy, in that it does not critically ex-
amine and justify all the particulars of procedure, method and
metaphysical theory which are Involved; but, despite this in-
completeness, it represents a comprehensive and elemental
philosophical outlook in which thought about life and its re-
lations achieves coherence, and in which significant unity,
direction and meaning for life are secured.
2. In his world-view Schweitzer is not, as has been repres-
ented, a literal eschatologist , a dualist or a positivist. The
semblance of the latter positions is due to a positivistic in-
terpretation of the work of the natural sciences, a contrast
of the apprehension of reality in the self through immediate
intuition, and in the natural world through objective observat-
ion, and a theory of the inadequacy of intellect alone for the
attainment of knowledge*
3. The basis for a world-view is found by Schweitzer in a
factor of immediate intuition, which is an element of direct
self-apprehension belonging to all experience and capable of
being the object of reflection. In this understanding and use
of it, such an element of experience is accepted as actual and
valid.
tt
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4. A theory of the definitely ethical character of reality,
regarded as essentially active and spiritual, which is dis-
covered in the immediate experience of it in the self, is one
of the most distinctive of Schweitzer's doctrines. Whether
this is the nature of self-experience, and whether it repres-
ents a native disposition, cannot be decisively determined by
the individual, but the suggestion is regarded as significant
and as possessing the appearance of being justified.
5. Schweitzer's metaphysical theory is a pantheistic
spiritualism of a voluntaristic type. Every existent is re-
garded as a will-to- live which is one of many individuated
forms of a universal Will-to-Live which has its reality in
them and in its eternally successive forms. The view is an
organic part of Schweitzer' s whole philosophical outlook. It
is not a manifestly impossible conception, but it involves
serious logical difficulties, and it makes the unity of the
ultimate metaphysical reality difficult, if not impossible, to
conceive in any adequate and satisfactory way.
6. In Schweitzer's metaphysical conception the influence
of Hegel's notion of the concrete universal is observable,
but an abstract Absolute and also Hegel's intellectuallstic
conception of reality are sharply rejected. Schweitzer is
influenced by Hegel's philosophy of history, but abandons the
dialectical conception at the point where progress is made
to result from the synthesis of contradictions.
7. The voluntaristic conception of reality is derived from
Schopenhauer, but through the interpretation of will-to- live
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out of inner experience of a moral sort, and through bringing
nature into relation to ethics rather than the reverse, Schweit-
zer separates sharply from him in a world- and life-affirming
attitude, which is like that of Nietzsche in its optimism
and enthusiasm, hut which is affirmative of gentleness, service
and self-sacrifice. In this optimistic voluntarism, despite
the influence of the above thinkers, the chief determining
factor has been a keenly sympathetic and strongly ethical
personality.
8, Schweitzer rejects the idealistic theory of perception
and epistemology. He holds that Critical Idealism is untrue
to our sense of reality in its epistemology, is without re-
lation to the realm of morality, and fails to arrive at an
interpretation of the world and Jife. He does not offer a
definite theory of perception, but his view is manifestly
realistic, though not that of naive realism, since he interprets
reality -as a community of active wills within an embracing
Will.
9* Schweitzer's philosophical construction involves the
employment of self-experience as a principle for the interpret-
ation of reality in general. He takes the self as representat-
ive of reality, and its processes, in so far as they are inher-
ent and universal in spirit, as valid for, and representative
of objective reality. Whether more or less consciously, this
assumption has commonly to be made for reason at least, and
what Schweitzer does is to make reason broader than intellect.
Schweitzer does not give a definite and adequate justification
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of the procedure, but it vrould seem to be, In its general
form, essential to any theory,
10, The feature of ethical intultlonism in Schweitzer's
philosophy does not refer to a divine revelation or a faculty
of infallible discrimination, but to a somewhat formal dis-
position in the nature of the self which it cannot deny without
violation of its character. Since this disposition is regard-
ed as fundamental in the nature of being, and is related to
the carrying out of a world purpose and process, not to the
realization of experiences which are regarded as pleasant or
as rationally desirable, the subjective ethical dispositions
are related to ultimate reality and given cosmic significance.
This is regarded as highly significant, as are also Schweit-
zer's liberation of the essential spirit of morality from
considerations of utility and his emphasis upon a fundamental
non-rational factor in ethics, in the element of moral oblig-
ation. Schweitzer must be regarded as erring, however, in so
far as he represents moral action as ultimately irrational,
even though it may be said to be such from the viewpoint of
immediate pleasure or utility.-
11 • Religion, In Schweitzer's view, becomes something
realized in ethical action. This does not mean that ethics
takes the place of religion, but that the religious spirit
and values are secured in different practices than those of
traditional religion. Though Schweitzer avows mysticism,
mystical experience as traditionally conceived in religion is
impossible in his system. Mysticism is present only in the

308
form of non-rational elements In knowledge (and ethical unity
with the Will-to-Live in its particular forms), and is accomp-
anied by insistence upon a reflective theory of life.
12. The spirit and method of Schweitzer's philosophy are
fundamentally rationalistic, "but it is his view that a reflect-
ive theory must discover and incorporate non-rational elements,
and further that the commitment of will to an active and
ethical optimism, in the case of the dualism of appearances,
represents something universal and is thus significant of the
objective truth of its Judgment.
13. Schweitzer's logic is not deductive but synoptic. It
can be considered as essentially the coherence logic. Some
incompatibility with the method of coherence and its criter-
ion appears in Schweitzer's insistence upon disregard of the
objective appearances of the world in our philosophical
theory, and of the rationally-determined value of the acts in
our ethics, but this is due to the attainment of an interpret-
ation of the objective phenomena as being different in their
essence from the appearances, and of the acts as manifestations
of a universal power whose significance for it is not known
or reckoned by our relative calculations. Thus these factors
are not left out of account, but are Interpreted in a new way
in which they can enter coherently into a more comprehensive
whole of experience which takes account of self-experience
and its element of moral obligation. The method, furthermore,
is synoptic in that, for the attainment of truth, it takes
into consideration all the faculties of spirit and its varied
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processes of intellection, evaluation and volition.
14. Empiricism has a place with rationalism and intuition-
ism in Schweitzer 1 s method. It is said that an adequate
world-view must be reflective, and that it must also allow for
non-rational elements, but the non-rational elements are
daily repeated experiences of the nature of the self. In
Schweitzer 1 s ethics, moreover, experience of an objective sort
is actually involved. In the first place, though the moral
disposition is not created by experience, it is called out by
it. Secondly, the disposition of regard for life is really
empty without experience, which reveals where life is, and
what methods one may use, or what ends one must realize, in
order to serve it.
15« In Schweitzer's philosophical method, as it is represent-
ed above, there is no wholly new feature. There has been
recognition before of the need of reflective establishment
of philosophical theory, of non-rational elements in thought,
and of the solely practical and descriptive character of the
natural sciences. But in the combination of them, the clarity
of their enunciation, and the manner in which they are used
to support each other in a philosophical theory which develops
from reflection upon the experience of reality in one's self,
they take on a new and vigorous form. This method, after the
doctrine of the distinctly ethical nature of reality as
known in immediate self-experience, is the most distinctive
feature in Schweitzer's philosophical theory, and its clear
proposal is a contribution to philosophical discussion.
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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
SUMMARY
The study of Schweitzer's philosophy, and exposition of
what is distinctive in its method and foundation, has been ob-
liged to take his life and works in their full scope into view.
This is not merely on account of anticipations of the theories
of the Rulturphi lo
s
ophl
e
in the earlier writings, although
tnere are such, but also because of the intimate relation be-
tween all aspects of Schv^ei tzer 1 s life and his particular out-
look. Every activity has its place either in the development,
or in the expression, of his view of the nature of reality and
of the principle of life. Accordingly, Schweitzer's personal
history, his treatment of Kant's philosophy of religion, his
theological writings, his musical training and study of Bach,
and his medical missionary work in Africa, have been presented
in some detail as preparation for his philosophical theories.
What is most distinctive in Schweitzer personally is the
depth and strength of his ethical character; and his primary
concern in philosophy is with the reflective foundations of
ethical judgment and obligation. These were sought in Critical
Idealism, with the conclusion that the theoretical considerations
of that system do not give rise to the ideas which are of moral
interest, aid that the ideas which belong to moral will are
distinct from those of theoretical reason and incapable of iden-
tification with Hiem. After a quest for the authority of the
moral ideas in historical religion, also, it was Schweitzer's
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judgment that our ethical dispositions and optimistic world-
view are not derived from those of Jesus and the early church,
but are different, and are nevertheless convincing and author-
itative .
In the study of Kant's religious and moral theory the feat-
ures which impressed Schweitzer were: the conception of the
innate and autonomous moral law, with its demand for perfection;
the notion of the ethical community in which the demanded per-
fection is alone possible, as the "Endzweck der Natur;" and the
conception of an ethical Creator which is realized in relation
to this idea - none of which belonged to the system of Critical
Idealism. What he found to be significant in Jesus was not His
specific ideas, but the spirit of uncalculating devotion and of
self-sacrifice for the social good, which he regards as of uni-
versal and ultimate authority. Knowledge of Jesus and of the
secret of His personality, he holds, do not come through histor-
ical understanding, but through surrender to His spirit.
Under the influence of these ideas, not yet developed into
a conscious world-view, Schweitzer put hls'attitude into ex-
pression in devoting himself to the medical relief of the neg-
lected natives of Africa. Through this object ifi cation, and
through accompanying reflection, his theories came to self-
conscious form, and were - expressed in his Kulturphi losophie .
The distinctly philosophical theory which belongs to
Schweitzer has been presented in this setting of his develop-
ment and work, and against that background the attempt has been
made to understand it correctly, and to isolate and examine its
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particular features. It is Schv/eitzer ' s theory that an active
and ethical world-view is not, and cannot be, founded upon
observation of the world about us, which never enables us to
know its significance for life. This world-affirmative and
ethical attitude, however, is primary in spirit, and is persist-
ent in the individual in the absence of theoretical grounds for
it, or even quite resolutely in opposition to them. It is non-
rational, and belongs to the fundamental nature of reality as
it is manifested in self-experience . Thus, although reality,
in its multiplicity of appearances, is equivocal for objective
experience, and does not reveal any single or unitary meaning,
the meaning of reality as active force directed toward the
production, maintenance, and enhancement of life is known in
subjective experience, - the only method of knowing through
which meaning is found. Reflection upon the disposition of
regard for life as a non-theoretical, inherent and underived
characteristic of reality as it is known in Immediate intuition,
though not by deduction from its various manifestations, gives
rise to a conception of reality as a multiplicity of forms of
will-to-live in which a universal and eternal Force which is
directed to the perfection of life, is expressed. Morality,
then, is regarded, not as being built up by experiences of
pleasure or utility, but as representing an inherent tendency
in which the purposiveness of reality is manifested. To be
ethical, accordingly, is not to act on considerations of
practical consequences, but out of the subjective world-affirm-
ative disposition and enthusiasm for life in which one is a
part of the universal process.
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It is shown In the above exposition that Schweitzer, in
interpreting the consciousness and ministry of Jesus as wholly
eschatolosical, is not himself a literal eschatologist , but
that he finds in the life of Jesus and the history of Christ-
ianity, evidence of the primacy and independence of moral
impulse in its relation to observation of the world and to
theoretical understanding. Furthermore, It is made clear that,
despite the extended and forceful denial of the possibility of
finding meaning in the world about us, Schweitzer is not, as
he has been represented, positivistic, but that he considers
a knowledge of reality as ethical Will to be given in immediate
Intuition of it in the subject. It is also shown that no
theory of a dualism between the world and the spirit is held
by Schweitzer, as has been claimed, but that the inherent
nature of the self is taken to be representative of a universal
reality. The disposition of Schweitzer to assume the last
point is regarded as referable, to considerable extent, to his
artistic disposition and to influences in the field of music,
but as having little specific logical justification in his
writings. The system as a whole is considered to be a note-
worthy example of a reflective philosophy of life, containing
both practical social values and significant theoretical
suggestions
.
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